Buddhism and
Vegetarianism
The Rationale for the Buddha's Views on the Consumption of Meat
by Dr V. A. Gunasekara
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C O N T E N T S
Prefatory Note
The Buddha's Three-Fold Rule
Other Religious Views on Meat
Eating
The Rationale for the
Buddha's Rule
The Arguments for
Vegetarianism
Conclusion
PREFATORY NOTE
This article originally appeared in Vīma.msā the
Journal of the Buddhist Society of Queensland for October 1983. It was reprinted
subsequently in the Young Buddhist (Singapore). It was later issued in the BSQ Tracts on
Buddhism series, but has been out of print for some time. In view of the continuing
interest in this subject the booklet is being reissued.
The opportunity has been taken to make some
stylistic changes, include some additional material and footnotes. There has been no
change in the general argument advanced in the booklet.
1. The Buddha's Three-Fold Rule
Vegetarianism is a growing practice in modern
society and some of its-new-found enthusiasts have pointed an accusing finger at the
Buddha who is recorded as having eaten meat, and at modern Buddhists who eat meat. In this
situation it is worthwhile examining the attitude of the Buddha to the consumption of fish
and meat. We shall first state the Rule which the Buddha laid down relating the
consumption of fish and meat, and then investigate the rationale for this rule. While the
Buddha's rule has been stated many times there is very little discussion of the rationale
for this rule. It is this that the present work seeks to address.
There is some controversy as to the exact
composition of the last meal of sūkaramaddava eaten by the Buddha, some (following
Buddhaghosa) considering it to be pork, others (following Mahayana sources) to be medicine
or truffles. However there are other incidents recorded where the Buddha and the early
Bhikkhus ate meat. The classic reference to this is in the story of the
"conversion" of General Sha given in the Vinaya Piaka (Mahāvagga, VI,
31-2). The General had invited the Buddha and the Bhikkhus for a meal at which meat was
served. The Jains who had earlier enjoyed the exclusive patronage of the General, now
spread the story that Sha has a "fat beast" (thūla pasu) killed for the
occasion, and the Buddha by knowingly partaking of its meat, had committed an act of grave
karmic consequence (pā.ticcakamma). In fact the meat had not been specially slaughtered,
but had been purchased on the market. The Buddha took the opportunity created by this
incident to lay down the rule governing the consumption of fish and flesh.
Addressing the monks he said: "Do not eat meat
knowing that it has been killed specially for (your) use; I allow the use of fish and meat
blameless [NOTE1] in three ways, unseen, unheard and unsuspected" (na bhikkave
jāna.m udissakata ma.msa.m paribhunjitabba.m. Anujānāmi bhikkave tiko.tiparisuddha.m
maccama.msa.m adi.t.ta.m asuta.m aparisankitan ti [V I 233]). We shall refer to this rule
as the Buddha's three-fold rule on meat eating [NOTE 2]. The three conditions postulated
amount to not witnessing the actual killing, not being told that the meat had been
specially killed (for the use of the consumer), and even in the absence of such
information not suspecting that such was the case (i.e. the eye, ear and mind should be
satisfied as to the "blamelessness" of the meat).
In the light of the three-fold rule the Pali texts
make a distinction between two kinds of meat, called respectively uddissakatamasa and
pavattamasa. The former term is used to refer to meat destined for a specific person's
consumption. Such meat would not be cleared by the three-fold rule. Although not stated so
a rough criterion which could be used to identify this kind of meat is that the person
doing the killing has a clear notion that the meat would be consumed by a specific person,
and if that person were to consume it that person would partake not only of the meat but
also of the karmic consequences attached to the provision of that meat. The term used for
the other kind of which it is permissible to eat (pavattamasa) literally means
"already existing meat" (translated by Ms Horner as "meat at hand").
There has been some controversy as to what types of meat would fall into this category of
"already existing meat". Some interpreters have taken it to mean that it refers
to the meat of animals killed accidentally or killed by other animals. But in fact it
includes meat sold commercially. This is clear from another incident in the Vinaya where
the lady Suppiyā sends her servant to the market to fetch meat (to make a soup for a sick
monk), and is told by the servant that "existing meat" could not be found as
"today is not a slaughter day" (n'atth'ayye pavattama.msa.m māghāto ajjā ti).
This shows that meat slaughtered for sale in the market was regarded as pavatta-masa and
therefore falling into the category of permissible meat. This kind of meat is considered
blameless because it is karmically neutral as far as the consumer is concerned (but not of
course for the provider of the meat who must take the full karmic responsibility). We
shall refer to the two kinds of meat as karmically effective and karmically neutral meat
[NOTE3].
A shorter version of this incident is reported in
the Anguttara Nikāya. In the Jivakasutta of the Majjima Nikāya the same rule is
explained to Jivaka the physician. This sutta goes to great lengths to specify the wrong
karmas that would accompany the violation of the three-fold rule. The rule is again
reiterated when the Buddha rejected Devadatta's request to incorporate vegetarianism into
the Vinaya [NOTE 4]. It has been reported that this rule also appears in the Vinayas of
the other early "Hinayāna" schools like the Dharmaguptas and the Mula
Sarvastavādins (although not in their Sutras). It can therefore be considered to be an
authentic rule of the Buddha.
The distinction between karmically effective and
karmically neutral meat is based on moral grounds. However there are other arguments for
vegetarianism; these will be considered in Section 4 below. The Buddha attached some
importance to at least one of these other reasons as well. It was on this grounds that the
meat of ten kinds of living beings were prohibited. These were: humans, elephants, horses,
dogs, snakes, lions, tigers, leopards, bears and hyenas. The texts simple declare that
such meat is "unsuitable" (akappiya). There is no detailed discussion why these
ten species were selected for the prohibition, but one would suspect that this was so
because they were so considered by the Public at large [NOTE5].
In view of the fact that only meat that was
"karmically neutral" was permitted to the Buddhist community the Buddha
requested that no meat should be consumed without enquiry as to its provenance: na ca
bhikkhave appativekkhitvā masa.m paribhunjitabba.m. Thus ignorance was no excuse if the
wrong kind had been consumed. It was the responsibility of the consumer to determine the
suitability of meat for his or her own consumption. These rules are specifically laid down
with respect to monks, but they have been considered as applicable to the whole Buddhist
community, both monk and lay.
Practices in modern Theravada countries differ. By
and large in Sri Lanka only fish is served for monks although increasing number of monks
are vegetarians. In Thailand there appears to be greater readiness to serve meat, and it
has even been rumoured that some of this meat has been "specially slaughtered"
for the use of the monks and therefore would fall into the category of karmically
effective meat which violates the three-fold rule of the Buddha.
2. Other Religious Views on Meat Eating
The Buddha's views on meat-eating should be put in
the context of his times. The earliest Indian religious texts, the Vedas, did not prohibit
meat eating or the killing of animals. Indeed large scale sacrifice became the norm,
particularly the cruel ritual of the asvamedha which gradually assumed large dimensions as
the power of the Indian rulers grew.
It was the Upanishads that introduced, at first
tentatively, the principle of non-injury (ahi.msā) into Indian religious life. But even
here sacrifice to the gods were permitted, though not on the scale that it had assumed in
later Vedic times. The early Upanishads, like the Chandogya, permit the consumption of
meat, especially if part of it is offered to god. It was only in post-Buddhist times that
certain Hindu sects adopted vegetarianism as a general rule. But the rule was not
universal and some Hindu sects, like those following the cult of Tara, engaged in ritual
killing and consumption of meat. Most Hindus however either became vegetarians, or at
least avoided some kinds of meat, notably beef.
It is amongst the Jains that we find the most
extreme assertion of the principle of ahi.msā. They prohibited the killing of all forms
of life, even microscopic organisms. Most of Jain ethics consists of a series of rules and
regulations all related to the principle of ahi.msā. Thus the Jain layperson's eight
basic restraints (mūlaguna) involve abstention from meat, alcohol, honey, and five
specific kinds of figs. The last seven kinds of foods were prohibited because they could
harbour small organisms. In addition a whole host of other rules have to be kept, e.g. not
eating after sunset (because cooking fires could attract insects to their death) and not
drinking unfiltered water (which may contain organisms). Jain laypersons even excluded
agriculture from their "right livelihood" occupations as agriculture too
involves destruction of life. Many of them took to commerce and trade. The rules for the
Jain monk (muni) was even more strict, some sects even avoiding clothing which could be
destructive to bodily parasites. Some Jain munis even undertook the practice of fasting to
death (sallekhana) because no kind of food can be really free of harm to animals (see the
section below on the arguments for vegetarianism).
Amongst Buddhists vegetarianism was extolled by
certain Mahayanist groups. Already in the Sanskrit version of the Mahāparinirvāna Sutra
the following statement is attributed to the Buddha: "I order the various disciples
from today that they cannot any more partake of meat". This statement is, of course,
absent in the Pali version of this Suttanata. It is well known that various statements
have been interpolated into this sutta to get the Buddha's authority posthumously. The
condemnation of meat eating occurs in other Mahayana sutras such as their version of the
Brahmajāla Sutra, and more importantly the Lankāvatara Sutra. Chapter 8 of the latter
sutra is devoted entirely to this question, and some 24 arguments are advanced against the
eating of meat. Some representative arguments adduced against meat eating in the
Lankāvatara are:
present-day animals may have been one's kith and kin
in the past;
one's own parents and relatives may in a future life
be born as an animal;
there is no logic in exempting the meat of some
animals on customary grounds while not exempting all meat;
meat is impure as it is always contaminated by body
wastes;
the prospect of being killed spreads terror amongst
animals;
all meat is nothing other than carrion;
meat eating makes the consumer to be cruel and
sensual;
man in not a carnivore by nature.
In this Sutra the Buddha instructs the Bodhisattva
Mahamati thus: "There is no meat that is pure in three ways: not premeditated, not
asked for, and not impelled; therefore refrain from eating meat".
It is clear that this is the Mahayana answer to the
Buddha's three-fold rule given in the Pali and other "Hinayana" Canons. But the
three conditions mentioned do not coincide with the conditions stipulated by the Buddha in
the Pali suttas. In spite of the textual criticisms of meat eating Mahayanists have
generally consumed meat in practice. This is particularly true of Tibetan Buddhists. The
Dalai Lama has given the excuse that this is because of the poor soil and cold climate of
Tibet which is no condusive to agriculture. But it may also be due to tantric influences
under which fish and meat and two of the five "M"s which tantrists indulge in.
As we have seen the Theravada School sought to
adhere to the Buddha's rule. The only notable exception was Devadatta's schism, which the
Buddha categorically rejected even the rule of vegetarianism. However remnants of
Devadatta's schism could still be seen in some of the tāpasa sects in Theravada [NOTE 6].
The monotheistic religions that arose in the middle
east (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) did not develop the ethic of non-injury to animals.
Both Judaism and Islam required animal sacrifice to God, and they also specify the way in
which animals have to be killed for human consumption (a way that is often cruel).
According to the Bible God shortly after the Creation ordered humans to be vegetarians.
This injunction however was short-lived and was revoked after the mythical
"Flood". Now humans were allowed to kill and eat meat with some curious
restrictions relating to the shedding of blood. This is the basis of the cruel method of
butchery resorted to by Jews and Muslims. The Judeo-Christian Bible sanctions the
"dominion" which God had given to animals and the environment which has had
severe consequences in history.
It will be seen that Buddhism takes a middle
position between the Jain ahi.msā ideal and the complete abandon of the
Judeo-Christian-Islamic position.
3. The Rationale for Buddha's Rule
What is the rationale for the Buddha's three-fold
rule on meat eating? It cannot be said that the hands of the consumer of "karmically
neutral" meat are clean, especially if the meat is bought in the market as is the
case with most consumers of meat. For it is a rule of the market place that without the
demand there would be no supply [NOTE 7]. At issue is the degree of involvement with the
act of killing if meat of any sort (excepting accidentally killed animals, or those that
have died naturally) is to be consumed. We may identify various degrees of involvement of
the consumer with the act of killing. The most direct is where the consumer directly kills
the animal whose flesh is eaten. The second degree of involvement is when an employee of
someone under the direct power consumer is asked to do the killing. A variant of this
degree of involvement is when consumer dines on meat offered by a friend or a relative who
in turn had either directly killed or caused the animal to be directly killed. Both these
degrees of involvement would fall outside the Buddha three-fold requirement and is
prohibited to the Buddhist community.
The next (third) degree of involvement is when the
consumer buys the meat on the open market. The Buddha seems to have considered this as
satisfying the three-fold rule and it is deemed karmically neutral. The reasons for
permitting the third degree of involvement with the act of killing is not directly
discussed in the Canon. So the reasons for it has to be inferred from the Buddha's
position in general. It is this rationale that we hope to supply in this section.
The relationship of this degree of involvement in
killing to the first precept of Buddhism (refraining from the taking of life) must first
be explored. Karma adheres to acts of sovereign choice. It is true that a butcher will
only kill animals for the sale of their meat only if there are consumers will to buy the
meat. But is so doing the butcher is making a sovereign choice. There is no compulsion for
the butcher to have become a butcher rather than say a baker or a candle-stick maker. If
there were no persons willing to supply the meat trade meat eaters would, if they want to
persist in their meat eating, be compelled to do their own killing thus incurring karmic
responsibility. It is this lack of compulsion on the part of the consumer of the meat that
really frees this type of meat consumer from the full karmic responsibility for the act of
killing which made it possible for this person to buy the meat in the first place. Thus
the Buddha could logically hold on to both the first precept of Buddhism and the
three-fold rule of meat eating as not involving a logical contradiction.
The most compelling argument for the Buddha's rule
is that the whole of samsaric existence involves some from of killing or other. As will be
shown in the next section the supply of "vegetarian" food also involves the
destruction of life, sometimes to a greater extent than the supply of meat products. The
stark reality is that both the vegetarian and the meat-eater by their very existence in
samsara causes the destruction of some form of life or other. In fact it may be impossible
to live at all without the destruction of life (as the Jain munis realised).
The fundamental point in the Buddha's teaching is
that the whole of samsāric existence involves some form of killing. This is indeed an
aspect of dukkha, the omni-present reality. Instead of a fruitless effort to end all forms
of killing, and make the world perfect in this respect, the Buddha laid a path to escape
from samsara and all its defects. This involves abstaining from the grosser forms of evil,
including the consumption of "karmically effective" meat, together with the
co-development of other elements of the Eight-Fold Path.
The Buddha stressed graver ethical defects than
meat-eating. The classic sutta in this regard is the Amagandha Sutta in the Sutta Nipāta,
one of the earliest books of the Pali Canon. In this an unnamed vegetarian Brahmin
confronts the Buddha proclaiming the evils of eating fish and flesh. The word āmaganda
literally means the stench of fish and meat, and is also used to denote defilements. In
his reply the Buddha utters a number of verses listing the real defilements that taint
moral conduct. At the end of each verse he utters the refrain: ...esāmagandho no hi
ma.msabhojana.m ("... this is the stench giving defilement, not the consumption of
meat").
The Buddha's approach is validated in Darwinian
theory. Darwin showed that all species are in constant conflict and that only the fittest
survive. According to this the survival of any species is brought about by the
non-survival of other species that compete for the same limited bio-space. The survival
and proliferation of mankind must necessarily involve the destruction of countless lives
irrespective of what the diet of humans is vegetarian or non-vegetarian.
4. The Arguments for Vegetarianism
We must next examine the ethical and other
implications of vegetarianism. There are many arguments advanced for vegetarianism amongst
which the following arguments should be considered: the moral argument, the biological
argument, the ecological argument and the socio-cultural argument.
From the religious point of view the moral argument
is the most important and will be considered first. Many vegetarians relish in taking the
moral high-ground. They claim either that their diet does not involve the killing and
suffering of animals, or that even if it does so there would be greater suffering and
animal killing if they adopted non-vegetarian diets. Of course it is a simple fact is that
commercial agriculture, which is the basis of vegetarian diets, cannot be undertaken
without the destruction of life. Even the very act of tilling the ground kills many
earth-bound insect life, but the main form of killing comes from the need to protect crops
and harvests from insects, predators and other vermin. We need only contemplate the
wholesale killing of feral pigs, rabbits, kangaroos, etc. for this purpose, often using
poison, traps, and man-induced diseases involving cruel and horrible deaths. The snails,
grasshoppers, grubs, locusts and other insects destroyed by powerful insecticides number
by the million. Even the number of rats killed to save the stored-up grain from being
eaten greatly exceed the number of cattle slaughtered to feed the meat eaters. Indeed it
could be argued that the number of animals and insects killed to produce the average
vegetarian meal greatly exceeds the number of animals killed to produce the a
non-vegetarian meal of equal food value. If this is so the adoption of a vegetarian diet
may actually increase the number lives lost in the food production process.
Also many vegetarians use animal products like milk.
While it might appear that this is a "humane" food as no killing is resorted to
this may not really be the case. Suppose that everyone gives up meat-eating but retains
milk-drinking. A consequence would be that male calves will be killed at birth (except for
a few kept for stud purposes), unless of course the unproductive bulls are maintained
which is not likely to happen. Milk is meant by nature for the calves, and its forced
appropriation by humans is questionable morals. It is curious to note that some of
staunchest vegetarians like the Hare Khrishnas as also the most addicted to the use of
milk products. They not appear to see the moral dilemma involved in their dietary habits.
The Buddha's three-fold rule, while not a perfect one as none such exits, at least avoids
the moral conundrums that must remain to confuse the ethically motivated vegetarian.
The biological argument for vegetarianism has
greater validity than the moral one. It may well be that the human body is not designed to
subsist on meat (as the Lankavatara Sutra claims). The two aspects of the human anatomy
may suggest that vegetarian food is the normal food for humans. The first is the
composition of human teeth (where molars are more important than the incisors), and the
other is the rather large ratio of the length of the intestines to the body length in
humans. Carnivores have incisor teeth to tear the flesh, and short intestines as the
putrefying meat has to be expelled from the body as soon as possible. The human body is
closer to that of herbivores, but not exclusive herbivores who have a different structure
to their stomachs. In fact the human anatomy is a compromise between the pure herbivore
and the pure carnivore - in fact it is that of an omnivore. Also the harmful effects from
the consumption of animal products (e.g. cholesterol) are not counterbalanced by the
alleged lack of high grade protein in vegetarian diets. On balance the biological argument
seems to favour vegetarianism over meat-eating.
The ecological argument too is in favour of
vegetarianism. Meat is a very inefficient way of converting energy into food. It is far
easier and cheaper to convert energy into biomass that is suitable for direct consumption
by humans rather than indirectly after feeding it to animals and then consuming the flesh
of the animals. Mass production of livestock (chickens, pigs, cattle) would either lead to
cutting down of native forests to create grazing lands, or under the battery method lead
to great cruelty, release of methane, etc. Selective breeding of farm animals and use of
chemicals and hormones to enhance growth can have unexpected side effects in other areas.
But it must be mentioned that conversion into vegetarianism will not necessarily improve
the environment ecologically. What is needed is a decline in the population, and the
adoption of living standards that are sustainable without environmental damage.
The socio-cultural argument involves the aesthetic
argument of what society considers fit to eat. Social norms differ in this respect. Most
societies have ruled out cannibalism, and do not permit the consumption of carrion and
scavenging of dead animals. In most Western countries and in the Indian subcontinent there
is a general aversion to eating pets (dogs, cats) or reptiles. However no such inhibitions
exist in parts of Africa and the Far East (although in China in 511 CE the Emperor Wu of
Liang prohibited the consumption of meat). Logically there is no difference between eating
one species of animal and avoiding another. But aesthetically and culturally there can be
a significant difference. Certainly vegetarians foods are more aesthetic than mead
products however well the latter may be dressed up to be.
5. Conclusion
The foregoing argument should not be taken as a
justification of meat-eating. Our concern is to speculate on the rationale behind the
three-fold rule on this subject enunciated by the Buddha and to refute the charge that the
Buddha's rule involves a moral contradiction with the other parts of the Buddha's teaching
such as his insistence on loving-kindness and the precept on the taking of life.
There are many compelling arguments for
vegetarianism, the most important of these being the biological, ecological and social
arguments we have identified in the previous section. The moral argument on which many
vegetarians adopt to claim to a morality which is even higher than that taught by the
Buddha has been shown to be invalid. In fact if people were to switch over from
meat-eating to vegetarianism there will not necessarily be a reduction in the amount of
killing and cruelty involved in the provision of food. Only different kinds of animals are
likely to suffer.
There is also another interesting moral point to
resolve. Most of the animals killed for human consumption are deliberately bred for this
purpose (e.g. chickens, pigs and cattle). If there were no demand for their meat the
animals would not simply exist. Thus abolition of meat eating will not in the long run
"save" any animals as these animals will simply not be reared. The problem is
whether it is morally preferable for some animals to be kept alive for a limited period
rather than not allow them to exist at all. Without meat consumers most of the animals not
slaughtered for food would not have existed at all. We shall not examine the moral
conundrum involved in this question.
The Buddha's requirement was for moderation in
eating (matta¤¤uta ca bhattasmi). Whether vegetarian or meat diets are used eating
should be restricted to the minimum that is necessary to keep the bodily functions going.
The Vinaya rule of not eating after mid-day may be related to this rule of moderation in
consumption. But however careful one may be in the matter of diet, there is no way to keep
one's body going in a material sense that does not cause harm to some other organism. The
interdependence between organisms ensures that the survival of any one species - even the
human species - must involve the destruction of other forms of life.
Even though there is no blanket proscription on meat
eating in the Buddha's teaching the three-fold rule that he enunciated has considerable
value. The Buddha was concerned with devising a practical rule that will reconcile the
dilemma involved in living in samsara and allowing other life forms too to exist. The fact
that the three-fold rule is not ideal is not a reflection on the Buddha but of the
existential fact that samsāra-faring must involve harm to others. The Buddha's final
solution to this is perhaps the only way in which this problem could be satisfactorily
solved. This solution is to chart a course to get out of phenomenal existence, i.e. chart
a path to Nibbāna.
NOTES
1. The term parisuddha is best translated as
"blameless" rather than the more literal "pure" which is the rendition
favoured by Horner (who translated the Vinaya for the Pali Text Society). It is the karmic
quality of the meat that is important, not its purity in other respects. [Return]
2. The word "meat" will be used to
designate all forms of food derived from animals whether they fish, flesh or fowl. From
the ethico-moral perspective there is no essential difference between these various form
of flesh. [Return]
3. The relationship of meat-eating to karma is not
specifically made by the Buddha. The distinction we have made should be treated with care.
Even the consumption of what we have termed-"non-karmically effective" meat can
have adverse karmic effects depending on the thought moments that accompany the
consumption of that meat. What is meant however is that the consumption of what we have
called "karmically effective meat" will always have adverse karmic consequences,
while the other kind of meat may have adverse consequence. In neither case can there be
any good karmic effects. [Return]
4. The rule of vegetarianism was the fifth of a list
of rules which Devadatta had proposed to the Buddha. Devadatta was the founder of the
tāpasa movement in Buddhism and his special rules involved ascetic and austere practices
(forest-dwelling, wearing only rags, etc). The Buddha rejected all the proposed revisions
of Devadatta, and it was in this context that he reiterated the tikoiparisuddha rule. (On
this see the author's Western Buddhism and a Theravāda heterodoxy, BSQ Tracts on
Buddhism. [Return]
5. In general the Buddha tended to accept currently
prevailing social customs unless there was a direct conflict with the Dhammic principles.
In this case there was no need to change current practices. It is interesting to note that
the ten kinds of animals does not include the ox or cow. This was later to become of one
of the greatest taboos of Hinduism. Perhaps at the time of this Buddha this aspect of
Hinduism had not developed the importance that it was later to assume. [Return]
6. On this see the present writer's Western Buddhism
and a Theravada Heterodoxy, BSQ Tracts on Buddhism Series. [Return]
7. The argument that the animal is already dead when
its meat is bought is not a valid one. Most butchers and meat shops sell out of stocks
they hold. When a sale is made the seller orders more stock to replace the item sold. Thus
when an already dead chicken is bought an order is sent out to kill another chicken to
replace the one sold. [Return]
Source: http://www.uq.net.au/slsoc/budsoc.html
Update : 01-12-2001