"Cutting the Roots of Virtue:"
Tsongkhapa on the Results of Anger
By Daniel Cozort
Assistant Professor of
Religion, Dickinson College
ISSN 1076-9005, Volume 2 1995
Abstract:
Anger is the most
powerful of the kle"sas that not only "plant seeds" for suffering but
also "cut the roots of virtue" for periods of up to a thousand aeons per
instance. This article examines and assesses the exegesis by Tsongkhapa,
founder of the Tibetan Gelukba order, of Indian sources on the topic of
anger. It argues that despite Tsongkhapa's many careful qualifications
he may not be successful in avoiding the conclusion that if the sūtras
are to be accepted literally, there almost certainly will be persons for
whom liberation from saṃsāra is
precluded.
INTRODUCTION
Among the six root
afflictive emotions (nyon mongs, kle"sa) identified in the Buddhist
Abhidharma literature as the causes for episodes or entire lifetimes of
suffering, anger (Tibetan: khong khro, Sanskrit: pratigha) holds a
singular place. It is one of a few mental states[1] that not only
establish "seeds" or "roots" of nonvirtue, but also nullify the seeds or
roots of individual virtue planted by exemplary actions such as giving
and patience. Among these states, anger is uniquely destructive. The
Mañju"srīvikrīḍita Sūtra warns
that a single moment of anger can result in a person's loss of a hundred
aeons of virtue.[2] "Sāntideva, the ninth century author of the greatly
influential Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra multiplies this dire warning tenfold
(chapter 6, verse 1): anger wipes out not just a hundred, but a thousand
aeons of virtue.
Since most people lose
their tempers with dismaying frequency, it seems reasonable to wonder
how, from a Buddhist perspective, it is possible simultaneously to
contend that a mere outburst can have such an extraordinarily negative
effect and to assert, as Mahāyāna Buddhists generally do, that all
sentient beings will gain merit sufficient to attain liberation. It
appears that apologists for the Mahāyāna tradition have a heavy
burden--they must either interpret statements about anger's effect on
the stores of virtue as gross exaggerations spun out as a matter of
"skill in means" (thabs la mkhas pa, upāya-kau"salya), delimit the range
of persons to whom they are said to apply, or indicate ways in which
anger's effects can be ameliorated.
Tsongkhapa Losang
Drakba [3] (tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419), founder of the
Tibetan Gelukba (dge lugs pa) order, uses the latter two routes in his
extensive analysis of anger. I will examine portions of his Great
Exposition of the Stages of the Path (completed in 1402) and his
Illumination of the Thought, Extensive Explanation of (Candrakīrti's)
Madhyamakāvatāra (1418) where Tsongkhapa meticulously scrutinizes the
Indian sources. In these works he assesses the importance of the status
of the recipient of anger and attempts to explain what precisely it does
and does not mean to "cut the roots" of virtue for the incredible spans
indicated in the Indian sources.[4] In the process, he manages to limit
significantly the scope of the Indian sources, explaining that they
refer only to anger at bodhisattvas and that "cutting" the roots of
virtue means something far less than "destroying." However, it is not
clear that, in the end, Tsongkhapa has succeeded in demonstrating that
anger does not, at least in some cases, prevent salvation.
QUANTIFYING THE PENALTY
FOR ANGER
Although clearly the
Buddha regarded anger as a massively destructive force, sūtra sources
that quantify its effect are noticeably scarce. Tsongkhapa cites the
Upāliparipṛcchā Sūtra, the
Mañju"srīvikrīḍita Sūtra, and
the Sañchayagāthāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra. The Upāliparipṛcchā
Sūtra[5] warns that there is no greater cause for elimination of the
roots of virtue "than when one spiritual adept (brahmacārya) abuses
another," but it does not specify how great that loss might be. For
that, the locus classicus appears to be the aforementioned
Mañju"srīvikrīḍita Sūtra which
warns that one may lose a hundred aeons of virtue in a moment of anger.
Candrakīrti (7th cent.), the Mādhyamaka interpreter through whom
Tsongkhapa views nearly all important matters of Buddhist doctrine,
possibly basing his estimate on this source, also states that anger
destroys a hundred aeons of virtue (Madhyamakāvatāra 3.33):
Therefore, anger toward
a Conqueror Child
Destroys the virtue
arisen from giving and ethical discipline,
Accumulated over a
hundred aeons, in a moment.
Candrakīrti clarifies
the sūtra by indicating that hundred-aeon anger is directed at a
"Conqueror Child," or bodhisattva--a person who, for Tsongkhapa, has an
aspiration to Buddhahood both altruistic and spontaneous (but who is not
necessarily someone who has amassed significant amounts of merit or
wisdom). This, of course, greatly reduces the probable instances of
hundred-aeon anger by an ordinary person. Tsongkhapa also cites
"Sāntideva,[6] who without specifying the recipient of anger, says
(Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra 6.1):
Whatever good deeds [you
have done],
Collected over a
thousand aeons,
Such as giving and
homage to the Ones Gone Thus
Are destroyed in one
[moment of] anger.
Aware that Candrakīrti
has specified that the recipient of hundred- aeon anger is a
bodhisattva, he surmises that the recipient of the thousand-aeon anger
mentioned by "Sāntideva must also be a bodhisattva and, moreover, that
the angry person must be a non- bodhisattva.[7] If this is what
"Sāntideva meant, we might suppose that a thousand-aeon penalty would be
a rather rare occurrence. Given a bodhisattva's generally benign
behavior, presumably a bodhisattva would rarely commit acts that would
spur the wrath of others.[8]
Continuing with this
line of reasoning, Tsongkhapa concludes that if the supreme penalty for
anger involves a non-bodhisattva's anger with a bodhisattva, then
Candrakīrti's reference to a lesser penalty that also involves anger
with a bodhisattva can only mean that one bodhisattva is angry with
another. It is surprising to learn that bodhisattvas ever get angry,
since they are, for Tsongkhapa, persons always able to rouse their
bodhicitta, the altruistic aspiration to Buddhahood. However, although
bodhicitta can arise spontaneously, it is not continuously present in
non-buddhas, and at least some bodhisattvas are susceptible to anger for
nearly all of a period of "uncountable" aeons. This is the length of the
paths of "accumulation" (tshogs lam, saṃbhāramārga)
and "preparation" (sbyor lam, prayogamārga), the first two of the five
paths concluding in Buddhahood.[9] Anger is not precluded until one is
well into the path of preparation, the second part of which is called
"peak" (rtse mo, mūrdhan) because it is the end of the period in which
one can generate anger that will sever the roots of virtue. At least one
contemporary scholar says that a bodhisattva may become angry even after
that point, but the anger is weaker than the anger to which the
quotations refer and will not sever the roots of virtue.[10]
Tsongkhapa is very
specific about the consequences of being an angry bodhisattva. A mature
bodhisattva who is angered by one who is lesser[11] loses a hundred
aeons of virtue; on the other hand, a bodhisattva angry with a greater
one loses an aeon of virtue for each instant of the anger's duration. In
the latter case, Tsongkhapa has a source in the
Sañchayagāthāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra, which states:[12]
If a bodhisattva who has
not been prophesied
Angers and disputes with
another who has so been,
He must bear the armor
from the beginning for as many
Aeons as the times his
mind was imbued with hatred.
Tsongkhapa interprets
this to mean that a bodhisattva's anger with one who has received the
prophesy of Buddhahood from a Buddha will impede the former's progress
for many aeons. For example, someone about to progress from the path of
accumulation to the path of preparation would be set back for as many
aeons as there were instants of anger. Presumably the number of instants
would swiftly rise above one hundred, since anger has more serious
consequences for lower persons than high ones and otherwise the greater
bodhisattva would pay a higher price than a lesser.
However rare or common
angry bodhisattvas might be, they incur lesser "penalties" for anger
than do the rest of us. A bodhisattva's anger with a non-bodhisattva
would entail a penalty far less than a hundred aeons. Tsongkhapa
explicitly asserts that "Only a bodhisattva is an object of anger that
destroys roots of virtue accumulated over a hundred or a thousand
aeons." [13]
According to Tsongkhapa,
it does not matter whether one knows as a bodhisattva the person with
whom one is angry. This is unexpected. Tibetan discussions of karma
virtually always classify correct identification of the recipient of an
action as a primary consideration in the determination of a specific
act's weightiness. It is of lesser consequence, for instance, to shoot a
gun at a coiled rope in the corner of a darkened room that one believes
mistakenly to be a snake than to shoot at an actual snake. However,
perhaps Tsongkhapa would answer that even if one does not realize that
the person at whom one is angry is an actual bodhisattva, one certainly
would have had experience of that person's compassion; one therefore
would have correctly identified the fundamental character of the person
even if one did not realize that the person merited the title
"bodhisattva." If so, it would support the view of the contemporary
Gelukba scholar, Geshe Kelsang Gyatso[14] , who contends that anger
toward anyone who has shown one great kindness is a source of "limitless
destruction of merit." To become angry even at an equal, he continues,
may cost roots of virtue collected over many lifetimes. To speculate,
perhaps this is because anger mixed with ingratitude contributes to
pride and other kle"sas. This modern interpretation seems consonant with
the thrust of the Indian sources.
Whoever is the
recipient of one's anger, clearly anger is considered an immensely
negative force. We would not be surprised to learn that anger could
result in rebirth in a hell for thousands of years or that it might give
one who had an otherwise fortunate birth an ugly countenance. But anger
is far worse. What makes anger different from most other nonvirtues is
that it not only contributes to the store of causes for miserable future
experiences but also affects the store of causes for fortunate
experiences.
CUTTING VIRTUE'S ROOTS
Tsongkhapa calls the
principal effect of anger "cutting" the "roots of virtue" (dge rtsa,
ku"sulamūla).[15] Ways to cultivate and "plant" roots of virtue were a
major concern in early Buddhism, as Robert Buswell has recently
shown.[16] For instance, roots of virtue are a major topic in the
Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā (second
cent.), the document from which comes the name of the Vaibhāṣika school that, according to Tibetan doxographers, is one of
the two principal Hīnayāna systems. Subsequent theoreticians of karma
retained the horticultural metaphor but switched to the image of "seeds"
rather than roots; Tsongkhapa treats "roots" and "seeds" as synonymous
terms. Both refer to the establishment in an individual continūm of a
potential for future effects. Both virtuous intentional actions and
nonvirtuous intentional actions infuse an individual continūm with
potentials. The nature of these potentials --are they physical? mental?
neither?--has long been debated in Buddhist scholasticism.
Again, the Indian texts
seem to warn clearly and unambiguously that even a moment of anger can
wipe out the virtue one has accumulated over the course of aeons. What
else might it mean to "destroy" (bcom) virtue "from the roots?" When a
plant's roots are cut, it usually dies. Alternately, when its seeds are
destroyed it can no longer bear fruit. However, some plants, such as the
sweet potato, do not die when their roots are cut; they lie dormant
until the conditions exist for their regeneration, or they slowly
produce new root systems. Tsongkhapa, it seems, considers virtue to be a
sweet potato. He explains that when anger "cuts" virtue's "roots," it is
not destroyed, although aeons will roll on before it again becomes
capable of producing the sweet fruit of a pleasant rebirth. Therefore,
"destruction of the roots of virtue" (dge pa'i rtsa la bcom pa) is not
equivalent to "totally cutting the roots of virtue" (dge pa'i rtsa ba
kun tu chad pa, samucchinnaku"salamūla) which for some early Buddhists
meant a permanent disbarment from liberation.[17]
This is the picture that
emerges from Tsongkhapa's reflections in the "Patience" chapter of his
Lam rim chen mo. It arises as he addresses himself to certain unnamed
scholars, apparently[18] the followers of Bud"on (bu ston, 1290-1364),
the prolific scholar of the Sagya (sa skya) sect whose influential works
were still reverberating when Tsongkhapa began his Buddhist studies. He
affirms Bud"on's basic interpretation: despite the presence in the
Indian sources of apparently unambiguous language such as "destruction"
or "elimination," the "seeds" (sa bon, bīja) established by virtuous
actions are certainly not destroyed by negative emotions such as anger;
they are merely incapacitated. They cannot be destroyed by anger because
only wisdom--consciousnesses at the level of the path of seeing (mthong
lam, dar"sanamārga) and above--can eliminate karmic seeds. That is,
until one has experienced emptiness (stong pa nyid, "sūnyatā)
mystically--without any dualities, without conceptuality--liberation
from any sort of karma and its results is impossible. Hence, the
language of the Indian texts is not literal, but must be interpreted in
the following way: because the seeds of virtue cannot reach fruition,
for the angry person it is as though the roots of virtue were destroyed.
Although it is not a
question Tsongkhapa addresses explicitly, we can see that by
interpreting "cutting" as something less than destruction, Tibetan
exegetes seek to avoid a serious challenge to the Mahāyāna doctrine of
universal salvation (namely, that all sentient beings will eventually
reach Buddhahood). If anger can be so potent, and as we know too well
ourselves, occur so frequently, then certainly how could they ever have
fortunate rebirths in which to make progress toward Buddhahood? Asa"nga
(fourth cent.), in his Abhidharmasamuccaya, asks just this question.[19]
He makes a distinction between "roots" and "seeds" of virtue and
nonvirtue such that it might be possible for someone to have lost roots
but not seeds and therefore retain the possibility of future
regeneration of the roots of virtue. However, he contends that there are
some among those whose roots of virtue are eradicated who also have no
seeds of virtue and therefore have no "dharma of parinirvāṇa." They make saṃsāra
truly endless, for they themselves will never escape it. Tsongkhapa
makes no distinction like Asa"nga's between "roots" and "seeds" and does
not admit the possibility that some are doomed to endless saṃsāra.
He appears to think that since the roots of virtue can be regenerated,
and since, moreover (as we will see below), their period of dormancy can
be abbreviated by the application of proper antidotes to the poison that
has deadened them, no such result need be entailed. As I state later, it
is not clear that his explanation succeeds.
Although Tsongkhapa
agrees with Bud"on and his followers that the roots of virtue continue
to exist despite anger, he disagrees with them over whether this will
entail adverse consequences. The problem, they think, with asserting
that virtue might still exist despite having been "cut" is that it might
then seem to follow that if certain precise conditions were to occur,
virtue's seeds might yet sprout; therefore, anger would not actually
have had a deleterious effect on virtue. For example, if virtue
continued to exist, could not a wayward monk whose temper too often
bested him somehow still experience the effects of past virtue?
Tsongkhapa's response falls under several heads.
SEEDS CAN EXIST WITHOUT
RIPENING
In the first place,
Tsongkhapa wishes to establish that karmic seeds can exist without
ripening even in the presence of conditions that ordinarily would cause
them to "sprout." He relies on Bhāvaviveka's (sixth cent.) Madhyamakahṛdayavṛttitarkajvālā to
assert that, for example, even an "ordinary" person (one who has not had
the mystical experience of emptiness) can use the "four opponent
powers"--remorse, restraint, the cultivation of specific "antidotes,"
and cultivating bodhicitta[20] -- to suppress the issuance of the
effects of nonvirtue. One might regret a harsh utterance, pledge not to
repeat the behavior, cultivate loving-kindness, and so forth. Just as
anger cannot destroy the seeds of virtue, so the four powers do not
destroy the seeds of non-virtue, but they do prevent their unpleasant
effects from being issued.[21] This suppression of the maturation of
negative karmic seeds is commonly called "purification," which one might
incorrectly assume entailed complete destruction or elimination, but as
we have seen can mean only temporary incapacitation.
Another of Tsongkhapa's
examples involves a far more advanced person who has attained the path
of preparation, that level at which, according to Tsongkhapa, there has
been an inferential understanding of emptiness.[22] For such a person,
the attainment of a higher path consciousness ensures that even the
presence of what ordinarily would be proper ripening conditions will
still not lead to the maturation of those seeds of non-virtue that could
ripen as wrong views (log lta, mithyāḍṛṣṭi)
or birth in the miserable realms of animals, hungry ghosts, and
hell-beings. As in the previous instance, although the seeds cannot yet
be destroyed, they can be incapacitated.
Indeed, all "heavy"
karma, the sort that results in particularly fortunate or miserable
birth, suppresses the issuance of effects that are contrary to it. For
instance, a hell-being never experiences pleasure, nor does a god
experience pain (until, after vast stretches of time, his or her
birth-impelling karma approaches exhaustion). Therefore, in Buddhist
cosmology, the incapacitation of seeds of nonvirtue or virtue is a
common occurrence.[23]
Tsongkhapa's final
example is not as obvious as the others. Among seeds that exist without
ripening are those that have already ripened, yet continue to exist.
Commenting (in Illumination) on a passage in the Akṣayamatinirde"sa
Sūtra that compares virtue to a drop of water placed in the ocean,
remaining as long as the ocean endures, Tsongkhapa says,[24] "Virtuous
roots are not consumed through the emergence of their effects; however,
it is not the case that anger does not consume them." In Great
Exposition he says, "Even with regard to virtuous and nonvirtuous
actions that have ceased upon issuing their own maturation, there has
not been an elimination of their seeds."[25] In brief, he says that
actions can cause effects without being "used up."
How could "ripened
seeds" continue to have any kind of existence? We must recall that seeds
established by virtue (or nonvirtue) cannot be destroyed by anything
other than wisdom of the path of seeing or above; therefore, they are
not destroyed even if their effects have already issued forth. This
point is, perhaps, counter-intuitive: once a seed has produced its
effect, what sense can be made of saying that it continues to exist? It
is as though one were to say that despite the fact that a seed had
developed into a tree, the seed continued to exist (although it could
not, of course, produce yet another tree). I think, however, that
Tsongkhapa's point is considerably more subtle. He expands upon it in
Illumination, commenting on Candrakīrti's statement in Madhyāmakāvatāra
(6.33) that:
Because a sprout is not
[inherently][26] other than its seed,
At the time of a sprout,
the seed has not been destroyed.
However, because they
are not the same
It is not said that at
the time of a sprout its seed exists.
Tsongkhapa comments:[27]
In the [non-Prāsa"ngika]
systems, they think: "When a thing such as a sprout has disintegrated,
everything that is part of the sprout is obliterated." Since one does
not get any other thing that is different from a sprout, such as a pot,
they assert that disintegratedness (zhig pa) is utterly not a thing. In
the [Prāsa"ngika] system, for example, one cannot designate (1)
Upagupta's individual five aggregates (phung bo, skandha), (2) their
collection, or (3) that which is a different entity from those two as an
illustration of Upagupta, and Upagupta is also unsuitable to be an
illustration of those three. However, it is not contradictory that
despite that, what is designated as Upagupta in dependence on his
aggregates is a thing. Similarly, even though disintegratedness also
cannot be an illustration of either the thing (dngos po, bhāva) that has
been destroyed or anything that is the same type as that, it is a thing
because it is produced in dependence on a thing that has been destroyed.
In Tsongkhapa's view,
karmic "seeds" are neither physical presences nor even mental phenomena
that persist over time. Then, what are they? They are
"disintegratednesses" (zhig pa, naṣṭa--there
is no graceful English term). Because all impermanent phenomena
disintegrate moment-by-moment, when an action disintegrates, its state
of having disintegrated--its disintegratedness--arises. It too,
disintegrates, giving rise to the "disintegratedness of the
disintegratedness" of the action, and so on, until a fruition occurs.
Hence, "seed" really refers to the present moment of "disintegratedness"
of an original action. Asserting that "disintegratedness" is a
functioning entity but denying that it is substantially existent allows
Tsongkhapa to avoid either the absurdity of saying that karma persists
unchanged or of proposing a substantially existent entity like the
Vaibhāṣika "acquisition" (thob,
prāpti) to account for the continuing link between a mind-stream and a
karma.[28]
Based on his
understanding of Prāsa"ngika philosophy, Tsongkhapa describes all
phenomena as mere imputations designated in dependence on certain bases.
In his example, a man named Upagupta is not identical with the body and
mind in dependence on which "Upagupta" is designated. This is Upagupta's
mode of existence because he is empty of inherent existence (rang bzhin
gyis grub pa, svabhāvasiddhi). Nevertheless, Upagupta exists. Similarly,
says Tsongkhapa, the "disintegratedness" of a virtuous action exists
upon the action's disintegration. Although there is nothing to which one
can point that is the "disintegratedness" (just as there was nothing to
which one could point which was Upagupta), nevertheless there is a
basis--the disintegrated action--in dependence on which
"disintegratedness" can be designated (just as there is a basis--a body
and mind--in dependence on which "Upagupta" can be designated).
The consequence of this
is that Tsongkhapa feels that it is possible to assert that even when an
actions's fruition has been experienced, the action's disintegratedness,
which functions as its "seed," does not cease. Of course, how could
"disintegratedness" ever cease to exist? Once something has
disintegrated, it will always be true that it has disintegrated. Thus,
there is no way that anger could destroy the seeds of virtuous
actions.[29] (It may also be that this manner of explaining the
persistence of virtue's "seeds" even when virtue has been "ripened" has
to do with denying that the accumulation of merit is a "zero-sum game."
That is, although virtue might ripen in fortunate rebirths, it continues
to "count" toward the store of merit that comprises half -- the other
half being the store of wisdom -- of the requisite for Buddhahood.)[30]
ONE CAN BE VIRTUOUS
WITHOUT HAVING ROOTS
Tsongkhapa explicitly
argues that not only does anger not really destroy the roots of virtue,
it does not preclude the performance of virtuous acts. That is, even
though one cannot experience the effect of previous virtuous actions
during the period in which virtuous roots have been incapacitated, one's
predispositions to perform virtuous acts have not necessarily been
eliminated.
We might have expected
the opposite, namely, that one result of the incapacitation of virtue
would be a neutralization or reversal of its "habitual" effect, the
establishment of propensities for further virtuous action.[31]
Apparently Tsongkhapa feels that although the seeds are incapacitated,
the habits are not necessarily broken. This makes sense because even
angry persons may have had much conditioning to predispose them to
virtuous behavior. Certainly this would be true in the cases of the
bodhisattvas who become angry with each other or with common beings. It
would contradict what we observe daily to maintain that a moment of
anger dramatically and permanently alters an otherwise balanced or even
benevolent personality.
If, then, one can
accumulate more virtue, does this mean that there are "fresh seeds" that
might ripen as fortunate rebirth or pleasant experiences? If so, does
this not considerably reduce the negative effect of anger? Since this
would otherwise constitute a major loophole in Tsongkhapa's formulation,
we can perhaps presume that these seeds, too, are incapacitated by
anger. This assumption is consistent with the basic thrust of
Tsongkhapa's interpretation of the meaning of "cutting the roots of
virtue," since it looks forward toward aeons in which there will be no
ripening of the seeds of virtue rather than looking backwards at so many
aeons of virtue ruined. Of course, it leads to the apparent paradox that
the stores of virtue may be increased during the same period in which
virtue's roots are "cut" and raises questions such as: if new roots of
virtue are produced -- and incapacitated -- does this mean that some
dormant "older" roots are activated? In other words, does anger affect a
certain quantity of virtuous roots?
VIRTUE THAT IS CUT ONLY
PARTIALLY
Besides tempering what
the Indian texts say about the existence of virtue and affirming the
possibility of its performance, Tsongkhapa also distinguishes between
degrees of anger, only the worst of which truly "cuts" the roots of
virtue. Thus, he appears to think that although in general, the seeds of
virtue cannot ripen, there may be exceptions. He says:[32]
The overcoming of a
virtue does not mean that a virtue in one's continūm ceases to exist
after one generates anger; rather, anger harms the virtue's capacity to
issue forth an effect. The extent to which later fruition is harmed
accords with the amount of harm done, causing a small, middling, or
great extinguishment of virtue as explained above.
Tsongkhapa is referring
to the Upāliparipṛcchā Sūtra,
which said:
Upāli, I have not seen
such a drawing of a wound or maiming as when a trainee in the pure life
(brahmacārya) abuses [another] trainee in the pure life. Upāli, then
those great roots of virtue become diminished, thoroughly reduced, and
eliminated. Upāli, if you would not try to attack with your mind things
such as burning logs, what can we say about a body with consciousness?
Tsongkhapa interprets
"diminished," "reduced," and "eliminated" respectively as small,
middling, and complete elimination. That is, he argues that although it
is true that anger cuts the roots of virtue, it may do so only
partially. It is not clear whether this means that in "small" or
"middling" eliminations only some roots of virtue are touched or whether
it means that all roots of virtue are diminished significantly, so that
only partial fortunate results are possible.
In short, Tsongkhapa
argues that although the Indian texts warn of draconian consequences to
even a moment of anger--the loss of a thousand aeons of virtue, for
instance--this really means, in most cases, that there is a partial
incapacitation of that virtue for a long future period. The result is
that some of the seeds of virtue might actually ripen as a good body
with good resources, etc., and because of this one could probably
continue to make progress as a bodhisattva on the paths to Buddhahood.
However, one's progress will be slow. A novice bodhisattva's anger at a
mature bodhisattva, for instance, will not de-commission her, but it
will impede her development. Therefore, "cut" not only means just
"incapacitation" but also just "mostly incapacitated." Perhaps anger
incapacitates those roots of virtue that would have ripened as lifetimes
with superb conditions for the study of Dharma, enabling only those
roots of virtue that could ripen as lifetimes or circumstances that are
relatively mediocre.
CONTRADICTIONS, APPARENT
AND REAL
According to
Tsongkhapa's own reckoning, the journey over the paths to Buddhahood
requires no less than three periods of "countless" great aeons. In a
sense, then, a moment of anger amounts to no more than a stumble on the
path. On the other hand, who gets angry only once in a great while --
like a thousand aeons, for instance? Even with Tsongkhapa's
modifications, it seems likely that an ordinary person would have little
virtue not incapacitated by anger. The most serious problem with any of
the accounts of the effect of anger, then, is that they seem to leave
open the possibility that there might be persons who would be the karmic
equivalent of indentured servants, unable ever to be born into a body
from which they could seek liberation. This would contradict a deeply
held dogma about the possibility of universal salvation, which
Tsongkhapa supports.[33] A single lifetime's episode of anger
(particularly if that life is spent largely being jealous of one or more
real bodhisattvas) could easily dig a hole so deep that even innumerable
aeons seem too brief to permit escape. For, one of the principal reasons
why vice is vicious is that it impels one into life after suffering life
in which anger, among other negative emotions, is the norm rather than
the exception. The Tibetan tradition uses a famous analogy to saṃsāra
which compares the chances of being born as a human who can hear the
Dharma to the odds that a blind sea turtle, surfacing only once in a
hundred years, will stick its head through a golden yoke floating on a
vast ocean. Adding multiple-aeon calculations on anger is like changing
the setting of this scenario to outer space. What odds remain? In short,
Tsongkhapa's efforts at moderation notwithstanding, the Indian sources
seem to lead to an untenable conclusion.
Second, an apparent
self-contradiction in Tsongkhapa's interpretation is that he himself
maintains that regarding the roots of virtue, "cut" cannot be equated
with "delay" or else there would be no great difference between anger
and other negative emotions such as jealousy or gossiping, which also
can delay the issuance of the effects of virtue. He says: "The mere
temporary postponement of maturation is not appropriate to be the
meaning of destroying the roots of virtue; otherwise, all the
nonvirtuous actions that have power would have to be set forth as
destroyers of the roots of virtue."[34] Based on our analysis, it is
difficult to see how his understanding of the destruction of roots of
virtue amounts to anything other than delay, since anger, though much
more potent than any of these other kle"sas, seems to be different only
by degree. However, Tsongkhapa focuses upon the way in which the other
kle"sas cause a delay:[35]
The virtuous or
nonvirtuous actions that have matured earlier temporarily stop the
opportunity for the maturation of other actions; however, merely those
[earlier maturations] cannot destroy virtue or nonvirtue and that is not
set forth [in scripture as the meaning of "cut" the roots of virtue].
The fruition of the
seeds of any virtuous or nonvirtuous action can result in a birth that
prevents the maturation of seeds of its opposite. For instance, a seed
established by nonvirtue might ripen as a birth in one of the hells.
Because such a life is devoid of pleasure, seeds formerly established by
virtue would lack the necessary conditions for their maturation. These
seeds would not have been rendered ineffective in exactly the same way
that anger renders seeds ineffective; they would not have been "cut" or
"scorched" or "withered" or otherwise directly neutralized. They would
be like patrons in line for a film who do not know that around the
corner, near the box office, others are cutting in. But what difference
does it make that anger and pride, for instance, operate differently? In
practice, the result is the same.
OTHER QUESTIONS
By focussing on the
narrow issue of how and to what degree anger affects the stores of
virtue, we have not yet asked several obvious questions that probably
should be raised before leaving the topic. First, why is anger seen to
be so incredibly destructive? There is no other religious tradition that
approaches Buddhism in its negative assessment of the consequences of a
moment's angry outburst. What is special about anger for Buddhists?
Let us look at
Tsongkhapa's arguments against anger (in which he follows the lead of
"Sāntideva's Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra).[36] (1) Anger against others is
irrational because others lack autonomy. They are helpless against their
own conditioning, which leads them to commit acts that provoke us to
anger. It is obvious that they lack autonomy because even though they
themselves want happiness, they commit acts that lead to suffering. (2)
Similarly, if one thinks that others are inherently annoying, they
cannot rationally be blamed, since they are merely doing what is their
nature. (3) If, on the other hand, their annoying qualities are not
inherent, then those qualities are a merely adventitious product of
conditioning and should not be held against them. (4) The provocative
person is only indirectly responsible for annoyance; he or she is being
used by hate in the same way that a person uses a stick. One should
oppose the annoyance, not the person ("love the sinner, hate the sin").
(5) Whatever makes one angry is the result of one's own past actions.
Annoying persons are nothing other than the agents of one's own previous
misdeeds. And (6) only a provocative person gives one the opportunity to
amass merit that can be helpful for spiritual progress. Therefore, one
ought to be grateful for the provocation.
Note that focus is on
what happens to a person who gets angry, not on the immediate
consequences to the recipient of the anger. In other words, Tsongkhapa
does not argue that anger ought to be avoided because it leads to
violence against others or because it tends to provoke the recipient of
one's anger into an equally angry state. These would be legitimate
arguments, but Tsongkhapa's concern is for the mental state of the
person who gets angry. He wishes to convince us that anger is simply
irrational and that forbearance is beneficial, not that anger is wrong
because it leads to physical or verbal acts (as he might argue if, for
instance, he were addressing the faults of intoxication). It is a
reminder that karma is primarily about intention (sems pa, cetanā), not
act.
What is noteworthy
about these arguments is that most of them revolve around the angry
person's assumption of autonomy with respect to a provocateur--around
the sort of ignorance that Buddhists identify as the "root of saṃsāra."
To be angry with someone implies that one falsely imputes to that person
an autonomous self, and the dynamics of anger serve to reify that
misconception. Tsongkhapa also demonstrates that anger involves
ignorance about oneself, for it indicates that one does not understand
that harms, real or imagined, arise only in dependence upon one's own
continūm.[37] Because anger reifies ignorance, it is strongly contrary
not only to the development of wisdom but also to the development of
compassion, which grows only where the distinction of self-and-other has
been weakened. Perhaps, then, anger is felt to be in a different class
than other nonvirtues because even more than desire, etc., it solidifies
that most vicious of all vices, ignorance? That is why anger joins
ignorance and desire to comprise the "three poisons" functioning as the
hub of the wheel of saṃsāra.
Moving to a second
question, why do Buddhists say that anger affects virtue instead of
simply saying that anger is a nonvirtuous act that carries tremendous
potential for future suffering? Why place anger (and a few other
nonvirtues, as described below) in a different category than any other
act? Perhaps the answer is that anger does not merely set in motion a
future retribution and habituate the one it grasps to further outbursts;
it creates a mood, or is one, which undermines positive thoughts and
actions. It would not be sufficient on the plane of ordinary experience
to describe anger's effect only in terms of future negative effects. We
would surely also want to add that anger diminishes positive movement.
Thinking homologically, it must seem necessary in karmic theory to claim
that anger produces not only roots of nonvirtue but affects the roots of
virtue as well.
This is equally true of
weighty virtues, such as giving. They establish roots or seeds for
future pleasant lives or experiences, but they also "purify" nonvirtues
(as we saw above when we considered the four powers that can temporarily
nullify nonvirtues). The language of cleaning, rather than that of
destruction, is used; for instance, we are not told that generosity
"cuts the roots of nonvirtue." With virtues, what Buddhist teachers
emphasize are ways in which the fruition of the virtues will enhance the
attainment of liberation for oneself and others.[38]
Finally, one question
that might be raised with regard to the purification of nonvirtue is
what consequence this might have for virtue. We have seen that according
to Tsongkhapa, anger can be nullified by the four opponent powers of
remorse, restraint, etc.[39] But if anger is nullified by remorse, etc.,
is its nullification of virtue similarly cancelled? Are the roots of
virtue then freed? Or does one just establish roots of liberation?
Tsongkhapa, commenting in Great Exposition on Bhāvaviveka's statement
that even though there is purification by the four powers, there is no
destruction of seeds, concludes that "even though your accumulation of
sins is washed away through purification by the four powers, this does
not contradict the fact that you are slow to produce higher paths."[40]
In Illumination he is even more explicit; referring to the
Sarvavaidalyasaṃgraha Sūtra, he
says:[41]
If one abandons the
doctrine as set forth in the sūtra but confesses the fault three times
daily for seven years, the fruition of that deed is purified, but even
at the fastest ten aeons are necessary to attain endurance [i.e., to
progress to the next path]. Thus, even though confession and restraint
in many ways does not restore a path that has become slower, it will
purify experience of the fruition.
In other words, the
purification of nonvirtues such as anger does not undo its devastating
effect on virtue. "Purification" prevents the issuance of unpleasant
effects, but does not rehabilitate good seeds gone bad.
SUMMARY
Anger, identified along
with ignorance and desire as a "poison" that generates saṃsāra,
is singled out by Tsongkhapa as a particularly destructive emotion. It
is founded on ignorance and reifies it. It not only establishes
potentials for future occasions of suffering and habituates its subject
to react similarly in future provocative circumstances, but also has a
considerable impact on the store of previously accomplished virtue. The
magnitude of its effect on virtue is dependent on (1) the degree of
anger, (2) the status of the person with toward whom it is directed, (3)
the status of the person who is angry, and (4) whether it is "purified"
by the four opponent powers. To expand briefly on these points:
(1) Anger has "small,"
"middling," and "great" forms. Only anger that is of "great" intensity
can "cut the roots" of virtue. While lesser instances presumably can
produce painful effects, they do not also affect the ripening of virtue.
(2) Anger is most
destructive that is directed toward persons who display great
compassion. Therefore, anger with buddhas and mature bodhisattvas is
worst, anger with lesser bodhisattvas next worst, anger with persons who
have shown one great kindness next worst, and so on.
(3) Conversely, the
higher a person's status, the less damaging are his or her instances of
anger. If a mature bodhisattva were ever angry, the anger would have
only minor consequences; an ordinary person's anger with a buddha or
mature bodhisattva, on the other hand, can result in the cutting of the
roots of virtue for a thousand aeons.
(4) Anger that is not
addressed will fester and fulfill its potential for destruction.
Remorse, etc., can nullify the painful effects of anger. However, it is
impossible to undo anger's effect on virtue; at best the damage can be
moderated.
Although the effect of
anger--or, at least, intense anger--is to "cut the roots (or, destroy
the seeds) of virtue," this does not actually mean that virtue is
destroyed, for nothing other than a wisdom consciousness can destroy
karma. Rather, the roots or seeds of virtue are incapacitated.
Consequently, one may be reborn many times in the miserable realms below
the level of humans, or, if born a human, will be unable to make much
spiritual progress.
Tsongkhapa's attempt to
explain and moderate the position of the Indian texts is not wholly
convincing. On the one hand, since anger only temporarily incapacitates
the roots or seeds of virtue, it is not clear how it differs from other
kle"sas such as pride. Tsongkhapa himself says "cut" must mean more than
"delay" but in the final analysis it appears to mean that and nothing
more. On the other hand, even if anger means only incapacitation, its
extraordinary damage spreading over many aeons, based on as little as a
moment's outburst, seems to make liberation a practical impossibility
for most persons. Tsongkhapa's interpretation would have to be even
bolder--or, anger of the root-cutting variety would have to be clearly
restricted to only the most extraordinary moments of rage--to avoid this
untenable conclusion.
REFERENCES
Buswell, Robert
1992 "The Path to
Perdition: The Wholesome Roots and their Eradication," in Robert Buswell
and Robert Gimello (eds.) Paths to Liberation (Honolulu: University of
Hawai'i Press).
Candrakīrti
nḍ.
Madhyāmakāvatāra. P 5261, P 5262, vol. 98. Edited Tibetan: Louis de La
Vallee Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti. Bibliotheca Buddhica
IX (Osnabr™ck: Biblio Verlag, 1970). English translations: C. W.
Huntington, Jr., The Emptiness of Emptiness (University of Hawai'i
Press, 1989). Chapters 1-5: Jeffrey Hopkins, Compassion in Tibetan
Buddhism (Valois, NY: Gabriel/Snow Lion, 1980). Chapter 6: Stephen
Batchelor, in Geshe Rabten, Echoes of Voidness (London: Wisdom, 1983):
47-92.
Cozort, Daniel
1989 "Unique Tenets of
the Middle Way Consequence School: The Systematization of the Philosophy
of the Indian Buddhist Prāsa"ngika-Mādhyamika School by the Tibetan
Ge-luk-ba Scholastic Tradition." PhḌ.
Dissertation, University of Virginia.
Dhargyey, Geshey Ngawang
1980 Tibetan Tradition
of Mental Development, 3rd edition (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works
and Archives).
Gyatso, Geshe Kelsang
1980 Meaningful to
Behold (London: Wisdom).
Gyatso, Tenzin, Dalai
Lama XIV
nḍ.
Dalai Lama at Harvard (Ithaca: Snow Lion).
Hirakawa, Akira
1990 A History of Indian
Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press).
Hayes, Richard P.
1994 "The Analysis of
Karma in Vasubandhu's Abhidharmako"sa-bhāṣya,"
in Katherine Young (ed.), Hermeneutical Paths to the Sacred Worlds of
India (Atlanta: Scholar's Press).
Hopkins, P. Jeffrey
1980 Compassion in
Tibetan Buddhism (Ithaca: Snow Lion).
______.
1983 Meditation on
Emptiness (London: Wisdom).
Jamyang Shayba
1973 ('Jams dbyang bzhad
pa). Dbu ma chen mo.Great Exposition of the Middle Way/Analysis of
(Candrakīrti's) "Entrance to (Nāgārjuna's ) 'Treatise on the Middle
Way'", Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the
Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate (dbu ma chen
no/ dbu ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal
skal bzang 'jug ngogs). In Collected Works of
'Jam-dbya"ns-bzad-pa'i-rdo-rje, Vol. 9, Drashikyil edition (New Delhi:
Ngawang Gelek Demo). English translation (section on two truths): Guy
Newland, The Two Truths, PhḌ.
Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1988 (not included in 1992 book
published by Snow Lion.)
______.
nḍ.
Great Exposition of Tenets/Explanation of "Tenets", Sun of the Land of
Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others' Tenets
and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and
Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings (grub mtha' chen mo/grub
mtha'i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kin dang zab don mchog tu gsal
ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba kun
skong). Drashikyil edition (Mundgod: Gomang). English translation
(beginning of the Prāsa"ngika chapter): Jeffrey Hopkins in Meditation on
Emptiness (London: Wisdom, 1983).
Klein, Anne
1994 Path to the Middle:
The Spoken Scholarship of Kensur Yeshey Tupten (Albany: State University
of New York Press).
Lopez, Donald
1992 "Paths Terminable
and Interminable," in Buswell and Gimello (eds), Paths to Liberation.
Pabongka Rinpoche
1991 Liberation in the
Palm of Your Hand (London: Wisdom).
Pradhan, Pralhad (ed.)
1950
Abhidharma-Samuccaya of Asa"nga (Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati).
Rahula, Walpola (tr.)
1971 Le Compendium de la
super-doctrine (philosophie): (Abhidharmasamuccaya) d'Asa"nga (Paris:
Publications de l''Ecole Francaise d'Extreme Orient).
"Sāntideva
1979
Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra. (byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa).
P5272, Vol. 99. English translation: Stephen Batchelor, A Guide to the
Bodhisattva's Way of Life (Dharamsala: LTWA).
Tsongkhapa (tsong kha pa
blo bzang grags pa1357-1419)
1985 Great Exposition of
the Stages of the Path/Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Thoroughly
Teaching All the Stages of Practice of the Three Types of Beings (lam
rim chen mo/skyes bu gsum gyi rnyams su blang ba'i rim pa thams cad
tshang bar ston pa'i byang chub lam gyi rim pa). P 6001, vol. 152. The
edition used for this article is the Lhasa bya khyung edition published
by Mtsho sngon mi rigs Printing Press. Other editions have been
published in Dharamsala (Shes rig par khang, 1964) and Delhi (Ngawang
Gelek, 1975).
______.
nḍ.
Illumination of the Thought, Extensive Explanation of (Candrakīrti's)
"Entrance to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'" (dbu ma la 'jug
pa'i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal). P 6143, Vol. 154. The
edition used for this article is the Dharamsala Shes rig par khang
edition. Another edition was published in Sarnath, India (Pleasure of
Elegant Sayings Press, 1973).
Wayman, Alex
1991 Ethics of Tibet
(Albany: State University of New York Press).
NOTES
[1] Anger is not unique
as a negative emotion that can "cut the roots" of virtue. In
Illumination of the Thought Tsongkhapa cites sūtra passages collected in
"Sāntideva's "Sikṣāsamuccaya
that identify other extremely counterproductive notions such as
disbelief in cause and effect, boasting about spiritual attainments one
does not have, etc. as root-cutters. He also mentions that the
Aakā"sagarbha Sūtra identifies root infractions of bodhisattva vows as
root-cutters. See Illumination: 57a.5-57b.1. Of course, none of these
are said to have the force of anger. Return
[2] Tibetan Tripiṭaka
764, Vol. 27 (Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripiṭaka
Research Foundation, 1956). Cited in Tsongkhapa, Great Exposition.
Return
[3] To represent Tibetan
names, I use a modified form of Jeffrey Hopkins' "essay phonetics"
(Hopkins 1983: 19-22) system for Lhasa dialect. I drop the hyphens and
tonal marks, and I make an exception for the name Tsongkhapa, which has
become widely known in that form (it would otherwise be spelled
Dzongkaba). I use the phonetic form because it is well known that we
can't remember what we can't pronounce, and I think that the names of
the best Tibetan scholars are worth remembering. Tibetan book titles are
translated into English to avoid the consonant-cluster nightmare of
transliterated Tibetan that alienates those who are not Tibetanists and
to avoid the phonetic form that alienates Tibetanists. The translation
of titles also reminds readers of book contents. Return
[4] Great Exposition of
the Stages of the Path (lam rim chen mo) is the common name for Stages
of the Path to Enlightenment Thoroughly Teaching All the Stages of
Practice of the Three Types of Beings (skyes bu gsum gyi rnyams su blang
ba'i rim pa thams cad tshang bar ston pa'i byang chub lam gyi rim pa).
It is Tsongkhapa's grand synthesis of Indian materials pertaining to the
enlightenment path. It has been partially translated by Alex Wayman
(Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real in 1978 and Ethics of Tibet in
1991). A new translation of the entire text is in preparation by a team
working under the auspices of the Tibetan Buddhist Learning Center in
Washington, New Jersey and is scheduled for publication in three volumes
by Harper in 1996-98. My own interest in the topic of anger was raised
by my translation of the "ethical discipline" and "patience" chapters
for the project. Illumination of the Thought (dbu ma dgongs pa rab gsal)
is the common name for Illumination of the Thought, Extensive
Explanation of (Candrakīrti's) "Entrance to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on
the Middle Way'" (dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab
gsal). It is Tsongkhapa's attempt, late in life, to clarify the thought
of Candrakīrti, who he saw in turn as the most important of Nāgārjuna's
Mādhyamika successors. Since Candrakīrti's discussion in the
Madhyamakāvatāra revolves around the ten bodhisattva grounds,
Illumination is also concerned with many of the same issues as Great
Exposition and is also characterized by copious citations from Indian
texts. It has been partially translated by Hopkins (1980; chapters 1-5)
and Klein and Hopkins (Klein 1994; first part of chapter 6). Tsongkhapa
makes similar statements in both sources (in fact, much of the text of
Illumination on this topic has simply been lifted from Great Exposition.
The principal difference is that in the later Illumination he clarifies
a few matters (for instance, the precise parties to whom he believes the
Indian texts refer). Return
[5] Identified by
"Sāntideva as a "text of the Aarya- Sarvāstivādins." The relevant
portion is cited later. Return
[6] Although Tsongkhapa
mentions Candrakīrti's and "Sāntideva's estimates in both Illumination
and Great Exposition, he reconciles the differences in only the later
work, Illumination. Candrakīrti is particularly important for
Tsongkhapa's understanding of Mādhyamika, but "Sāntideva is particularly
important for his understanding of the topic of patience. Return
[7] Admitting that
Prajñākaramati's commentary on the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra says
otherwise, mentioning only "sentient beings," Tsongkhapa says that he
finds this "difficult to believe." Return
[8] One famous
counter-example is that of Milarepa, but his pattern of
mass-murderer-turned-saint is highly unusual. Of course, there are also
instances in which a bodhisattva guru might provoke a student's anger in
order to teach the student, and I am not certain how the tradition might
work out the consequences. Return
[9] The extensive
Gelukba sa lam (=bhūmi and mārga, grounds and paths) literature is based
on Maitreya's Abhisamayālaṃkāra
(which in turn is based on the Prajñāpāramitā literature, where the
five-path scheme can be dimly discerned) and Haribhadra's commentary; it
also uses the five-path scheme of Kamala"sīla's Bhāvanākrama (following
a much older tradition evident even in Sarvāstivādin texts--Hirakawa
208ff.). In brief, the bodhisattva path of accumulation begins with the
initial generation of bodhicitta, and the path of preparation with a
union of calm abiding (zhi gnas, "samatha) and special insight (lhag
mthong, vipa"syanā) with emptiness (stong pa nyid, "sūnyatā) as the
object. Return
[10] Tenzin Gyatso: 83.
Return
[11] The angry
bodhisattva must still be a relatively low one since a bodhisattva who
has progressed past the third of the ten bodhisattva bhumis (a
pre-Mahāyāna system adapted to Mahāyāna in, for instance, the
Da"sabhūmika Sūtra) is no longer ever subject to anger. This
qualification can be found in Maitreya's Abhisamāyalaṃkāra
and elaborated in subsequent treatments of the bodhisattva path (cf.
Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra 3.13). The Gelukba scheme would place
such a person even lower. The second of the four parts of the path of
preparation is called "peak" (rtse mo, mūrdhan) because it is the end of
the period in which one can generate anger that will sever the roots of
virtue. Also, Tsongkhapa makes a distinction between bodhisattvas whose
faculties are sharp and those whose are not. The former are the sort who
needed to convince themselves that the Buddha's teaching on emptiness
was true, and therefore that Buddhahood was attainable, before they
could make the extraordinary commitment to strive for countless aeons to
free all sentient beings. Such persons might have attained a level of
understanding equivalent to the path of preparation even before they
generated bodhicitta, the effect of which would be to undermine (though
not, of course, destroy) their predispositions to anger and desire. A
later commentator, the fifteenth century Jaydz™n Cho/oogyi
Gyeltsen (rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan) who wrote the Mādhyamaka
textbook--based on Illumination--still in use by Sera Jay (se ra rje)
Gelukba monastery, went even further. He claimed that not only do
intelligent persons realize emptiness prior to generating bodhicitta,
but most dull ones do also (see Newland: 43). Return
[12] Translation is
Hopkins (1980: 212). Return
[13] Illumination:
54a.5-6. Translation follows Hopkins (1980: 210). Return
[14] See Hopkins (1980:
154). Return
[15] It may not be the
case that all instances of anger cut the roots of virtue. As we will
see, instances of anger may be differentiated on the basis of their
recipients, but are there other factors that make one instance worse
than another? Tenzin Gyatso, Dalai Lama XIV, says that it is still
possible for someone past the path of seeing to experience anger;
however, since root-cutting anger is no longer experienced past the
second part of the even earlier path of preparation, it is clear that
this anger would not impel lifetimes of suffering. The implication is
that a higher bodhisattva's anger is not as serious, perhaps because to
some extent its root cause, ignorance, has been undermined. Does this
also mean that not all instances of anger would result in severance of
the roots of virtue? Would Tsongkhapa agree with the Dalai Lama's
conclusion?Return
[16] Buswell: 107-134.
Return
[17] Buswell: 118-123.
Return
[18] The seventeenth
century Gelukba abbot Jamyang Shayba ('jams dbyang bzhad pa) makes this
identification in his dbu ma chen mo (Great Exposition of the Middle
Way: 160a.5), which is a commentary on Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra.
Return
[19] Pradhan: 35/Rahula:
78:58. Cited in Buswell: 119-20. According to Tsongkhapa's Gelukba
order, the mind's emptiness of inherent existence is a "natural lineage"
(rang bzhin gnas rigs) that is the Buddha nature of each sentient being,
and hence there is no one who will fail, eventually, to attain
Buddhahood. (For a review of reasons why some of Tsongkhapa's followers
found difficulties with these doctrines, see Lopez.) They interpret
Asa"nga to mean that he sees five lineages (rigs, gotra) for sentient
beings, respectively those who follow the path of the "Srāvakas,
Pratyekabuddhas, and Bodhisattvas, those who switch from one of the
former to the latter, and those without a lineage for liberation. Return
[20] According to
Tsongkhapa, the four opponent powers involve remorse for transgressions;
cultivating their antidotes; restraint; and taking refuge in cultivation
of the spirit of enlightenment (bodhicitta). Tsongkhapa does not
specify, at least here, whether these powers are sufficient to
counteract all nonvirtues, but that seems to be a commonly held opinion
(cf. Pabongka Rinpoche: 218). Return
[21] Presumably, painful
experiences must be due to actions of previous lives or for which the
person had no remorse, etc., possibly because they had been forgotten.
Return
[22] To be more precise,
according to Gelukba exegetes, the path of preparation is the level at
which one has experienced a union of calm abiding (zhi gnas, "samatha)
and special insight (lhag mthong, vipa"syanā)with emptiness as one's
object. The realization is powerful but is as yet one that is
inferential rather than direct. Return
[23] This paragraph is
not Tsongkhapa's example, but my own, which I include because it seems
parallel to the example he furnishes. As I point out below, Tsongkhapa
wants to distinguish between the temporary suppression of fruitions by
the ripening of other, contrary, karmas, and the incapacitation of
fruitions by anger. That is, anger is qualitatively different from most
other nonvirtues. That is why I think that he himself would not use this
as an example. However, there seems to be no difference between the
practical effects of these nonvirtues. Return
[24] In Illumination:
56b.1. Return
[25] Great Exposition:
401.12-14. Return
[26] Tsongkhapa and his
followers consistently interpret the "not other than" statements in
Indian Mādhyamaka as meaning "not inherently other" since, of course,
things such as seeds and sprouts are different from each other. On the
other hand, they are individually not inherently existent (rang bzhin
gyis grub pa, svabhāvasiddhi) and do not have a relationship of inherent
otherness--a relationship that is not merely imputed by thought. Return
[27] Illumination:
127b.3-6. Return
[28] Prāpti and other
means to account for the continuation of karma, such as the ālayavijñāna
of Yogacārā texts, are rejected by Tsongkhapa as entities not included
in the conventions of the world (which he thinks are, in contrast,
upheld by sūtras of definitive meaning and in the ultimate commentarial
tradition of Prāsa"ngika-Mādhyamika), not to mention the fact that as
described by their proponents they could be established only by ultimate
analysis. This is a major topic of the "unique tenets of Prāsa"ngika"
section of Jamyang Shayba's Great Exposition of Tenets (grub mtha' chen
mo), which I translated as part of my dissertation. For a recent
discussion of Vaibhāṣika
positions and how they are critiqued by Vasubandhu's Abhidharmako"sa-bhāṣya,
see Hayes. Return
[29] Of course, it also
raises the question of how wisdom could destroy seeds. This is
reminiscent of a discussion by Jamyang Shayba (Great Exposition of the
Middle Way: 628.3-.5) on the "disintegratedness" of the obstructions to
omniscience (shes sgrib, jñeyāvaraṇa)
for Buddhas. To become Buddhas, of course, necessitated the destruction
of those obstructions, but Jamyang Shayba, wishing to avoid saying that
Buddhas have anything like a taint in their continūms, maintains that
the disintegratedness of obstructions to omniscience does not exist. His
reasoning: in order to be a functioning entity, something must be
capable of producing an effect, and this disintegratedness cannot.
Instead, the obstructions to omniscience are completely "extinguished
into the dharmadhātu." I have discussed arguments for and against
Jamyang Shayba's position in my dissertation. Return
[30] Although I doubt
that they are that to which Tsongkhapa refers, there are seeds that are
capable of producing more than one effect; e.g., a single act of killing
is said to be capable of ripening into numerous lifetimes in the
miserable realms. Even if some effects had ripened, those seeds would
continue to exist. Return
[31] A single action
produces a "seed" (sa bon, bīja) for a future effect, a "predisposition"
(bags chags, vāsanā) or tendency to repeat that type of action, and an
environmental effect of contributing to the causal conditions for the
world shared with other beings. Cf. Dhargyey: 87-88. Return
[32] Illumination:
57a.2-.3. I follow Hopkins' translation. Return
[33] As Donald Lopez has
shown (1992), Tsongkhapa seems not to have believed that all sentient
beings would inevitably reach Buddhahood, bringing an end to saṃsāra; on the other hand, he would certainly claim that it is
possible for all of them to attain liberation and omniscience. Return
[34] Great Exposition:
401.19-20. Return
[35] Great Exposition:
401.17-19. Return
[36] This is a summary
of Great Exposition: 405-414. Return
[37] This comes close to
implying that every unpleasant occurrence is a direct result of one's
own karma. Tsongkhapa would not say this, I think; however, he might
argue that every unpleasant experience at least indirectly stems from
one's past actions insofar as one's actions are a part of the collective
karma that creates and sustains a shared environment. Return
[38] Cf. Buswell for an
analysis of the importance of giving, in particular, for the spiritual
path. Giving can be seen not only as a virtuous act but one that is a
conditioner of insight. Return
[39] Kensur Yeshey
Tupten, a great twentieth century Gelukba scholar, adds (Klein: 85) that
even prior to the direct cognition of emptiness that begins to destroy
karma on the path of seeing and above, conceptual understanding of
emptiness also purifies the seeds established by anger. Return
[40] Great Exposition:
402.4-6. Return
[41] Illumination:
55a.5-6. My translation follows Hopkins (1980: 212). Return
Copyright 1995
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Source: http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/
Update: 01-12-2004
