Criteria for Judging the Unwholesomeness
of Actions in the Texts of Theravaada Buddhism
By Peter Harvey
University of Sunderland
School of Social and International Studies
Chester Road, Sunderland,
Tyne and Wear,
United Kingdom
ISSN 1076-9005 ; Volume
2 1995
Abstract:
After briefly reviewing
the role of ethics on the path in Theravāda texts, the article moves on
to discuss the various criteria for distinguishing between wholesome and
unwholesome actions. It then explores the gradation of unwholesomeness
of actions according to several variables, and then applies this to
wholesome actions, here highlighting the importance of right view.
Finally, the question of the relation between precept-taking and the
moral worth of actions is assessed.
THE PLACE OF ETHICS
IN THE PATH
In the perspective of
the Four Holy Truths, ethics is not for its own sake but is an essential
ingredient on the path to the final goal (though this itself includes an
ethical dimension). This is well expressed in a passage which explains
that "purity of virtue" leads onward to "purity of mind", this to
"purity of view", and this, through various stages of increasing
spiritual insight, to "utter Nirvana without attachment", "unshakeable
freedom of mind" (M.I.149-50). It is emphasised that while each stage
supports the next, the "holy life" is not lived for any of them except
the final one. This is because at any lower stage of spiritual progress,
there is still attachment and a person may become complacent, conceited
or arrogant about his or her attainments, thus barring further progress.
The foundational importance of ethics for the rest of the path is,
however, crucial:
So you see, Aananda,
wholesome virtues (kusalāni sīlāni) have freedom from remorse as object
and profit; freedom from remorse has gladness; gladness has joy; joy has
tranquillity; tranquillity has happiness; happiness has concentration;
concentration has seeing things as they really are; seeing things as
they really are has turning away and non-attachment; turning away and
non-attachment have release by knowing and seeing as their object and
profit. So you see, Aananda, wholesome virtues lead gradually up to the
summit (A.V.2).
In this process of
development, the cultivation of one stage is seen to lead naturally on
to the cultivation of the next, so that the components of the path
support one another and interact to form a harmonious whole. The basis
for them all, however, like the earth for plants or a foundation for a
building, is moral virtue (sīla) (Miln. 33-4).
"Defilements" such as
greed, hatred and delusion are seen to exist in the form of unwholesome
activities of body and speech, unwholesome thoughts, and the latent
tendencies in the mind which are the root of all these. Moral virtue
aims to restrain the external expression of the defilements, meditation
aims to undermine active defilements in the mind, and liberating
insight, facilitated by meditative calm, aims to destroy defilements in
the form of latent tendencies. These three levels of development can
perhaps be seen in the popular verse:
Not to do any evil,
To cultivate wholesome
action,
To purify one's mind--
This is the teaching of
the Buddhas (Dhp.183)
CRITERIA OF GOOD AND
BAD
Within Buddhism, the
most usual way of referring to a good action is to describe it as kusala:
"wholesome", in that it involves a healthy state of mind--stable, pure,
unencumbered, ready-to-act, calm and contented--or "skilful" in
producing an uplifting mental state and spiritual progress in the doer.
[1] A "bad" action is akusala: "unwholesome" or "unskilful". The
criteria for deciding what action is "unwholesome" and what is
"wholesome" are of three kinds.
The first type of
criterion concerns motivation. The three possible motivating "roots" of
"unwholesome" action (M.I.47) are: i) greed (lobha), which covers a
range of states from mild longing up to full-blown lust, avarice,
fame-seeking and dogmatic clinging to ideas; i i) hatred (dosa), which
covers mild irritation through to burning resentment and wrath; and i i
i) delusion (moha), the veiling of truth from oneself, as in dull, foggy
states of mind through to specious doubt on moral and spiritual matters,
distorting the truth, and turning away from the truth.
The opposites of these
are the three "roots" of wholesome action: i) non-greed, covering states
from small generous impulses through to a strong urge for renunciation
of worldly pleasures; i i) non-hatred, covering friendliness through to
forbearance in the face of great provocation, and deep loving kindness
and compassion for all beings; and i i i) non-delusion, covering clarity
of mind through to the deepest insight into reality.
While phrased
negatively, these three are nevertheless seen as positive states. The
importance of seeing the harmfulness of the unwholesome roots and the
benefit of the wholesome ones is emphasised in a number of texts. The
three roots of the unwholesome are seen as intertwined. Greed and hatred
are grounded in delusion, and greed may lead to hatred. It is said that
greed is a lesser fault, but fades slowly, hatred is a great fault, but
fades quickly, and delusion is a great fault and fades slowly (A.I.200).
This gives a clear indication of Buddhist values, especially the need to
develop wisdom--analytically directed intuitive insight--so as to
overcome delusion. It is also said that common motives for evil deeds
are partiality, enmity, stupidity and fear (D.ĪI.181-2), and that greed,
hatred and delusion can each lead a person to abusing others with the
thought "I am powerful" (A.I.201-02).
The second type of
criterion for what actions are unwholesome or wholesome concerns the
anticipatable direct effect of the action in terms of causing suffering
or happiness. This is shown by a passage where the Buddha advises that
one should reflect before, during and after any action of body, speech
or thought, to consider whether it might conduce to the harm of oneself,
others or both, such that it is unwholesome and results in dukkha. If
one sees that it will so result, one should desist from the action. If
one sees that the action conduces to the harm of neither oneself nor
others, nor both, it can be seen to be wholesome, with a happy result
(M.I.415-16). The "harm" to oneself which is relevant here is spiritual
harm, or material harm if this arises from self-hatred (e.g. by harsh
asceticism, M.I.342-9): an act which benefits others at the expense of
material harm to oneself is certainly not unwholesome. Harm to oneself
is also seen to arise as an immediate result of unwholesome action: "One
who is thus caught up, whose mind is thus infected, in the evil,
unwholesome states born of greed... of hatred... of delusion,
experiences suffering, stress, agitation and anxiety in this present
life" (A.I.202).
The third type of
criterion for what is wholesome or unwholesome builds on the second. It
concerns an action's contribution to spiritual development, culminating
in Nirvana. Thus it is said that unwholesome conduct is that which
causes injury, that is, having dukkha as fruit, due to leading to the
torment of oneself, others or both, and conducing to the arising of
further unwholesome states and the diminution of wholesome ones: that
is, having unhealthy effects on the psyche. Wholesome actions are of the
opposite kind (M.Ī.114-15). Moreover, "wrong directed thought", for
example, is said not only to conduce to the harm of self and other but
to be "destructive of intuitive wisdom, associated with distress, not
conducive to Nirvana", while "right thought" has the opposite effect
(M.I.115-16).
Overall, one can say
that an "unwholesome" action is one that arises from greed, hatred or
delusion (or a combination of these), leads to immediate suffering in
others and/or oneself and thus to further karmic suffering for oneself
in the future, and contributes to more unwholesome states arising and to
liberating wisdom being weakened. "Wholesome" actions have the opposite
characteristics. They arise from a state of mind which is virtuous, as
judged by the action's motive and the agent's knowledge of likely harm
or benefit, its contribution to the improvement of the character of the
person who does it, and thus its assistance in moving a person along the
path to Nirvana.
Using the above
criteria, one list of what is "unwholesome" specifies: i) onslaught on
living beings, i i) taking what is not given, i i i) sensual misconduct,
iv) lying speech, v) back-biting speech, vi) harsh speech, vi i) empty
gossip, vi i i) covetousness (abhijjhā), ix) ill-will (byāpāda), and x)
wrong view (particularly the view that one should not be held
responsible for ones actions, that actions matter). That is, wrong
action of body (i-i i i), speech (iv)-vi i) and mind (vi i i-x). What is
wholesome is restraint (veramaṇī)
from each of these (M.I.47). Such unwholesome actions are said to be "of
unwholesome will (akusala-sañcetanika), yielding dukkha, ripening in
dukkha" (A.V.292). Of these actions, only those relating to body and
speech would normally be seen as coming under the purview of the English
words "morality" or "ethics"; indeed the Pali word sīla, or "moral
virtue", has a similar range. That which is "wholesome" or
"unwholesome", then, goes beyond purely moral considerations to include
states of mind, which may have no direct effect on other people. All the
factors of the Eightfold Path, for example, are seen as "wholesome".
INTENTION, KNOWLEDGE AND
DEGREES OF UNWHOLESOMENESS IN ACTIONS
The degree of
unwholesomeness of an action is seen to vary according to the degree and
nature of the volition/intention (cetanā) behind the action, and the
degree of knowledge (of various kinds) relating to it. An action becomes
more unwholesome as the force of the volition behind it increases, for
this leaves a greater karmic "trace" on the mind. The Theravādin
commentator Buddhaghosa discusses the unwholesome act of "onslaught on
living beings" as follows:
"Onslaught on living
beings" is, as regards a living being that one perceives as living, the
will to kill it, expressed through body or speech, occasioning an attack
which cuts off its life-faculty. That action, in regard to those without
good qualities (guṇa)-- animals
etc.--is of lesser fault when they are small, greater fault when they
have a large physical frame. Why? Because of the greater effort
involved; and even where the effort is the same, due to the greater
substance of animal. In regard to those with good qualities-- humans
etc.--the action is of lesser fault when they are of few good qualities,
greater fault when they are of many good qualities. But when size or
good qualities are equal, the fault of the action is in proportion to
the intensity of the mental defilements and of the attack. Five factors
are involved: a living being, the actual perceiving of a living being, a
thought of killing, the attack, and death as a result of it. There are
six methods: with one's own hand, by instigation, by missiles, by
contrivance (trap or poison), by sorcery, by psychic power (M.A.I.198).
[2] Here, one can see that an act is the worse according to the strength
and perversity of the volition motivating and accompanying it. To kill a
virtuous human, or a respect-worthy one such as a parent is particularly
perverse (D.I.85; Vibh.378), just as giving to a virtuous person is
particularly good (A.IV.237-78). That killing in a state of intense
defilement is worse, would mean that premeditated killing, from a mix of
greed, resentment and also delusion, would be very bad.
Other factors which are
seen to affect the degree of unwholesomeness of an action are the degree
of both intention and knowledge involved, and one can outline five
levels of unwholesomeness accordingly:
i) An action performed
without intending to do that particular action, for example accidentally
treading on an insect, without any thought of harming, or doing
something when one is insane.
Such an action is not
seen as unwholesome, blameworthy or as generating any bad karmic
results. This can be seen from the fact that it is said that to
accidentally crush worms while crushing sugar cane for its juice is not
blameable (Miln.166) though to deliberately kill any living being is
morally blameable. Moreover, there is no offence for a monk if he kills
a living being unintentionally, not realising that his actions would
harm a living being (Vin.IV.125). Likewise, in the case of the monastic
offence--normally entailing defeat in the monastic life--of deliberately
killing a human, "there is no offence if it was unintentional, if he did
not know, if he were not meaning death, if he was out of his mind..."
(Vin.I I I.78; cf.Vin.I I.91). Again, a monk who breaks a monastic rule
when mad does not commit an offence (Vin.IV.125). What, though, of an
act which is not intended to harm any being, but is such that one knows,
or has strong reasons to expect, that a being or beings will be harmed?
For example, crushing the sugar cane when one knows, or strongly
suspects, that it contains worms? Or driving a car on a hot day when it
is very likely that many insects will be killed? Are these cases of a)
culpable carelessness, or b) simply a lack of extra-mile altruism?
i i) If one knows that
a certain kind of action is evil, but does it when one is not in full
control of oneself, for example when drunk or impassioned.
This is a lesser evil
than if one did it with full knowledge of what one was doing, and with
full intention. The Milindapañha discusses the case of a Jātaka story
(no.433, J.I I I.514-19) where the Bodhisattva, as an ascetic,
sacrifices (or almost does?) many animals when a king says that he can
marry his beautiful daughter if he does so (Miln.219-21). The
Milindapañha says that this was an action done when he was "out of his
mind (visaññinā) with passion, not when he was thinking of what he was
doing (sacetanena)". The action was not in accordance with his nature
for he was "unhinged, impassioned. It was when he was out of his mind,
thoroughly confused and agitated that, with thoughts confused, in a
turmoil and disturbed", like a madman. Thus it is said that "Evil done
by one who is unhinged...is not of great blame here and now, nor is it
so in respect of its ripening in a future state". Thus, full insanity
excuses an act, while a temporary "unhinged" state, from passion or
drink, means that there is little moral blame or karmic effect; getting
into such a state can be held to be blameworthy, though.
i i i) If one does an
evil action when one is unclear or mistaken about the object affected by
the action.
This is moderately
blameable. Thus, while it is an offence requiring expiation for a monk
to intentionally kill a living being, it is a lesser offence, of
"wrong-doing", if a) he is in doubt as to whether it is a living being,
or b) if he tries to kill a non-living thing that he thinks is, or might
be, living, for example by shooting an arrow at it. There is no offence,
though, if he fires an arrow at a living being not knowing that it is a
living being (Vin.IV.125). An attempt to use such reasoning to lessen
the evil of an action can be seen in the actions of the Buddhists of
Zanskar, a Kashmiri valley bordering Tibet, who feel that they have to
kill predatory wolves. The killing is done as indirectly as possible:
after luring the wolves into high-walled stone traps, large stones are
thrown over the wall by a group of people--consequently nobody knows for
sure who kills the animals. In this way, the people seek to put a
distance between themselves and what they see as a practically necessary
evil. One might compare, here, the practice sometimes used in firing
squads, where not everyone's rifle has live ammunition in it, so that no
one actually knows whether they have fired one of the fatal shots!
iv) An evil action done
where one intends to do the act, fully knows what one is doing, and
knows that the action is evil. This is the most obvious kind of wrong
action, with bad karmic results, particularly if it is premeditated.
v) An evil action done
where one intends to do the act, fully knows what one is doing (as in
iv), but do not recognize that one is doing wrong. This is seen as the
worse kind of action. Such an action is discussed at Milindapañha 84,
which says that if an evil action is done "unknowingly (ajānanto)", it
has a worse karmic effect than if it is done "knowingly". This is
illustrated by saying that a person taking hold of a red-hot iron ball
is more severely burnt if he does so unknowingly. This suggests that an
evil action--such as intentionally killing a living being (Miln.158)--is
the worse if it is done without hesitation, restraint or compunction.
This will be the case if an action is not seen to be wrong, as there
will be no holding back on the volitional force put into the action. On
the face of it, this may seem unjust but perhaps not on further
reflection. In an English court of law, the "ring-leader" of a crime is
often punished more harshly than those who were led on,
half-reluctantly. The leader may well be held to see no wrong in the
action--e.g. by showing no remorse--but the others have some
compunction. Relevant to this is the case of doing a so-called
"necessary evil", for example killing an enemy to prevent one's country
being invaded. Here, a recognition that such an act is still evil is
preferable to a glorying in the act. Indeed, some of the worse crimes of
the twentieth century have been carried out under the banner of an
ideology which saw them as "right" actions: Hitler's Holocaust, Stalin's
purges and the Khmer Rouge's murder of many Cambodians. If one has the
wrong view, for example, that one belongs to the "master race" and that
Jews are "vermin" who should be killed, one is not likely to hold back
in one's evil actions. Here, wrong physical action is both accompanied
by and strengthened by wrong view. [3]
Milindapa~ha
Ṭīkā 29, on Milindapañha 158,
talks of the "non-knowing of evil (pāpa-ajānana)". Note that in the
monastic discipline, the only viewpoint that a monk can be disciplined
for is the persistent claim, even when admonished, that what the Buddha
calls "stumbling blocks"--namely sense-pleasures--are no stumbling
blocks in the spiritual life (Vin. IV.133-36). Elsewhere, such an "evil"
view is said to generate much badness-power (apuñña) (M.I.132). That is,
to deny that something reprehensible is reprehensible is particularly
blameworthy.
The above may perhaps
be clarified by tabulating what is said of particular kinds of actions
which are unwholesome when intentionally and knowingly done:
i)
i i) i i i) iv) v)
One intends to do a
specific act
No Min
Part Yes Full or Yes
One is in a state of
mind in which one knows one is doing that act No Min
Part Yes Yes
One knows the act to be
wrong, if it is intentionally done Yes Yes Yes
Yes No
The act is unwholesome
No Min Part Full More
Key:
Min: Minimally
Part: Partially
Full: Fully
More: More than normally
so
Here, it can be pointed
out that there are different kinds of "ignorance", only some of which
excuse an action. If one knows that sentient beings should not be
harmed, but not that one's action is actually harming one, this
"ignorance" as to a matter of ordinary fact excuses one. The spiritual
ignorance which leads one to deny that harming living beings is wrong is
no excuse, however, but compounds a wrong action. Of course, in
Buddhism, lesser degrees of spiritual ignorance--lack of spiritual
insight--are seen to affect all beings until they are enlightened. This
forms a background to all unenlightened actions, good or bad, though
specifically feeds into wrong actions when they are "rooted" in, that
is, motivated by, delusion: "whatever unwholesome states there are, all
are rooted in spiritual ignorance... are fixed together in spiritual
ignorance", like rafters in a roof-peak (S.Ī.263). Among other things,
spiritual ignorance feeds the "I am" conceit: the conviction that one
has a permanent, substantial, essential Self to protect and bolster up
the root of selfishness.
It is no coincidence
that the Buddha's criticism of people is not couched in terms of them
being evil or sinful, but usually in terms of them being a "fool". It is
said that a person is known as a "fool" by immoral conduct of body,
speech and mind, just as a wise person is known by moral conduct, and
that the fool does not recognise a transgression for what it is
(A.I.102-03), nor to accept another person's acknowledgement of having
committed a transgression (A.I.59). That is, it is good to see one's own
faults and pardon those of others. Indeed, "a fool who knows he is a
fool is to that extent a wise person; the fool who thinks he is wise is
called a fool indeed" (Dhp.63). Given this, it is clear that one is, for
example, doing a slaughterer a favour if one tries to get him to see
that what he is doing is wrong (though to do so in an aggressive manner
is unwholesome as it is an expression of ill-will). Even if he carries
on in his trade, he is better off if he is at least uneasy about what he
is doing.
Of course, this assumes
that there is such a thing as objectively wrong actions. Only then does
it make sense to say that one could be mistaken in holding something not
to be wrong. Given Buddhism's clear criteria of what is unwholesome
action, it is quite happy to agree to this: an action's "wrongness"
subsisting in a combination of the action itself and the state of mind
in which it is done. It is not a matter of what a person happens to like
or dislike (emotivism), nor of what his society happens to approve or
disapprove of (cultural relativism). [4]
Parallel things to the
above could mostly be said for good actions: i) an unintentionally
beneficial action is not to one's credit; i i) a beneficial action done
when one was in a disturbed state is only of little credit; i i i) an
action done when one is unsure there is someone to benefit from it is
moderately good; iv) an intentional good action is straightforwardly
good. The parallel breaks down at v), though: if one thinks that a right
action is a wrong one but still does it, one will do it with
compunction, such that it is a less good action than it would otherwise
be. This perhaps shows the potency of "right view". Indeed, it is said
that the thing which is the greatest cause of the arising or increase of
unwholesome states, and the nonarising or decrease of wholesome states,
is wrong view. It is likewise seen as the greatest cause of rebirth in a
hellish realm. For one of wrong, evil view, whatever deeds of body,
speech or mind "undertaken in complete accord with (that) view, whatever
volitions, aspirations, resolves, activities, all those states conduce
to..ṣuffering" (A.I.31-2; cf.
M.ĪI.178-79). The opposite is said of right view. As a wholesome mental
action, right view is defined as holding that good and bad actions do
have results beyond this life, and that spiritually developed people
have knowledge of such things, wrong view being to deny this:
i) there is gift, there
is offering, there is sacrifice;
i i) there is fruit and
ripening of deeds well done or ill done;
i i i) there is this
world, there is a world beyond; iv) there is
mother and father; v)
there are spontaneously arising beings;
vi) there are in this
world ascetics and brahmins who are faring
rightly, practising
rightly, and who proclaim this world and the
world beyond having
realized them by their own super-knowledge
(M.ĪI.72, numbers
added).
A partial "good"
parallel to v) would be doing a truly good action even though others say
it is a bad one. Here, great determination is needed, so the action can
be seen as a very good one. Another partial parallel is where a young
child does a good action even though he or she has not been told it is
"good". An example, here, is given at Asl.103. A young boy is told to
catch a hare to feed as medicine for his sick mother; he could not do
so, though, for he intuitively recognized that it was wrong to kill.
PRECEPT-TAKING AND
MORALITY
This raises the
question, though, of whether it is worse to do an unwholesome action
when i) one has formally undertaken not to do so, or i i) when one has
not so undertaken. If one undertakes the precept of not stealing, this
must be because one recognises that such an action is unwholesome. If
one then breaks the precept, while one does not do so in ignorance of
what is right and wrong (as in v), above), one is also breaking a
promise: not to steal. Unless this is a premeditated lie, though, it
perhaps does not outweigh the goodness of the original
promise/resolution to avoid stealing. As expressed by Tatz, "To act
morally in accordance with a vow is considered more beneficial than to
act morally without one, because the moral conduct is associated with
progress toward a higher goal". [5] To break a moral precept which one
is generally seeking, and succeeding, to follow, would thus be better
than to go against one that one has not formally undertaken.
What, though, of the
many monastic rules undertaken by a monk or nun, but not by a
lay-person? The most obvious one of these is the avoidance of all sexual
activity. Sexual activity is acceptable for a lay-person, provided it is
within certain moral bounds. A monk undertakes to avoid it, as a crucial
part of his training to overcome all greed/attachment, hatred and
delusion. Any act of sexual intercourse will then lead to "defeat" in
the monastic life, and expulsion from it. In this case, it is seen as
better not to take the relevant precept, by remaining a lay-person, or
disrobing, than to take it and then break it. This is partly because of
the solemnity of the monastic vows, and the obligation a monk has to
make himself worthy of the alms of the lay-people who support him, and
so not betray their faith. One could also say that sexual activity is
not itself immoral, so it only becomes blameworthy if indulged in after
vowing not to do so (or if done in a way involving suffering to others).
Here, a useful distinction is made by Asa"nga: between the ten
unwholesome courses of action (above), which are "reprehensible by
nature", and most of the monastic rules, which are "reprehensibly only
'by precept'", as breaking them brings no direct harm to others. [6]
Likewise, the Abhidharma-Ko"sa (IV.122bc) says that some things are not
immoral, dauh"sīlya, but are prohibited by the Buddha for monks, for
example eating after noon.
Another potentially
problematic issue is the case, for example, of a person who steals so as
to feed his starving mother. This would be seen as an act which is a
mixture of bad and good, in which the good aspect helps counterbalance
the bad, especially if the theft is done in recognition of the wrongness
of stealing. Buddhism acknowledges that poverty in a society makes theft
more likely (D.I.76-7). While poverty does not excuse theft, it can be
seen to make it less blameable.
CONCLUSIONS
The perspective of early
Buddhism views morality as part of a spiritual path which largely
consists of cultivating a more wholesome character: by undermining
moral/spiritual defilements and cultivating counteractive virtues. This
process of--generally gradual-- transformation is seen to culminate in a
state of liberation from all traces of greed/attachment, hatred and
delusion, and their consequent suffering, through the experience of
Nirvana. Such a vision assumes that people have no fixed, unchanging
Self, but are capable of radical transformation, brought about by
attention to the nature of one's mind and actions.
Attention is given to
actions out of a concern for: a) the happiness/unhappiness that actions
directly bring to the agent and others; b) moral praise and blame, or
sanctions within a monastic community; c) contribution to spiritual
development, or its opposite; and d) the natural karmic effects that are
seen to arise, in the future, for the agent.
All of this entails
that what one does, and how and why one does it, is of great import: for
one's actions both express and shape one's character, and contribute to
one's destiny. Much emphasis is put on the state of mind, and intention,
lying behind any action--yet some actions are identified as always
unwholesome to some degree, dependent on precise motivation.
Consequently, it is good to not only seek to avoid such actions, but to
formally vow to avoid them.
Criteria are spelled
out to identify, in as objective a way as possible, which
action-intentions should be recognised as morally unwholesome or
wholesome. In this, ignorance of ordinary matters of fact is seen as
excusing what might otherwise be seen as an unwholesome action, but
moral/spiritual ignorance is seen as compounding an action's
unwholesomeness. That is, to perform an unwholesome action while
claiming or regarding it as acceptable or wholesome is seen to be
particularly perverse. In other words, it is held that some
action-intentions--primarily those that deliberately cause harm to a
sentient being--are wrong, and that it is wrong to deny this and to act
on this denial, or from moral blindness.
Such moral objectivism
is derived from: a) the notion that we all have a natural sympathy for
the plight of others, however much we try to ignore, or bury it; b)
acting in accord with, and strengthening, this sympathy naturally leads
to more happiness and less suffering for oneself and those one interacts
with; c) no substantial, permanent Self or I exists, and actions
selfishly rooted in the I-view or -attitude are out of accord with
reality, so as to be both morally unwholesome and naturally productive
of unpleasant karmic result.
Of course, for
Buddhism, an act is seen to have unpleasant karmic results because it is
wrong; it is not seen as "wrong" because it happens to produce bad
karmic results. A final point is that it is better to do a wrong action
with compunction than without compunction (though subsequent guilt-trips
are not encouraged, as they lead to an agitated, beclouded mind-state).
Moreover, a key aid to moral development is the formal avowal of certain
moral precepts, which are seen to strengthen one's moral vision and help
to increase the momentum of moral development. In other words, it helps
to have some moral "aims and objectives" that one agrees with and can
happily affirm, even if one is not always so good at achieving them!
NOTES
[1]. P.A. Payutto, Good,
Evil and Beyond: Kamma in the Buddha's Teachings (Bangkok: Buddhadhamma
Foundation, 1993): 19. Return
[2]. E. Conze, Buddhist
Scriptures (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1959); cf. Khp.A.28-31. Return
[3]. Cf. Payutto, Good,
Evil and Beyond: Kamma in the Buddha's Teachings: 62-65. Return
[4]. D. Keown, The
Nature of Buddhist Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1992): 64 & 231-232.
Return
[5]. M. Tatz, "Asa"nga's
Chapter on Ethics", Studies in Asian Thought and Religion, Volume 4
(Lewiston/Queenston: Edwin Mellen, 1986): 13; On vows (saṃvara),
see Abhidharma-Ko"sa 4: 43-51. Return
[6]. Tatz, "Asa"nga's
Chapter on Ethics": 10. Return
Copyright 1995
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Source: http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/
Update: 01-12-2004
