Role of Intention (Cetaana)- in Buddhist Ethical Doctrine
of Kamma
- Bhikkhu Thich Nhat-Tu
---o0o---
It is no denying fact that the Buddha for the first time in history of
thought has laid stress on the importance of intention or volition (cetanaa) in performing
an act ethically. Cetanaa "refers only to the self-centred, goal-directed and
result-oriented volitional disposition which impels the worldly individual
(puthujjana)."[1] Ethical good (kusala) or bad (akusala), merit (pu~n~na) or demerit
(paapa) leading to their perspective ethical consequences will be depended on the level
and quality of intention (cetanaa) of the ethical agent. If the intention of performing an
act is present in high level, the result (vipaka) definitely bears the corresponding high
level. If it is absent, the result is lessened in quality of bearing fruit or may not bear
any fruit. Similarly, if the quality of intention is ethically good, the acts having good
intended intention bear wholesome consequence; while the acts having evil intended will,
bear unwholesome consequence. This interpretation, however, should not be confused with
the statement that the Buddha’s theory of kamma is of utilitarian type in the sense
that it lays stress on the consequence. It should be noted here that Buddhist ethics can
be considered as cetanaa-utilitarianism, which emphasizes the agent’s intention
(cetanaa) over the consequence of actions performed by him.The famous definition of kamma
attributed to the Buddha is read as: "Cetanaha"m bhikkhave kamma"m vadaami;
cetayitvaa kamma"m karoti kaayena vaacaaya manasaa,"[2] literally means
"Monks, intention or determinate thought,[3] I say, is kamma. When intention is
manifested, one acts by physical deed, speech or thought."[4] This definition is
reflected in the first twin-verse of the Dhammapada, where it runs: "Mind is the
fore-runner of all mental states [and deeds] (dhammaa). All mental states [and deeds] have
mind as the command chief as well as their maker. If one acts or speaks with an evil mind,
dukkha follows him just as the wheel follows the hoof-print of the ox that draws the cart
. . . Similarly, if one acts or speaks with a good mind, happiness follows him like a
shadow that never leaves him."[5] These two statements are of the same emphasis that
the taming and understanding the mind or intentional motive is necessary to the ethical
agent if moral practice and mental training are to be cultivated in order to attain higher
spirituality or perfect enlightenment. It is, however, of great controversy in giving
interpretation to the above-mentioned definition. Before proceeding to analysis of the
relation between kamma and cetanaa, it will be worthwhile to look at the interpretation
given by scholars then to turn briefly to a consideration of their use in the context
appeared.
Most of the Pali scholars are inclined to define "kamma as
exclusively cetanaa" (kammaha"m cetana"m vadaami). McDermott, thus, writes:
"In contrast to the Sarvaastivaadin opinion on this point, the P li schools
consider all kamma to be cetanaa. Mental acts are pure intentional impulse. Acts of body
and voice are intentional impulses which put the body and voice in motion, and not simply
the actions ensuant upon volition."[6] He further points out the common translation
of kamma as cetanaa that, "the Buddhist understanding of kamma is what usually
translated as ‘volition,’ namely cetanaa."[7] Poussin is perhaps the first
thinker, who interprets kamma as exclusively cetanaa: "Karma is volition and
voluntary action,"[8] and "Karma is twofold: (1) volition (cetanaa), or mental
or spiritual action (maanasa), and (2) what is born from volition, what is done by
volition."[9] His reductive interpretation of kamma into cetanaa is seen clearly when
he writes: "Buddhism, on the contrary, teaches that there is no Karman without
consciousness and even premeditation."[10] In another passage, he does so when
stressing the importance of the concept of cetanaa coined by the Buddha: "we must
consider this definition, ‘Karman is volition, and bodily or verbal action which
follows volition,’ as one of the steps in the history of the Indian
thought."[11] Halbfass is appeared to identify kamma with cetanaa though he considers
correctly the former is primary while the latter secondary in nature: "a notion of
agency which defines the act as rooted in, or even as essentially identical with, volition
and decision (cetanaa) and interprets its vocal or physical implementation as a secondary
phenomenon."[12] The discussion of Krishan, in this regard, is found precisely
similar, "The Buddha for the first time propounded that moral karma is essentially
mental in its nature."[13] Karunaratna is, in his scholarly article on cetanaa in the
Encyclopaedia of Buddhism,[14] of the view that cetanaa and kamma are synonymous in
denoting the idea of moral action in Buddhism. Thus he writes: "The all too brief
definition states expressly, precisely and concisely that cetanaa and kamma are
equivalent, and therefore, interchangeable as terms denoting the essential meaning of
moral action,"[15] or "Thus, cetanaa becomes one with kamma creating
consequences which serve to feed the further intensification of the self-centred activity
of the will."[16] On the basis of this equation, he concludes that the path leading
to the cessation of kamma is identical with the path leading to the cessation of cetanaa
and saaakhaaraa.[17] Von Glasenapp, in this regard, strongly claims that ". . . the
Buddha and the other sages have declared that not the action itself, but exclusively the
intention, the conscious willing of the person acting (cetanaa), are of decisive
significance."[18] Unlike Nyanatiloka[19] and others, Payutto carefully defines kamma
as cetanaa-kamma, rather than exclusively cetanaa, when he writes: "Etymologically
speaking, kamma means ‘work’ or ‘action.’ But in the context of Dhamma
we define it more specifically as ‘actions based on intention (cetanaa)’ or
‘deeds willfully done.’ Actions that are free of intention are not considered to
be kamma in the Buddha’s teaching."[20] In his well-known book, the Buddha and
His Teaching, Narada has already stated this interpretation earlier:(1) The Paali term
kamma, literally means action or doing. Any kind of intentional action whether mental,
verbal or physical is regarded as kamma. It covers all that is included in the phrase,
‘though, word and deed.’ Generally speaking, all good and bad actions constitute
kamma. (2) In its ultimate sense, kamma means all moral and immoral volition. Involuntary,
unintentional or unconscious actions, though technically deed, do not constitute kamma,
because volition, the most important factor in determining kamma, is absent.[21]While
partially agreeing with the first part of his definition, that kamma is any intentional
action whether mental, verbal or physical, I do not think the second part of his
definition is tenable. For him, any action without intention does not bear its fruit. Such
an interpretation proves somewhat unsatisfactory in analysis of kamma as mere cetanaa. The
reduction of kamma into exclusive cetanaa can not be accepted because the Buddha does not
deny the existence of unintentional actions (acetanaa-kammaa) rather than he stresses the
important role of cetanaa in directing and determining human ethical actions. Moreover, it
should be noted here that "not only the intentional stimulus, but the action itself
is also significant from the Buddhist point of view."[22]
Thus, the interpretation of kamma as mere cetanaa by modern scholars is
unsatisfactory. This interpretation is in fact rooted from the commentary literature,
especially in the Visuddhimagga and the Dhammasa"nga.nii A.t.thakathaa of the great
Pali commentator, Buddhaghosa. It is relevant here to take note on his analysis on the
Buddha’s statement. Quoting the Buddha (Cetanaaha"m bhikkhave kamma"m
vadaami), Buddhaghosa identifies kamma as exclusively cetanaa.[23] He inserts that
"kamma means consciousness or intention of the good and the bad, merit and
demerit."[24] This finds support in the Atthasaalinii, where kamma is defined as
cetanaa and the mental states associated with it.[25] He however comes very close to the
point, when he claims intention is the source of physical deed, verbal deed and mental
deed . . . mind is the door of mental action."[26] In this direction, it is believed
that Harivarman’s interpretation of the same is more relevant to the statement of the
Buddha, and therefore agreeable. For instance, in his Satyasiddhi'saastra,[27] he appears
to claim that kamma is not only cetanaa but the action manifested from it as well. This
logically follows that action manifested from intention would include physical, verbal and
mental deeds, and those actions unassociated with or not originated from intention
including unintentionally physical, verbal and mental deeds. On the same page, he stresses
the importance of the mind, when he writes, "ethical qualities, good and evil, are
controlled by the agent’s mind,"[28] or "without the presence of the mind,
ethical good and evil is impossible."[29] He points further out that "actions
whether ethical good or bad depends on the state of the mind."[30] He sees that
unintentional action certainly produces its fruition, though it is ethically lessened,
when he stresses that "the non-intentional kamma is not great sin."[31] This
gets support from scriptural passage, where it is stated "he [Naa.taputta] acted
unintentionally (asa~ncetanikam) and hence it is not a great sin or
crime."[32]Amongst the modern scholars, Poussin, as I believe, rightly points out
that the Buddhist definition of kamma as ‘intention together with the action,’
which follows upon it, to be one of the steps in the history of Indian thought.[33] The
emphasis in Buddhist theory of kamma on goal-oriented intentional motive behind the action
is to bring out the forceful importance of ethical orientation, and this in turn gives
rise to deed-direction and tendencies, which affect or determine the future states and
conditions of the ethical agent. What should be noted here is that by declaring
"cetanaaha"m bhikkhave kamma"m vadaami," the Buddha fundamentally lays
great stress on the importance of intention (cetanaa) behind the action as a major factor
in producing an ethical act leading to moral consequence, good or bad. Having stressed the
decisiveness of intention in determining the tendency and the fruition of an act, the
Buddha does not, in this context, deny the existence of the other three kinds of kamma,
namely unintentional acts of body (acetanaa-kaaya-kamma), unintentional acts of speech
(acetanaa-vacii-kamma), and unintentional acts of mind (acetanaa-mano-kamma). Because from
three main modes of kamma, viz., bodily act, verbal act and mental act, we can divide them
into two sub-modes of actions, namely intentional actions and unintentional actions. Of
the first group, there are intentional bodily action, intentional verbal action and
intentional mental action, which bears greatly ethical result, good or bad. Belonging to
the second, there are unintentional bodily action, unintentional verbal action and
unintentional mental action, which bear lessened or minimized ethical result. The Buddha
does not reduce all kammas to cetanaa-kamma, as the scholars did. The emphasis on the role
of cetanaa no doubt is the Buddha’s contribution to not only the theory of kamma but
also to the ethical tendencies as well its understanding leading to the specific ethical
effects. Ch’en states that the stress on cetanaa was a significant point added by the
Buddha to the prevailing views concerning karma.[34] McDermott impressively writes,
"What is unique with Gotama and his followers is the importance which he places on
the role of intention. Only in Buddhism could the intentional impulse (cetanaa) be defined
as kamma."[35]It is here of significance to observe that the Buddha’s statement
"cetanaaha"m bhikkhave kamma"m vadaami" does not amount to the
statement that "kamma is exclusively cetanaa" (kammaha"m cetanaa"m
vadaami), because kamma is of ‘twofold category’ to which cetanaa or
cetanaa-kamma as a variety of this twofold category belongs, and the other being
acetanaa-kamma. The logical distinction between the subject, kamma, and the predicate,
cetanaa, should not confuse the reader that they are mutually ‘identical.’
Employing the term ‘analytic statement and synthetic statement’ coined by Kant,
we can accordingly put the Buddha’s statement in this way: (1) cetanaa is kamma; this
is of the form of analytic proposition, like that of ‘'Si"m'sapaa is a
tree’. Here cetanaa is a variety of kamma, and (2) kamma is purely cetanaa; it has
the form of synthetic proposition, like that of ‘This tree is a
'Si"m'sapaa.’ Here the Buddha’s analytic statement "cetanaa is
kamma" does not amount to the synthetic statement as misinterpreted by scholars that
"kamma is exclusively cetanaa." In the context of the Buddha’s statement,
the analytic proposition is meant that the subject cetanaa is contained in the predicate
kamma. This statement does not discuss something new instead of repeating that cetanaa is
a kind, the most important kind, of kamma. The repetition here, however, makes
significance that is more ethical to agent’s will in performance of any
action.Furthermore, given the logically faultless inference form ‘a=b’ to
‘b=a’ we cannot proceed from the statement, ‘cetanaa is kamma’ to the
statement ‘kamma is exclusively cetanaa,’ for the first is logically true while
the second false. This wrong identification is sound similar to the statement
‘everything is identical with something’ mistakenly identified with
‘something is identical with everything,’ for the concept ‘everything’
is a greater category whereas the concept ‘something’ smaller, which should be
contained in the former instead of being identified with the former. The same holds true
with kamma and cetanaa.Moreover, one should pay attention not only to the first part of
the Buddha’s statement "cetanaaha"m bhikkhave kamma"m vadaami,"
but also to the second part of the statement following the first "cetayitvaa
kamma"m karoti kaayena vaacaaya manasaa,"[36] which makes the context more
ethical clearly. Here the Buddha does confirm not only that intention (cetanaa) is a
special kind of kamma in moral judgment, tendency and ethical performance, but also link
it with the bodily action (kaayakamma), verbal action (vaciikamma), and mental action
(manokamma) to make significantly the role of intention. According to the most popular
threefold classification of kamma[37] made by the Buddha into acts of body (kaayakamma),
acts of speech (vaciikamma), and acts of mind (manokamma), each of these acts produces
consequences: "All kamma whether good or evil bears consequence. There is no kamma,
no matter how small, which is void of consequence."[38] However, among these three
kinds of kamma, mental kind is the most important, as it is stated in the following
passage: "Listen, of these three kamma classified by me, I say that mental kamma
(manokamma) has the heaviest consequences for the committing of evil deeds, for the
existence of evil deeds, not action s of the body or speech."[39] It is clear that,
according to McFarlane, "the emphasis on the psychology of intentions in traditional
ethical teaching and spiritual practice should not lead to the undermining of physical
behaviour and actual consequences." He further explains that "It would be
incorrect to say that the intention or will to perform an unwholesome act, which was not
actually carried out, would produce the same effect as the actual performance of such an
act."[40]In reality, there are actions, which are not sprung from intention or devoid
of motive proved, harmful or beneficial to the ethical agent as well as to others. Both
the doer and the recipient are to experience its fruition, more or less suffered or
pleasant through unwitting actions performed. Take an example the case of being shot death
by mistake. The deceased, who has no intention or willing to be died, is certainly
suffered as a result of wrong identification or mistake by unintentional agent. The
unintentional shooter without motive of killing anyone is responsible for his carelessly
ethical action, say wrong shooting, being produced in the court and then to be put in
prison. Because of being in the prison, he may loose his job or stopped his habitual work
unwittingly. An encounter example can be seen in the case of a person who keeps away
scraps of food without any intention to give it to anyone.[41] But then a hungry dog comes
by and has a delicious meal out of it. His scraps of food were helpful and beneficial to
the life of the dog. When the time to come for that unintentionally helpful kamma to
mature, he will enjoy its fruit, even ethically lessened comparatively to that of
intention feeding the dog, say being helped by someone incidentally, as it has been
happened in the real.
This idea would be clear with the help of the following analysis.
Actual murder with evil intention no doubt has greater effect; with no evil intention
still has effect, though ethically minor; and even the mere thought of murder
unaccompanied by any performance is ethically wrong, from the Buddhist standpoint. That is
to say, mental action unaccompanied with outward performance and that the performance of
the physical deeds, either accompanied with intention or not, is considered to produce
specific kammic effects, at least on two respects, namely on the planning-doer himself and
on the recipient. So far as the part of the ethical agent is concerned, even the
‘mere’ intention, whether wholesome or unwholesome, will give some effect, say
disturbing the peacefulness of the mind of the planning-doer, who plans to make his
intention possible. With respect to the recipient, let us say for instance, the
destructive intention may either give rise to the feeling of being disturbed by
intentional violence of the planning-doer, or even he is facing death due to being killed
unintentionally by the evil-doer, respectively. In the Buddha’s statement, there is
obviously intention (cetanaa). On the other hand, there is crucially also ‘what is
born from intention,’ namely bodily action (kaayakamma), vocal action (vaciikamma)
and mental action (manokamma). If kamma were merely cetanaa there should be no other
actions named bodily action (kaayakamma), vocal action (vaciikamma) and mental action
(manokamma).[42] In fact, these actions obviously exist. The reducing identification of
kamma as exclusive cetanaa is, therefore, untenable.In the teachings of the Buddha, the
relationship between the levels of intention and performance of that intention should be
suitably acknowledged. As the motive force or guiding manager, intention is conductive to
performing an act after having conscious choice of objects of preference by the nature of
an awareness-mind. Where there is intention, there may be tendency to make it possible.
Similarly, where there is an increase of intensity of mental activity or intention to an
unbearable level, the tendency of performance of something would be transformed into
external activities, namely, either bodily action (kaayakamma), vocal action (vaciikamma)
or mental action (manokamma). In other words, not every intention will lead to the actual
performance. Depending on the levels of intentional motive, some dynamically become
physical or verbal activities while some remains mental activities only. In the case of
being mental activities, the effect of the intention on both the planing-doer and the
recipient is ethically lessened or minimized,[43] whereas with regard to intention having
transformed into outward performance, the effect is ethically serious. Take the
‘initial thought of destroying life’ and the ‘ actual act of destroying
life’ as an example. The intentional thought, ‘I want to kill A’ is
unwholesome thought in nature. This may produce some unfortunate result, if the
intentional doer is not remorseful or till in hoping so doing. In the case of someone
wishing to kill A with the plan of murder, the effect of being unfortunate here and
hereafter is more serious. If the murder is actually happened after having evilly willed
with careful planning and acting, the effect becomes most serious comparatively with the
first two cases.Thus, in the Buddha’s teaching generally and in the context of the
Buddha’s statement particularly, kamma can not be exclusively identified with cetanaa
because if it were so, the effect of ‘wishing to perform something’ and the
‘actual performance of that something’ is one and the same thing.[44] Then there
should be no enlightenment at all because no one is absolutely pure and perfect in his
intention-history; or one may have at least once thought of unwholesome deed.[45]
Similarly, there should be no need of moral practice and spiritual training for
enlightenment, for the mere wishing of becoming enlightened would be enough to make it
possible.[46] These statements are found irrational, just because ‘intentional
thought of doing something unwholesome’ is exclusively mistakenly identified with the
‘sin of performance that act,’ and in the same manner, ‘wishing to be
enlightened’ with ‘enlightenment’ or moral practice and mental development
for attaining that enlightenment, respectively.In the Nikaaya, we do find passages
supporting the idea that not only intention is responsible for determining kamma-vipaaka,
the action, physical or vocal, as well: "If one does not think (ceteti), nor arrange
(pakappeti), but dwell on (anuseti) [something], this become a cause for the persistence
of consciousness . . . [And] in the future birth and death, sorrow, lamentation,
suffering, grief and tribulation arise."[47] This is so because, one is responsible
for his ignorance,[48] as McDermott comments "although a misdeed done in ignorance is
not as serious in its effects as a deed done intentionally, it is nonetheless not without
efforts of its own, for man is culpable for his continued ignorance."[49]Notes
[1] EB. IV. s.v. cetanaa: 86b.
[2] A. III, 415.
[3] This render is first used by E.M. Hare in his GS. III. 294.
[4] Here quoted are different translations made by scholars. Payutto
translates this as "Bhikkhu! Intention, I say, is kamma. Having willed, we create
kamma through body, speech and mind." Payutto (1993): 6. Narada renders it as "I
declare, O Bhikkhus, that volition (cetanaa) is kamma. Having willed one acts by body,
speech and thought." (196). McDermott also renders it similarly "I say, monks,
that cetanaa is kamma; having intended (cetayitvaa), one does a deed by body, word or
thought." (1984: 26). McFarlane renders cetanaa as choice translating the sentence as
"It is choice or intention that I call karmaÐ mental workÐ for having chosen, a man
acts by body, speech and mind." (1994: 27).
[5] Manopubba"ngamaa dhammaa/ manose.t.thaa manomayaa/ manasaa ce
padu.t.thena/ bhaasati vaa karoti vaa/ tato na"m dukkhamanveti/ cakka"mva vahato
pada"m. (Dhp. 1). Translation is adopted with modification from Tin (1990): 1-2.
[6] McDermott (1984): 12-3. For argument on this point, see Poussin
(1927): 124-5.
[7] McDermott (1984): 26.
[8] Poussin (1982): 57. This book was first published in 1917.
[9] Poussin (1982): 68.
[10] Poussin (1982): 67.
[11] Poussin (1982): 70.
[12] Halbfass (1998): 214-5.
[13] Krishan (1997): 62, 209.
[14] EB. IV. s.v. cetanaa: 86-97.
[15] EB. IV. s.v. cetanaa: 89a.
[16] EB. IV. s.v. cetanaa: 91a.
[17] EB. IV. s.v. cetanaa: 92b.
[18] Von Glasenapp (1963): 29. Emphasis added.
[19] BD. s.v karma: 91-4.
[20] Payutto (1993): 6.
[21] Narada (1973): 195. Numbering added.
[22] McDermott (1984): 28.
[23] DhsA. 88.
[24] kamma naama kusalaakusalacetanaa. Visuddhimagga, p. 614. This
sentence literally means kamma is the name of moral and immoral intention or
consciousness.
[25] Asl. p. 88.
[26] cetanaa kaayakamma"m naama . . . cetanaa vaacikamma naama . .
. cetanaa manokamma"m . . .citta"m manokammadvaaram naama, p. 96.
[27] Satyasiddhi'saastra 3. 100.
[28] pu.nya"m paapa"m sarva"m cittaadhaaniiam.[29] na
cittavyatirikta"m pu.nyam paapam astiiti.[30] karma.na"m cittabalaat pu.nya
paapa vibhaaga.h.[31] asa~ncentanika"m karma na mahaasaavadyam. Satyasiddhi'saastra.
2. 84.
[32] Quoted in Krishan (1997): 64.
[33] Quoted from McDermott (1984): 29. Emphasis added.
[34] Ch’en (1968): 32f.[35] McDermott (1984): 29.
[36] A. III, 415.
[37] See, for example, this division at A. III. 415; M. I. 206.
[38] J. IV. 390.
[39] M. I. 373.
[40] McFarlane (1994): 27.
[41] This is adopted from Indasara (1988): 18-9. I however disagree
with him when he contradictorily says that the mistake in the example is only a kind of
‘kattaka-kamma’ bearing no fruit.[42] Mental action (manokamma) is identified
with cetanaa in some specific context. See, for example, the sentence "manasaa ce
padu.t.thena" of twin-verse 1-2 of the Dhammapada. Cf. Tin (1990): 1 n.2.
[43] This is different from the spiritual state of enlightenment of an
Arahat or the Buddha.
[44] Karunaratna is however of diverse point of view, when he give an
interpretation on the passage of Budhaghosa as quoted below: "for instance the mere
harboring of criminal intent to kill amounts to kamma, and that by ill-will, not by actual
life-taking" (Manodvaare pana cadhakacetanaaya uppannamattaaya eva kammapathabhedo
hoti, so va kho vyaapaadavasena na paa.naatipaatavasena. Asl., p. 90). Here he does not
differentiate the mental act ‘ill-will’ with the bodily action manifested from
ill-will, namely killing, in terms of life-taking. These two acts, in fact, can not be
considered identical equally ethical wrong, and therefore their level of criminal can not
be identified as the same. EB. IV. 94b.[45] This argument is derived from the passage
where the Buddha criticizes past-action determination (pubbekatahetuvaada) along with
theistic determination (issaranimmaanahetuvaada) and accidentalism (ahetu-apaccayavaada)
as immoral theories. A. I. 137; M. II. 214-222; Cf. Vbh. 367.
[46] This argument is derived from the passage where the Buddha
addresses to the householders who want to gain longevity, status, happiness, rank and
rebirth in heaven must observe the practice leading to the same. A mere wish or prayer
will not work. A. III. 47.
[47] S. II. 65. Translation quoted in McDermott (1984): 28.
[48] Dhp. 1-2, 161.
[49] McDermott (1984): 28.
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Update : 01-12-2001
