Are There “Human Rights” in Buddhism?
By Damien Keown
Lecturer in Indian Religion,
University of London,
Goldsmiths
Abstract:
It is difficult to think
of a more urgent question for Buddhism in the late twentieth century
than human rights. Human rights issues in which Buddhism has a direct
involvement, notably in the case of Tibet, feature regularly on the
agenda in superpower diplomacy. The political, ethical and philosophical
questions surrounding human rights are debated vigourously in political
and intellectual circles throughout the world. Yet despite its
contemporary significance, the subject has merited hardly a footnote in
mainstream academic research and publication in the field of Buddhist
Studies. Why is this? One reason would seem to be the lack of a
precedent within Buddhism itself for discussing issues of this kind;
scholars, by and large, continue to follow the tradition's own agenda,
an agenda which appears to some increasingly medieval in the shadow of
the twenty-first century. If Buddhism wishes to address the issues which
are of concern to today's global community, it must begin to ask itself
new questions alongside the old ones.
In the context of human
rights, which is the theme of this paper, an important preliminary
question would seem to be whether traditional Buddhism has any
understanding of what is meant by "human rights" at all. Indeed, it may
be thought that since the concept of "rights" is the product of an alien
cultural tradition it would be utterly inappropriate to speak of rights
of any kind - "human" or otherwise - in a Buddhist context. Even if it
was felt that these objections were overstated, and that the issue of
human rights does have a legitimate place on the Buddhist agenda, there
would still remain the separate and no less difficult question of how
human rights were to be grounded in Buddhist doctrine, particularly in
the light of the fact that the tradition itself provides little
precedent or guidance in this area.
This article offers a
preliminary exploration of the questions raised in the paragraph above.
It concludes that it is legitimate to speak of both "rights" and "human
rights" in Buddhism, and proposes a ground for human rights in Buddhist
doctrine.
INTRODUCTION
In the autumn of 1993
the Parliament of the World's Religions met in Chicago to determine
whether a consensus on basic moral teachings could be found among the
religions of the world. The meeting was attended by representatives of
the major world religions as well as ethnic and other minority groups.
Representatives of many Buddhist schools, including Theravāda, Mahāyāna,
Vajrayāna, and Zen were present and the main closing address was given
by the Dalai Lama in Grant Park on September 4th.
One of the major fruits
of this interfaith convention was a document known as the Declaration
towards a Global Ethic. [1] The Global Ethic sets out the fundamental
moral principles to which it is thought all religions subscribe. Many of
these principles concern human rights, and the Global Ethic sees the
universal recognition of human rights and dignity by the religions of
the world as the cornerstone of a "new global order."
A related aim of the
Global Ethic was to provide "the basis for an extensive process of
discussion and acceptance which we hope will be sparked off in all
religions." [2] The present paper is a contribution to this process from
a Buddhist perspective. Its aims are limited to an exploration of some
of the basic issues which must be addressed if a Buddhist philosophy of
human rights is to develop. I say "develop" because Buddhism seems to
lack such a philosophy at present. Buddhism is a latecomer to the cause
of human rights, and for most of its history has been preoccupied with
other concerns. It might be suggested, in defense of Buddhism, that
concern for human rights is a postreligious phenomenon which has more to
do with secular ideologies and power-politics than religion, and it is
therefore unreasonable to accuse Buddhism of neglect in this area. [3] I
will suggest below that such an understanding of human rights is
mistaken, but leaving the specific issue of human rights to one side
there is no doubt that Buddhism lags far behind religions such as
Christianity and Islam in developing the framework for a social gospel
within which questions of this kind can be addressed. For such an
intellectually dynamic tradition Buddhism is a lightweight in moral and
political philosophy. A fig-leaf of a kind may be found in the
suggestion that since much Buddhist literature remains untranslated
there may be hidden treasures in these areas awaiting discovery. Such
appeals to the unknown, however, lack credibility. For one thing, it
would be curious if only texts on these subjects had been lost to
history while literature on all manner of other topics abounds. Nor can
it be a coincidence that these subjects are absent from the traditional
monastic curricula. The absence of a discipline of philosophical ethics
in Indian culture as a whole makes it much more likely that Buddhism
simply invested little time in questions of these kinds. [4]
Political events in the
course of this century, however, have forced the issue of human rights
to the top of the agenda. [5] The Chinese invasion of Tibet, the bitter
ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, and the experience of military
dictatorship in countries such as Burma have all provided contemporary
Buddhism with first-hand experience of the issues at stake. Another
development which has done much to focus attention on social and
political themes is the emergence of "socially engaged Buddhism," a
movement whose very name implies a critique of the more traditional
(presumably "disengaged") forms of Buddhism. Leading Asian and Western
Buddhists now routinely express their concern about social injustice in
the Western vocabulary of human rights. What I wish to consider here is
how appropriate this language is for Buddhism, and what grounds there
are for supposing that Buddhism is committed to the cause of "human
rights" or has any clear understanding of what the concept means. Given
the lack of intellectual effort down the centuries in articulating,
promoting and defending rights of the kind which the world (and
especially the West) is now called upon to secure for oppressed groups
like the Tibetans, the more cynical might suggest that this late
conversion to the cause is born more of self-interest than a deep and
long-standing commitment to social justice. In calling for respect for
human rights today, then, is Buddhism simply riding on the coat-tails of
the West or is there, after all, a commitment to human rights in
Buddhist teachings?
My theme in this paper
may be summed up as the conceptual and doctrinal basis for human rights
in Buddhism. I am concerned with the intellectual bridgework which must
be put in place if expressions of concern about human rights are to be
linked to Buddhist doctrine. There are many aspects to this problem, but
three related issues will be considered here: the concept of rights, the
concept of human rights, and the question of how human rights are to be
grounded in Buddhist doctrine. I ask first if the concept of "rights" is
intelligible in Buddhism. To answer this question it will be necessary
to gain some understanding of the origin of the notion in the West. Next
I ask whether the Buddhist concept of human rights (if such a thing
exists) is the same as the Western understanding. Finally I consider in
what specific area of Buddhist teachings a doctrine of human rights
might be grounded. [6] Since the discussion is essentially theoretical,
detailed reference will not be made to particular Buddhist cultures or
schools, to specific human rights "abuses," or to the human rights
"record" of particular regimes. [7]
Before turning to these
issues a preliminary point must be made about Buddhism itself. In
speaking of "Buddhism" I should make clear that I am writing with
reference to an abstraction which might be termed "classical" Buddhism.
This abstraction is neither the same as nor different from Buddhism in
any historical or cultural context. It is not meant to represent the
views of any sect and is broad enough to include both Theravāda and
Mahāyāna schools. The justification for this fiction lies in the belief
that whatever concept of human rights we regard Buddhism as holding must
be one which is universal in form. The essence of any doctrine of human
rights is its unrestricted scope, and it would be as strange to have
distinct "Theravāada," "Tibetan" and "Zen" doctrines of human rights as
it would be to have "Catholic," "Protestant" and "Eastern Orthodox"
ones. To insist on the priority of cultural and historical circumstances
would be tantamount to denying the validity of human rights as a
concept.
RIGHTS
The concept of a "right"
has a long intellectual history in the West, and the contemporary notion
of a right as an exercisable power vested in or held by an individual
has its antecedents in a more impersonal understanding of what is
objectively true or right. Etymologically, the English word "right" is
derived from the Latin rectus meaning straight. Rectus, in turn, can be
traced to the Greek orektos which means stretched out or upright. As
Richard Dagger notes, "The pattern ... is for the notion of straightness
to be extended from the physical realm to the moral - from rectus to
rectitude, as it were." [8] In other words, the property of a physical
object, namely that of being right, straight or upright, is applied
metaphorically in a moral context. Dagger suggests:
By analogy with the
physical sense, the primary moral sense of "right" was a standard or
measure for conduct. Something was right - morally straight or true - if
it met the standard of rectitude, or rightness ...
Once the idea of
"rightness" had been transferred to the moral domain, the next
development was to view it as denoting a personal entitlement of some
kind. Dagger continues:
From here the next step
was to recognize that actions taken "with right" or "by right" are taken
as a matter of right. The transition is from the belief that I may do
something because it is right, in other words, to the belief that I may
do something because I have a right to do it ... Thus the concept of
rights joins the concept of the right. [9]
The metaphorical moral
usage of terms such as "right," "straight" and "upright" (in opposition
to "crooked," "twisted" and "bent") readily suggests itself to the mind.
The rationale for the transition from the moral use of "right" to the
notion of a right as a personal entitlement, however, is less obvious.
Indeed, this development which took place in the West during the late
Middle Ages, and which has been described as the "watershed" [10 ] in
the history of "right," may be a phenomenon which is culturally unique.
The evolution of the concept in this direction occurs sometime between
Aquinas in the thirteenth century and the jurists Suarez and Grotius in
the seventeenth. The modern usage appears clearly in Hobbes, writing in
the middle of the seventeenth century, and the idea of a right as a
personal power occupies center stage in political theory from this time
on.
As part of this
evolution in the concept of a right the notion of natural rights comes
to prominence towards the end of the seventeenth century, notably in the
writings of John Locke. The belief that there are natural rights flows
from the recognition of human equality, one of the great ideals of the
Age of Revolution. Natural rights are inalienable: they are not
conferred by any judicial or political process nor can they be removed
by these or other means. These natural rights of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries are the forerunner of the contemporary notion of
human rights.
Two questions might be
asked concerning the evolution of the doctrine of natural rights in the
West. First, why did it take so long for the concept of natural rights
to appear? The answer seems to lie in the fact that for much of Western
history "rights" were closely tied to social status, and were
essentially a function of position or role in society. A hierarchical
social structure, such as was predominant in Roman and medieval society,
is antithetical to the notion of natural rights. In these circumstances
a person's duties and responsibilities are determined fundamentally by
the office they hold (lord, citizen, slave), offices which are to a
large extent hereditary. It was only when the hierarchical model was
challenged and replaced by an egalitarian one that the idea of natural
rights began to gain ground.
The second and more
important question for our present purposes is: Does the part played by
the unique cultural matrix of social political and intellectual
developments in the Enlightenment mean that human rights are essentially
a function of the historical process? This conclusion need not follow,
for while it may be said that in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries the notion of natural rights was "an idea whose time had
come," the idea itself was not entirely new. The influence of Christian
doctrine can be seen in several respects, [11] such as the belief
(ultimately derived from Judaism) of a "universal moral law rooted in
the righteousness of God." [12] Since human beings are created in the
image of God and loved by him as individuals each is worthy of dignity
and respect. Furthermore, since each is a member of the human community
under God, all other memberships (tribe, state, nation) are
secondary.[13] Apart from Christianity, ideas about the just treatment
of individuals on the basis of their common humanity are found in a
secular context in Stoicism and the writings of Cicero and Seneca. [14]
The philosophical justification for a doctrine of human rights has thus
always been available, although the ground in which this seed might
flourish - a particular combination of social, political and
intellectual developments - has not.
So much for historical
background. What of contemporary theories of rights? The concept of a
right has been analyzed in a number of ways, as evidenced by the
extensive interdisciplinary literature on the subject spanning diverse
fields such as politics, law, philosophy and history. Within this
discourse of rights there is no single definition of a right which
commands universal assent. For our present purposes, however, a basic
understanding of the concept will suffice. We noted above that a right
is something personal to an individual: it may be thought of as
something an individual has. [15] What the holder of a right has is a
benefit or entitlement of some kind, and at the most general level this
is an entitlement to justice. This entitlement may be analyzed into two
main forms for which there are corresponding rights: rights which take
the form of a claim (claim-rights), and rights which take the form of a
liberty (liberty- rights).[16] A claim-right is the benefit which A
enjoys to impose upon B a positive or negative requirement. A
liberty-right is the benefit which A enjoys of being immune from any
such requirement being imposed by B. [17] This basic understanding of a
right may be summed up in the following working definition: a right is a
benefit which confers upon its holder either a claim or a liberty. One
important feature of any right is that it provides a particular
perspective on justice, in that the right-holder always stands in the
position of beneficiary. This subjective aspect of the entitlement,
which, as we have seen, appeared early in the history of the concept,
remains crucial to the modern understanding of a right. This is brought
out in the following definition by Finnis:
In short, the modern
vocabulary and grammar of rights is a many-faceted instrument for
reporting and asserting the requirements or other implications of a
relationship of justice from the point of view of the person(s) who
benefit(s) from that relationship. It provides a way of talking about
"what is just" from a special angle: the viewpoint of the "other(s)" to
whom something (including, inter alia, freedom of choice) is owed or
due, and who would be wronged if denied that something. [18]
The above brief review
of the Western concept of a right was required as a preliminary to an
assessment of its relevance to Buddhism. We are now in a position to ask
whether the concept of a right is found in Buddhism. If it is, then talk
of human rights in Buddhism seems legitimate.[19] If it is not, there is
a danger of anachronistically foisting onto the tradition a concept
which is the product of an alien culture. [20]
BUDDHISM AND RIGHTS
We took our cue for the
discussion of rights in the West from etymology, and perhaps we can
glean something further from this source. Above it was noted that the
English word "right" is derived from the Latin rectus meaning straight.
Both "right" and rectus themselves, however, have a more remote ancestor
in the Sanskrit rju (straight or upright). The equivalent form in Pali
is uju (or ujju) meaning "straight, direct; straightforward, honest,
upright." [21] It would therefore appear that both the objective sense
("straight") and the metaphorical moral sense ("rectitude") of the word
"right" referred to earlier occur in Buddhist as well as Western
languages. Despite a common Indo-European etymology, however, there is
no word in Sanskrit or Pali which conveys the idea of a "right" or
"rights," understood as a subjective entitlement. [22]
Does this mean that the
concept of rights is alien to Buddhist thought? Not necessarily. Alan
Gewirth has pointed out that cultures may possess the concept of rights
without having a vocabulary which expresses it. He suggests that it is
"important to distinguish between having or using a concept and the
clear or explicit recognition and elucidation of it ... Thus persons
might have and use the concept of a right without explicitly having a
single word for it."[23] Gewirth claims that the concept of rights can
be found in feudal thought, Roman law, Greek philosophy, the Old
Testament, and in primitive societies. In connection with the last
Finnis points out that anthropological studies of African tribal regimes
of law have shown that "the English terms a 'right' and 'duty' are
usually covered by a single word derived from the form normally
translated as 'ought.'" He suggests that the best English translation in
these cases is "due" because "'due' looks both ways along a juridical
relationship, both to what one is due to do, and to what is due to one."
[24]
It seems, then, that the
concept of a right may exist where a word for it does not. Could this be
the case in Buddhism? In Buddhism what is due in any situation is
determined by reference to Dharma. Dharma determines what is right and
just in all contexts and from all perspectives. With respect to social
justice the Rev. Vajiragnana explains:
Each one of us has a
role to play in sustaining and promoting social justice and orderliness.
The Buddha explained very clearly these roles as reciprocal duties
existing between parents and children; teachers and pupils; husband and
wife; friends, relatives and neighbors; employer and employee; clergy
and laity ... No one has been left out. The duties explained here are
reciprocal and are considered as sacred duties, for - if observed - they
can create a just, peaceful and harmonious society. [25]
From this it would seem
that Dharma determines not just "what one is due to do" but also "what
is due to one." Thus through A's performance of his Dharmic duty B
receives that which is his "due" or, we might say, that to which he is
"entitled" in (under, through) Dharma. Since Dharma determines the
duties of husbands and the duties of wives, [26] it follows that the
duties of one correspond to the entitlements or "rights" of the other.
If the husband has a duty to support his wife, the wife has a "right" to
support from her husband. If the wife has a duty to look after her
husband's property, the husband has a "right" to the safe-keeping of his
property by his wife. If under Dharma it is the duty of a king (or
political authority) to dispense justice impartially, then subjects
(citizens) may be said to have a "right" to just and impartial treatment
before the law.
Should it be concluded,
then, that the notion of a right is present in classical Buddhism? The
answer depends on the criteria adopted for "having" a concept. Dagger
sets out the options:
If one is willing to
look primarily for the idea or the notion, however it may be expressed,
then one can confidently say that the concept of rights is virtually as
old as civilization itself.
On the other hand:
If one insists that the
form of expression is crucial ... so that a concept cannot be said to
exist unless there is a word or phrase that distinguishes it from other
concepts, then one would have to say that the concept of rights has its
origin in the middle ages. [27]
I think our conclusion
should be that the concept of rights is implicit in classical Buddhism
in the normative understanding of what is "due" among and between
individuals. Under Dharma, husbands and wives, kings and subjects,
teachers and students, all have reciprocal obligations which can be
analyzed into rights and duties. We must qualify this conclusion,
however, by noting that the requirements of Dharma are expressed in the
form of duties rather than rights. In other words, Dharma states what is
due in the form "A husband should support his wife" as opposed to "Wives
have a right to be maintained by their husbands." Until rights as
personal entitlements are recognized as a discrete but integral part of
what is due under Dharma, the modern concept of rights cannot be said to
be present. In this respect, however, Buddhism is far from unique, and a
similar comment could be made about many other cultures and
civilizations. Finnis points out with respect to Roman law:
[I]t is salutary to bear
in mind that the modern emphasis on the powers of the right-holder, and
the consequent systematic bifurcation between "right" ... and "duty", is
something that sophisticated lawyers were able to do without for the
whole life of classical Roman law. [28]
He also suggests,
rightly I think, that "there is no cause to take sides as between the
older and the newer usages, as ways of expressing the implications of
justice in a given context." [29] A right is a useful concept which
provides a particular perspective on justice. Its correlative, duty,
provides another. These may be thought of as separate windows onto the
common good which is justice or, in the context of Buddhism, Dharma. It
would therefore be going too far to claim that the notion of rights is
"alien" to Buddhism or that Buddhism denies that individuals have
"rights."
In sum it might be said
that in classical Buddhism the notion of rights is present in embryonic
form although not yet born into history. Whether anything like the
Western concept of rights has, or would, appear in the course of the
historical evolution of Buddhism is a question for specialists in the
various Buddhist cultures to ponder. In many respects the omens for this
development were never good. Buddhism originated in a caste society, and
the Asian societies where it has flourished have for the most part been
hierarchically structured. MacIntyre, citing Gewirth, mentions that the
concept of a right lacks any means of expression in Japanese "even as
late as the mid-nineteenth century." [30] The preconditions for the
emergence of the concept of rights would seem to be egalitarianism and
democracy, neither of which have been notable features of Asian polity
before the modern era. On the other hand, a justification for the
rejection of hierarchical social structures is not hard to find in
Buddhism - one need look only at the Buddha's critique of caste. [31]
Buddhism also holds, in the doctrine of no-self, that all individuals
are equal in the most profound sense. [32] Like the Christian doctrine
that all men are created equal before God this would appear to be
fertile ground for a doctrine of natural rights. What seems to have been
lacking in both faiths, but perhaps more so in Buddhism, was the will to
incarnate this theoretical vision of man in the flesh of historical
institutions.
HUMAN RIGHTS
In the preceding section
attention was focused on the concept of a right. Here we consider what
it means to characterize certain rights as human rights, [33] and pursue
further the discussion initiated in the preceding section as to whether
Western notions of human rights are compatible with Buddhism. [34]
The point has already
been made that what are today called human rights were originally spoken
of as "natural" rights, in other words, rights which flow from human
nature. In the seventeenth century philosophers and statesmen began to
define these rights and enshrine them in early constitutions such as the
Fundamental Orders of Connecticut as early as 1639. Documents of this
kind inspired the publication of other declarations, charters and
manifestos in a tradition which has continued into modern times. As an
example of a modern charter of human rights we may take The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General Assembly of the
United Nations in December 1948. Since its promulgation this thirty-
article code has been used as a model for many subsequent human rights
charters.
What is the Buddhist
position with respect to declarations of this kind? It may be useful to
begin by asking whether Buddhism would endorse the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. The repeated calls by the Dalai Lama for respect for
human rights give some reason to think that it would. The signing of the
Global Ethic by many Buddhists also suggests that Buddhism has no
reservations about subscribing to charters or manifestos which seek to
secure universal human rights. Moreover, there seems to be nothing in
any of the thirty articles to which Buddhism would take exception.
Perera's commentary on each of the thirty articles of the Universal
Declaration shows them to be in harmony with early Buddhist teachings
both in letter and in spirit. In his Foreword to the commentary Ananda
Guruge’ writes:
Professor Perera
demonstrates that every single Article of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights - even the labour rights to fair wages, leisure and welfare
- has been adumbrated, cogently upheld and meaningfully incorporated in
an overall view of life and society by the Buddha. [35]
But how are these rights
to be justified with reference to Buddhist teachings? In asking this
question I am not seeking justification by reference to textual passages
which seem to support the rights claimed. There are many passages in the
Pali Canon, as Perera has ably demonstrated, which support the view that
early Buddhist teachings were in harmony with the spirit of the
Declaration. The justification required at this point has more to do
with the philosophical presuppositions underlying these passages and the
overall Buddhist vision of individual and social good.
The various
declarations on human rights themselves rarely offer a justification for
the rights they proclaim. MacIntyre observes dryly how "In the United
Nations declaration on human rights of 1949 [sic] what has since become
the normal UN practice of not giving good reasons for any assertion
whatsoever is followed with great rigor." [36] A gesture towards
justification is sometimes made in recital clauses by reference to the
"inherent dignity ... of all members of the human family" or some
similar form of words. The Global Ethic, which provides a fuller
statement than most, echoes the Universal Declaration in its call for
"the full realization of the intrinsic dignity of the human person".
[37] It states: "We make a commitment to respect life and dignity,
individuality and diversity, so that every person is treated humanely."
This is amplified as follows:
This means that every
human being without distinction of age, sex, race, skin, color, physical
or mental ability, language, religion, political view, or national or
social origin possesses an inalienable and untouchable dignity. And
everyone, the individual as well as the state, is therefore obliged to
honor this dignity and protect it. [38]
Elsewhere, as part of
his dialogue with world religions, Kung makes a constructive suggestion
on this point that students of Buddhism might do well to pay heed to:
Should not Buddhist
thinkers, as they critically assess their own and alien traditions, make
a more direct effort to establish an anthropology centered around human
dignity (which the Buddha himself deeply respected)? Buddhists are fully
aware that man can be adequately understood only as conditioned in every
way, as a relational being within the totality of life and the cosmos.
But should they not reflect more earnestly, especially in an ethical
vein, on the problems of the unique, inviolable, noninterchangeable
human self, with its roots in the past and its future destiny? [39]
It is by no means
apparent, however, how human dignity is to be grounded in Buddhist
doctrine. The very words "human dignity" sound as alien in a Buddhist
context as talk of rights. One looks in vain to the The Four Noble
Truths for any explicit reference to human dignity, and doctrines such
as no-self and impermanence may even be thought to undermine it. If
human dignity is the basis of human rights Buddhism would seem to be in
some difficulty when it comes to providing a justification for them. The
theistic religions, on the other hand, seem much better equipped to
provide an account of human dignity. Christians, Muslims and Jews
typically refer to the ultimate source of human dignity as divine.
Article one (paragraph 1700) of the most recent Catechism of the
Catholic Church, for instance, states: "The dignity of the human person
is rooted in his creation in the image and likeness of God." Buddhism,
clearly, would not wish to make such a claim. Kung notes how leading
Buddhists at the Parliament of the World's Religions felt called upon to
protest at calls for "a unity of religions under God," and at references
to "God the Almighty" and "God the Creator" in invocations during the
proceedings. He suggests, however, that these differences are
reconcilable since the Buddhist concepts of "Nirvana, Shunyata and
Dharmakaya ... fulfil analogous functions to the concept of God" and can
be regarded by Christians as "parallel terms for the Absolute." [40]
It may or may not be
the case that Mahāyāna schools recognize a transcendent reality which
resembles the Christian concept of God as the Absolute, and there are
those better qualified than myself to address such a question. Here I
will make only three brief points regarding the problems which arise in
regarding these things as the source of human dignity. The first is that
since these concepts are understood differently by the main Mahāyāna
schools they are unlikely to provide the common ground which is required
as a foundation for human rights. The second is that it is difficult to
see how any of these things can be the source of human dignity in the
way that God can, since no school of Buddhism believes that human beings
are created by them. The third point is that even if some metaphysical
ground of the above kind can be identified in Mahāyāna Buddhism it still
leaves the problem of how human dignity is to be grounded where
Theravāda Buddhism is concerned. For the Theravāda, Nirvāṇa
is not a transcendent Absolute, nor do the concepts of "Shunyata and
Dharmakaya" have anything like the meaning or significance they attain
later. No grounding for human rights can be truly satisfactory, I would
suggest, unless it unambiguously forms part of the core teachings of
classical Buddhism as a whole.
One suggestion as to
how human rights can be grounded in Buddhist doctrine has been made by
Kenneth Inada. In a discussion of "The Buddhist Perspective on Human
Rights," Inada suggests "there is an intimate and vital relationship of
the Buddhist norm or Dhamma with that of human rights." [41] He explains
the relationship as follows:
Human rights is indeed
an important issue, but the Buddhist position is that it is ancillary to
the larger or more basic issue of human nature. It can be asserted that
the Buddhist sees the concept of human rights as a legal extension of
human nature. It is a crystallization, indeed a formalization, of the
mutual respect and concern of all persons, stemming from human nature.
Thus, human nature is the ultimate source, the basis from which all
other attributes or characteristics are to be delineated. They all have
their respective raison d'etre in it. They are reflections and even
byproducts of it. The reason for assigning human nature the basic
position is very simple. It is to give human relations a firm grounding
in the truly existential nature of things: that is, the concrete and
dynamic relational nature of persons in contact with each other, that
which [sic] avoids being caught up in rhetorical or legalistic tangles.
[42]
Few would disagree with
the proposition that human rights are grounded in human nature. Towards
the end of the extract, however, Inada seems to move away from his
initial suggestion that human nature is the "ultimate source" of human
rights towards the view that the ultimate ground is the "dynamic
relational nature of persons in contact with each other." In other
words, it is in the interrelatedness of persons rather than in the
persons themselves that the justification for human rights is to be
found. This is confirmed a little later:
Consequently, the
Buddhist concern is focused on the experiential process of each
individual, a process technically know as relational origination (paṭicca-samuppāda).
It is the great doctrine of Buddhism, perhaps the greatest doctrine
expounded by the historical Buddha. It means that, in any life-process,
the arising of an experiential event is a total, relational affair. [43]
How is the link between
dependent-origination and human rights to be forged? The argument
reaches its conclusion in the following passage:
Like a storm which
consumes everything in its wake, an experience in terms of relational
origination involves everything within its purview. Hence, the
involvement of elements and, in our case, human beings as entities
should not be in terms of mere relationship but rather a creative
relationship which originates from the individual locus of existence. In
other words, each individual is responsible for the actualization of an
"extensive concern" for everything that lies in his or her path of
experience. So, we may say that the sum total of the "extensive
concerns" can be referred to as a mutually constituted existential
realm, and it thereby becomes a fact that there will be mutual respect
of fellow beings. It is on this basis that we can speak of the rights of
individuals. These rights are actually extensions of human qualities
such as security, liberty, and life. [44]
In simple language, the
argument seems to be as follows. Human beings, like everything else, are
part of the relational process described in the doctrine of
dependent-origination; since no-one exists independently we should look
out for one another; looking out for one another means respecting each
other's rights; examples of the rights we should respect are security,
liberty and life. [45]
Although I have
described this as an "argument" it is little more than a series of
assertions. Working backwards, it is difficult to know what sense to
give the concluding sentence: "These rights are actually extensions of
human qualities such as security, liberty and life." It is unclear what
is meant by "human qualities" here. In what sense is security a "human
quality" (perhaps a "need")? Why is life described as a "quality" of a
human being? Even granted that these things are "human qualities," what
does it mean to say that rights are extensions of "human qualities"? In
the first extract quoted above, Inada suggests that "the Buddhist sees
the concept of human rights as a legal extension of human nature." What
is left unexplained, however, is how human nature (or "human qualities")
become legal rights. Do all "human qualities" extend into rights or only
some? If so, which and why? Finally, if "human qualities" are what give
rise to rights, why invoke the doctrine of dependent- origination?
The derivation of human
rights from the doctrine of dependent-origination is a conjuring trick.
From the premise that we live in "a mutually constituted existential
realm" (we all live together) it has "thereby become a fact" that there
will be "mutual respect of fellow beings." In the twinkling of an eye,
values have appeared from facts like a rabbit out of a hat. However, the
fact that human beings live in relationship with one another is not a
moral argument about how they ought to behave. By itself it offers no
reason why a person should not routinely abuse the rights of others.
Inada's suggestion that human rights can be grounded in the doctrine of
dependent- origination turns out to be little more than a recommendation
that people should be nice to one another on the ground that we are "all
in this together." [46]
The approach adopted by
Perera is rather different. Perera's main concern is to demonstrate that
the articles of the Universal Declaration are adumbrated in early
Buddhist teachings, rather than explore their philosophical foundations.
He acknowledges that "Buddhism credits the human personality with a
dignity and moral responsibility" [47] but does not explain fully whence
this arises or how it provides a foundation for human rights. In a
number of places he suggests certain possibilities regarding the source
of human dignity, not all of which seem to be compatible. At one point
he defines "the ethical assumption on which the Buddhist concept of
human rights is founded" as the "fundamental consideration that all life
has a desire to safeguard itself and to make itself comfortable and
happy." [48] Basing rights on desires, however, is problematic. One
reason is that certain people, for example those who seek to end their
lives through suicide, seem to lack the desire in question. Nor is
difficult to conceive of a justification for human rights abuses along
the lines that the victims "no longer cared what happened to them." If
they themselves had no interest in their future, whose rights would have
been violated? A deeper problem is that the mere existence of desires
establishes nothing from a moral point of view. Desires are many and
varied and can be met in manifold ways. Moral questions arise both at
the level of whether a desire should be met and how it should be met.
The identification of a desire may be a starting point for moral
reflection, but it is certainly not its end. [49]
On the preceding page
Perera suggests an alternative foundation for human rights, one which
links it to human dignity. He writes: "Buddhism posits, as Jean Jaques
Rousseau did much later, that the essence of human dignity lies in the
assumption of man's responsibility for his own governance." [50] No
Buddhist sources are cited in support of this claim, and I believe it is
unlikely that Buddhism would wish to link human dignity quite so closely
to politics. Perhaps if this suggestion were developed a little further
it would make reference to underlying human capacities such as reason
and autonomy which enable men to constitute themselves into orderly
societies, and then point to these as the underlying source of human
dignity. While political institutions may be produced through the
exercise of distinctively human capacities, however, it is unlikely that
Buddhism would locate "the essence of human dignity" in their creation.
According to the Agga~ñnasutta, the evolution of political societies is
the consequence of depravity and decline, which makes them a dubious
testament to human dignity. Where then, should the foundations for a
Buddhist doctrine of human rights be sought? The proper ground for a
doctrine of human rights, I suggest, lies elsewhere than in the doctrine
of dependent-origination, as suggested by Inada, or in either the desire
for self- preservation or the acceptance of responsibility for
self-government, as proposed by Perera. Perera, in fact, comes closest
to what in my view is the true source of human rights in Buddhism in his
commentary on Article 1.[51] In discussing the first sentence of the
Article ("All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights") he comments that "Buddhahood itself is within the reach of all
human beings ... and if all could attain Buddhahood what greater
equality in dignity and rights can there be?" To focus attention upon
the goal, I believe, is more promising than any of the other approaches
considered thus far. Perera seems to grasp its significance in a remark
towards the end of his commentary on Article 1. He writes:
It is from the point of
view of its goal that Buddhism evaluates all action. Hence Buddhist
thought is in accord with this and other Articles in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to the extent to which they facilitate the
advancement of human beings towards the Buddhist goal. [52]
I believe the above
statement provides the key to understanding human rights from a Buddhist
perspective. What is missing in Perera's commentary, however, is the
explicit linkage between the goal and human dignity, and it is this
which I will now try to establish. What I will suggest in general is
that the source of human dignity should be sought not in the analysis of
the human condition provided by the first and second noble truths (the
area where Buddhist scholarship has myopically focused its attention)
but in the evaluation of human good provided by the third and fourth.
Human rights cannot be derived from any factual non-evaluative analysis
of human nature, whether in terms of its psycho-physical constitution
(the five "aggregates" which lack a self), its biological nature (needs,
urges, drives), or the deep structure of interdependency (paṭicca-samupāda)
. Instead, the most promising approach will be one which locates human
rights and dignity within a comprehensive account of human goodness, and
which sees basic rights and freedoms as integrally related to human
flourishing and self-realization. [53] This is because the source of
human dignity in Buddhism lies nowhere else than in the literally
infinite capacity of human nature for participation in goodness. [54]
The connection between
human rights and human good can be illustrated by asking what the
various declarations on human rights see to secure. Documents which
speak of human rights commonly announce a list of specific rights and
freedoms and proclaim them to be inviolable. The rights proclaimed by
the Universal Declaration include the right to life, liberty, security
of person, equality before the law, privacy, marriage and protection of
family life, social security, participation in government, work,
protection against unemployment, rest and leisure, a minimum standard of
living, and enjoyment of the arts. The exercise of these rights is
subject only to such general limitations as are necessary to secure due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and the
requirements of morality, public order and general welfare (Article
29.2). Otherwise, the rights are expressed in categorical forms such as
"Everyone has ..." and "No-one shall ...". For example, Article 3:
"Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person." And
Article 4: "No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and
the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms." The document
thus understands the rights it proclaims as both "universal" and
exceptionless. Using the terminology introduced earlier it can be seen
that some of these rights are claim rights while others are liberty
rights. Article 2 confirms this when it speaks of an entitlement to both
the "rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration." [55]
What do these rights and
freedoms amount to? It might be said that they map the parameters of
human "good-in-community." In other words, these rights and freedoms are
what is required if human beings are to lead fulfilled lives in society.
Article 29.1 recognizes this when it observes "Everyone has duties to
the community in which alone the free and full development of his
personality is possible."[56] In the absence of human rights the scope
for human development and fulfillment through social interaction is
drastically reduced. The rights specified define and facilitate aspects
of human fulfillment. The right to life is clearly fundamental since it
is the condition for the enjoyment of all other rights and freedoms. The
right to "liberty and security of person" (Article 3) is also basic to
any understanding of human good. Without these minimum conditions the
scope and opportunity for human fulfillment would be intolerably
restricted. The same would apply in the case of slavery (Article 4),
torture (Article 5), and the denial of rights before the law (Article
6). It can also be seen that many of the detailed rights identified are
actually derived from more fundamental ones. Article 3, for example, "No
one shall be held in slavery," is clearly implied in Article 2,
"Everyone has the right to ... liberty." It might thus be said that many
of the thirty articles articulate the practical implications of a
relatively small number of fundamental rights and freedoms which are the
basis of the common good.
It may be noted that
the Universal Declaration itself and modern charters like it do not
offer a comprehensive vision of human good. This is not intended as a
criticism, for the purpose of such charters is to secure only what might
be termed the "minimum conditions" for human flourishing in a
pluralistic milieu. The task of articulating a comprehensive vision of
what is ultimately valuable in human life and how it is to be attained
falls to the competing theories of human good found in religions,
philosophies and ideologies. Buddhism provides one view of human nature
and its fulfillment, Christianity another, secular philosophies a third.
To pursue any of these different paths, however, requires the
substructure known as "human rights," a complex of fundamental rights
and liberties which are the preconditions for the realization of the
particular opportunities made available by the competing ideologies.
If the aim of human
rights declarations is understood in the way outlined above then human
rights is fundamentally a moral issue. Where there is no right to life,
liberty and security of person, and where torture is routine, the
opportunities for the realization of human good are greatly reduced.
Freedom of religion (Article 18), for example, is vital to the Buddhist
vision of individual and social good, and the consequences of the loss
of these rights are all too obvious in Tibet. Human rights is thus an
area in which religions have a legitimate and vital stake, and there is
every reason why it would be proper for Buddhism both to endorse the
Universal Declaration and call upon others to respect and implement it.
[57]
If religions have a
legitimate stake in human rights, we might expect to find many of the
rights and liberties spelled out in human rights charters present in
either an express or implied form in their moral teachings. These
typically include commandments or precepts forbidding killing, stealing,
adultery, and lying, as do the first four of the Five Precepts. These
evils are prohibited because it is immediately apparent that they are
antithetical to human flourishing-in-community. The rationale for these
prohibitions, I suggest, coincides to a large extent with that of the
various human rights manifestos. [58] These manifestos, indeed, may be
regarded as a translation of religious precepts into the language of
rights. The process of casuistry can be seen at work in both. Just as a
limited number of moral precepts can be expanded to meet the needs of
different social situations (many of the extensive Vinaya rules, for
example, have their source in a handful of moral precepts), [59] so the
many articles in human rights charters are extrapolated from a
comparatively small number of basic rights and freedoms.
It must be admitted
there are grounds for skepticism towards the parallel which has just
been suggested since it cannot be denied that the Buddhist precepts look
and sound very different from contemporary declarations on human rights.
The Buddhist precepts make no reference to "rights" at all, and are
couched instead in the form of undertakings. [60] Let us examine what
these undertakings involve. On the basis of our earlier analysis it
would seem that "taking the precepts" in Buddhism is actually the formal
acknowledgment of a subsisting duty, a duty which arises from Dharma.
The person who takes the precepts is saying in effect "I hereby
recognize my Dharmic duty not to do x,y, and z." Since duties have their
correlative in rights, however, rights must also be implicit in the good
the precepts seek to promote. We saw earlier that rights provide a way
of talking about what is just and unjust from a special angle. We noted
further that a person who has right has a benefit, a benefit which can
be described as either a claim or a liberty. In the context of the
precepts, then, the right-holder is the one who suffers from the breach
of Dharmic duty when the precepts are broken. In the case of the first
precept this would be the person who was unjustly killed. The right the
victim has may therefore be defined as a negative claim-right upon the
aggressor, namely the right not to be killed. In simple terms we might
say that the victim has a right to life which the aggressor has a duty
to respect.
That the translation
between precepts and rights is accurate, and that the agreement between
the two formulations is more than superficial or accidental, is
supported by the authenticity with which the Dalai Lama was able to
affirm the Global Ethic. Kuschel comments as follows:
Something else seems
decisive to me: authenticity and humanity. The reason why the Dalai
Lama's speech was so convincing, and indeed seized people's hearts, so
that it was often interrupted by spontaneous applause, was that this man
simply wanted to be an authentic Buddhist. His plea for mutual respect,
dialogue and collaboration, for understanding between peoples and
respect for creation, was not an adaptation to Christian or Western
values, but came from the depths of his own Buddhist spirituality. [61]
Further evidence of the
linkage between the Buddhist precepts and social justice is found in the
Theravāda tradition. Writing on the theme of "Justice in Buddhism"
Vajiragnana states:
Man is responsible for
society. It is he who makes it good or bad through his own actions.
Buddhism, therefore, advocates a five-fold disciplinary code for man's
training in order to maintain justice in society ... These five ...
precepts are extremely important fundamental principles for promoting
and perpetuating human welfare, peace and justice. [62]
I suggest, then, that
the apparent differences between the moral teachings of Buddhism and
human rights charters is one of form rather than substance. Human rights
can be extrapolated from Buddhist moral teachings in the manner
described above using the logic of moral relationships to illumine what
is due under Dharma. A direct translation of the first four precepts
yields a right to life, a right not to have one's property stolen, a
right to fidelity in marriage, and a right not to be lied to. Many other
human rights, such as the rights to liberty and security can either be
deduced from or are extant within the general corpus of Buddhist moral
teachings. A right not to be held in slavery, for example, is implicit
in the canonical prohibition on trade in living beings. [63] These
rights are the extrapolation of what is due under Dharma; they have not
been "imported" into Buddhism but were implicitly present.
If modern conceptions
of human rights and Buddhist moral teachings are related in the way I
have suggested, certain conclusions follow for our understanding of the
Buddhist precepts. If there are universal and exceptionless rights, as
human rights charters affirm, there must be universal and exceptionless
duties. If human rights such as a "right to life" (by which I understand
a right not to have one's life taken unjustly) are exceptionless, there
must also be an exceptionless duty to abstain from unjustly depriving a
human being of life. The First Precept in Buddhism, therefore, should be
understood as an exceptionless duty or moral absolute.
Is this reverse
translation, from absolute human rights to absolute moral duties,
supported by textual sources? There is every reason to think that it is.
Such an understanding of the precept is clearly evident in classical
Buddhism, which tirelessly reiterates the principle of the sanctity of
life found in the pan- Indian teachings on non-harming (ahiṃsā),
and which gives no reason to suppose that its moral precepts are to be
understood as anything other than exceptionless norms. If, on the other
hand, it is thought that the precepts are not to be understood as moral
absolutes, then it is difficult to see what justification there can be
for Buddhists to hold that there are universal and exceptionless human
rights. It would be inconsistent to affirm the latter but deny the
former.
The above account of
human rights in Buddhism has been given entirely within the context of
an understanding of human good which has its apex in
nirvana-in-this-life. Reference to the transcendent dimension of human
good and its ground has been avoided for several reasons. The first is
that no reference need be made to transcendent realities in order to
ground human rights. That this is so can be seen from the absence of any
reference to such realities in contemporary human rights charters, and
the fact that many atheists are vigorous defenders of human rights.
Where Buddhism is concerned, the vision of human good set out in the
third and fourth noble truths provides the necessary basis for a
doctrine of human rights. Human rights turn out in essence to be what
justice requires if human good is to be fulfilled. The second reason for
avoiding reference to transcendent realities is that my aim has been to
suggest a basis for human rights acceptable to classical Buddhism as a
whole. Since all schools of Buddhism affirm the third and fourth noble
truths and the vision of human good they proclaim, the required common
ground for a pan-Buddhist doctrine of human rights is present.
The above should not be
read as a denial that there can be a transcendent ground for human
rights in Buddhism. Because the transcendent dimension of human good is
left obscure in Buddhist teachings, however, the transcendent ground for
human rights is also obscure. In terms of the account given here, the
transcendent ground for human rights would be post-mortem nirvana, not
in the sense of an absolute reality (as suggested by Kung) but as the
universalization of human good on a transcendent plane. The twin axes of
human good are knowledge (prajñā) and moral concern (karuṇā)
and on the graph defined by these axes can be plotted the soteriological
coordinates of any individual. Through participation in these twin
categories of good, human nature progressively transcends its
limitations and becomes saturated with nirvanic goodness. Eventually, in
post-mortem nirvāṇa, this
goodness attains a magnitude which can no longer be charted. If a
transcendent ground for human rights is desired, this is where it should
be sought.
To sum up: it is
legitimate to speak of both rights and human rights in Buddhism. Modern
doctrines of human rights are in harmony with the moral values of
classical Buddhism in that they are an explication of what is "due"
under Dharma. The modern idea of human rights has a distinctive cultural
origin, but its underlying preoccupation with human good makes it at
bottom a moral issue in which Buddhism and other religions have a
legitimate stake. The Global Ethic endorses the view that the principles
it sets forth on human rights are neither new nor "Western" when it
states: "We affirm that a common set of core values is found in the
teachings of the religions, and that these form the basis of a global
ethic." [64]
A final thought. Above
I have spoken only of human rights, and in the context of Buddhism this
perspective may be unduly narrow in that it seems to preclude the
universe of sentient non-human beings from any entitlement to rights.
Buddhists may feel, therefore, that it is less prejudicial in
discussions of this kind to revert to the older terminology of "natural"
rights. Whether or not animals have rights, and whether these are the
same rights as human beings, is a matter which requires separate
discussion. If human rights flow from human nature, as suggested, it may
be that rights of different kinds flow from natures of different kinds.
Such would seem to be the understanding of classical Buddhism.
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NOTES
[1] The text of the
Declaration, along with commentaries and supplementary information is
available in Kung and Kuschel, (eds) (1993). Return
[2] Kung and Kuschel
(eds) (1993:8). Return
[3] For a range of
cultural and ideological perspectives on human rights see Pollis and
Schwab (1979).Return
[4] On the absence of
ethics in Hinduism see Creel (1977:20ff). Return
[5] In spite of its
contemporary importance, however, little appears to have been written on
the subject from a specifically Buddhist perspective. The only monograph
on the subject appears to be Perera (1991), and I am grateful to the
Ven. Mahinda Deegalle for bringing it to my attention. Panikkar
(1982:76n) refers to a UNESCO Symposium which took place in Bangkok in
1979 entitled Meeting of Experts on the Place of Human Rights in
Cultural and Religious Traditions, which apparently included discussion
of Buddhism. I have as yet been unable to obtain a copy of the Final
Report SS-79/CONF. 607/10 of 6 February 1980. Return
[6] On the analogous
question of whether there is an "African" doctrine of human rights see
Howard (1986). Return
[7] For information on
these empirical questions see Humana (1992), Hsiung (1985), Rupesinghe
et al (1993), de Silva (1988), also Human Rights in Developing
Countries, Yearbook 1993 (Copenhagen, 1993: Nordic Human Rights
Publications). Return
[8] Dagger (1989:293). I
am indebted to Dagger's excellent paper throughout this section. Return
[9] Dagger (1989:294),
original emphasis. Return
[10] Finnis (1980:206).
Return
[11] Stackhouse lists
five (1984:35ff). Little (1988) shows the dependency of the modern
Western secular and liberal ideology on Christian theology by tracing
the historical connection between the Christian concept of conscience
and the intellectual framework within which the American doctrines of
liberty and religious freedom emerged in the eighteenth century in the
writings of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. He suggests that this
Western framework applies relatively unproblematically to Buddhism and
Islam, and notes in general: "Thus, current human rights formulations,
along with the important notions that underlie them, are by no means
necessarily irrelevant to cultures outside the West" (1988:31). For
perspectives on human rights from the world's religions see Rouner
(1988) and Swidler (1982). Issues concerning religion and rights are
discussed by Bradney (1993). A commentary on the Universal Declaration
from the perspective of Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity and Islam may
be found in Human Rights and Religions in Sri Lanka, published by the
Sri Lanka Foundation (Colombo, 1988). The Buddhist commentary by Perera
was republished separately in 1991. Return
[12] Stackhouse
(1984:35) Return
[13] Stackhouse
(1984:36). Return
[14] For a survey see
Carlyle and Carlyle (1950) Return
[15] Finnis (1980:208).
Return
[16] The most
influential modern analysis of rights is that by Hohfeld (1964). Return
[17] Finnis
(1980:199-205). Return
[18] Finnis (1980:205),
original emphasis. Return
[19] Perera's discussion
of Buddhism and human rights does not address these questions, and seems
to assume that the concept of rights and human rights as understood in
the Universal Declaration are directly applicable to canonical Buddhism.
Return
[20] For the view that
moral values are determined by culture, as maintained by many
anthropologists, see Ladd (ed.) (1983). The defensibility of a specific
cultural custom (female circumcision) from a human rights perspective is
discussed by James (1994). Return
[21] Pali Text Society
Pali-English Dictionary, uju and ujju. Return
[22] On the concept of
rights in Hinduism and the meaning of adhikāra, see Bilimoria (1993),
also Creel (1977:19). In Buddhist languages the notion of rights may be
distributed among a variety of terms, as perhaps, in Latin among the
words auctoritas, potestas, dominium, iurisdictio, proprietas, libertas
and ius (Dagger, 1989:291). Return
[23] Quoted in Dagger
(1989:286). Return
[24] Finnis (1980:209).
Return
[25] Vajiragnana (1992)
Return
[26] See, for example,
the Sigālovādasutta. Return
[27] Dagger (1989:297)
Return
[28] Finnis (1980:209)
Return
[29] Finnis (1980:210)
Return
[30] MacIntyre
(1981:69). Cf. de Bary on the Chinese neologisms which have been coined
to express these concepts (1988:183). Return
[31] The institution of
caste is criticized in numerous early discourses, notably the Soṇadaṇḍasutta. Return
[32] Carrithers (1985)
suggests that the Buddhist concept of the "self" (which he relates to
Mauss's concept of the "moi") is one which is easily transportable
across cultural frontiers. This enhances the prospects for a Buddhist
doctrine of universal human rights. Return
[33] Useful discussions
of the philosophical basis of human rights may be found in Donnelly
(1985) and Nickel (1987). Return
[34] On how far the
Western concept of human rights is relevant or applicable to other
cultures see Panikkar (1982), Teson (1985), Milne (1986), Welch et al
(1990). Return
[35] Perera (1991:xi).
Return
[36] MacIntyre
(1981:69). Return
[37] A Global Ethic,
p.14 Return
[38] A Global Ethic,
p.23 original emphasis. Return
[39] Kung (1986:383f),
original emphasis. Return
[40] A Global Ethic,
p.62f Return
[41] Inada (1982:71)
Return
[42] Inada (1982:70),
paragraphs joined. Return
[43] Inada (1982:70).
Return
[44] Inada (1982:70f).
Return
[45] An earlier attempt
to ground Buddhist ethics in dependent- origination can be found in Macy
(1979). Macy offers the Sarvodaya Shramadana, a self-help movement in
Sri Lanka, as "A notable example of the ethics of paṭicca-samuppāda,"
but, like Inada, fails to explain how a moral imperative arises out of
this doctrine. Also drawn to the seemingly magnetic doctrines of no-self
and dependent-origination is Taitetsu Unno, whose 1988 article,
supposedly about rights, is taken up almost entirely in providing a Pure
Land perspective on these two doctrines. While these doctrines offer a
congenial metaphysical backdrop for Buddhist ethics, they cannot provide
a moral ground for rights. Harris (1994) expresses doubts that
dependent-origination can provide a satisfactory basis for Buddhist
ecology. Return
[46] In a second essay
on the subject (1990) Inada gives much less emphasis to
dependent-origination and seems to want to ground human rights in
compassion. However, the nature of the argument, and in particular the
concluding paragraph, are far from clear. Return
[47] Perera (1991:28,
cf.88). Return
[48] Perera (1991:29).
Return
[49] A further problem,
although I believe it is ultimately a pseudo- problem, is that Buddhism
sees desire as the cause of suffering. Desire would therefore seem an
unlikely foundation for human rights. Return
[50] Perera (1991:28).
Return
[51] Article 1: "All
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in
a spirit of brotherhood." Return
[52] Perera (1991:24).
Return
[53] A discussion of
human nature and human good in Buddhism will be found in my forthcoming
Buddhism & Bioethics (Macmillan, 1995). Return
[54] A more familiar way
of making the same point in Buddhist terminology would be to say that
all beings are potential Buddhas or possess the "Buddha-nature." Return
[55] Emphasis added.
Return
[56] Emphasis added.
Return
[57] In the view of
Perera: "From the religious angle, it is possible to state that in this
Declaration lie enshrined certain values and norms emphasized by the
major religions of the world. Though not directly expressed, the basic
principles of the Declaration are supported and reinforced by these
religious traditions, and among them the contribution of the Buddhist
tradition, to say the least, is quite outstanding" (1991:xīi). Though
not wishing to deny that the early teachings support the principles of
the Declaration, I do not agree that the contribution of the Buddhist
//tradition// to the cause of human rights is in any way "outstanding."
Return
[58] In certain areas
(such as the prohibition on alcohol and matters of sexual morality) the
precepts go beyond the more limited aims of human rights charters. This
is because Buddhism provides a particular vision of human good and also
defines the practices required for its fulfillment. Return
[59] Keown (1992:33).
Return
[60] Sometimes a
contrast is drawn between the "voluntary" nature of the Buddhist
precepts and the "commandments" of Christianity. While the format of the
Buddhist precepts is certainly more appealing to liberal tastes, the
distinction has little real meaning. The precepts apply whether or not
they are formally "undertaken," and are commandments in all but name.
Return
[61] Kung and Kuschel (eds)
(1993:104), original emphasis. Return
[62] Vajiragnana (1992).
Return
[63] A.īi.208 Return
[64] Kung and Kuschel (eds)
(1993:14). Return
Copyright 1995
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Source: http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/
Update: 01-12-2004
