The Tree of Enlightenment
An Introduction to the Major Traditions of Buddhism
by Peter Della Santina
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Part Four
The Abidharma
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Chapter Thirty-Three
Analysis of Consciousness
Because of its importance and scope, I will dedicate three chapters to
the analysis of
consciousness within Abhidharma
philosophy. In this chapter I look at
some of the
systems for
classifying consciousness and also at the sense-sphere
consciousness in
particular.
To understand why we begin our Abhidharmic analysis of
experience with
consciousness, it is important to remember the
therapeutic concern of
Buddhist
philosophy in general and the
Abhidharma in particular. The starting
point of Buddhist
thought is
the truth of suffering. Suffering is a problem of
consciousness; only
that which
is conscious can suffer. Consciousness is subject tosuffering because
of ignorance, or
fundamental not-knowing,
which divides consciousness into subject and
object, into a
self and
an other-than-self (i.e., the objects and people around the
self).
In Buddhism, ignorance is defined as the notion of a
permanent,
independent self and its
object. Once we have this
division of consciousness into a self and an
other-than-self, we
have suffering, because tension is created between the two. We
also
have craving and
aversion, because we want those things that
support the self and are
averse to those things
that are not
conducive to the self.
This division or discrimination between the self (or subject)
and the
other-than-the-self
(or object) is the fundamental cause of
suffering. Such a division is
possible because of
ignorance--th belief
in a real self existing independently and in
opposition to theother-
than-self. Thus it is not surprising that the Abhidharma
should turn
first to an analysis of
subjectivity and objectivity.Indeed, when we examine the teaching of
the five
aggregates, we see that form (rupa) is the objective component,
while
name (nama),
consciousness, and the mental aggregates
of
volition, perception, and
feeling are the
subjective component.
Before looking at how this division affects the Abhidharmicanalysis of
consciousness,
we must be clear about
what it means. In Buddhism, this division does
not mean that we
have an essential, irreducible duality of mind and matter. Buddhism
is
not concerned with
mind and matter as ultimate metaphysical
facts but with mind and matter
as they are
experienced. Mind and
matter are forms of experience, not essences.
This is why
Buddhism is a phenomenological, not an ontological, philosophy,
and why
the division of
mind and matter in Buddhism is a
phenomenological division.
There are two systems for classifying consciousness in the
Abhidharma:
objective and
subjective. Objective classification
refers to the objects of
consciousness, while
subjective
classification refers to the nature of consciousness.
Objective classification primarily takes into account the
direction in
which consciousness
is oriented. Within this objective
scheme, there is a division into
four classes of
consciousness: (1)
the sense-sphere consciousness, or consciousness
directed toward
the
world of sense desire (kamavachara); (2) the consciousness
directed
toward the sphere of
form (rupavachara); (3) the
consciousness directed toward the formless
sphere
(arupavachara);
and (4) the consciousness directed toward nirvana
(lokuttara).
The first three classes of consciousness are worldly (lokiya)
and are
concerned with the
world of conditioned things. The fourth
class, also known as
supramundane
consciousness (alokiya chitta),
refers to the transcendental direction
of consciousness
(lokuttara)
and is the consciousness of the four types of noble
ones--the
stream-winner,
once-returner, non-returner, and liberated one (seeChapter 35).
The object of the kamavachara is material and limited; the
object of
the rupavachara is
not material but is still limited; and the
object of the arupavachara
is not material and is
unlimited. If we
look at these three in order, we find (a) a material
and limited
object, (b)
an immaterial but still limited object, and (c) an
immaterial and
unlimited object of
consciousness. All three types of
consciousness are directed toward
mundane objects.
There is a progressive unification and homogenization in the
object of
each
consciousness. The object of the consciousness of
the sphere of sense
desire is the most
proliferated and
differentiated, those of the form and formless types
of
consciousness are
increasingly less proliferated. The fourth type of
consciousness is
directed toward a
transcendental type of object.
Let us now look at the subjective classification of
consciousness. This
consciousness has
to do with the nature of the
subjective consciousness itself and is
also divided into four
classes:
the wholesome consciousness (kusala), the unwholesome
consciousness
(akusala), the resultant consciousness (vipaka), and
the ineffective or
functional
consciousness (kiriya).
The wholesome and unwholesome classes are karmically
active classes of
consciousness;
in other words, they have karmic
potential. The resultant and
functional types of
consciousness are
not karmically active and do not have karmic
potential. The
resultant
class cannot bring about results because it is itself the
result, while
the functional class
cannot do so because its
potentiality is exhausted in the action
itself.
We can thus place the wholesome and unwholesome
categories in the more
general
category of karmically active
consciousnesses, and the resultant and
functional types into
the
category of passive consciousnesses that do not have karmic
potential.
It might be useful to look for a moment at the meaning of the
terms
'wholesome'
(kusala) and 'unwholesome' (akusala), and then
at the definition of the
wholesome and
unwholesome categories of
subjective consciousness. Wholesome means
'what tends
toward
cure' or 'what tends toward desirable results.' Here we are
again
reminded of the
therapeutic concern of Buddhist philosophy.
Unwholesome means 'what
tends toward
undesirable results' or
'what tends toward perpetuation of suffering.'
The terms
'wholesome' and 'unwholesome' are also related to skillful and
unskillful, or intelligent
and unintelligent, moments of consciousness.
However, for convenience, people still sometimes refer to
wholesome and
unwholesome
consciousness as good and bad,
moral and immoral. 'Wholesome' and
'unwholesome'
can also be
defined with reference to the three wholesome and
unwholesome
root causes(non-greed, non ill-will, and non-delusion, and greed,
ill-will, and
delusion, respectively).
Greed, ill-will, and delusion arethe derivative forms of fundamental
ignorance, which is
themistaken notion of a self as opposed to what is other-than-self.
Ignorance in its
fundamental sense might be likened to the root of a
tree, and greed,
ill-will, and delusion
to its branches.
The karmic potential of a moment of consciousness
conditioned by any of
the three
unwholesome causes is
unwholesome, while the potential of a moment
conditioned by
any
of the three wholesome causes is wholesome. These wholesome
and
unwholesome
classes of consciousness are karmically active,
and they are followed
by a resultant
class--in other words, by the
ripened results of those wholesome and
unwholesome
actions. The
inactive or functional class refers to actions that are
not productive
of further
karma, and that also do not result from wholesome and
unwholesome
karma, such as the
actions of enlightened ones--the
Buddhas and Arhats--and deeds of
indifferent or
neutral karmic
content.
In addition to these two general systems for classifying
consciousness--the objective,
which classifies consciousness according to its object and direction,
and the subjective,
which classifies consciousness according to its nature--we have a third
system in which
consciousness is distinguished according to feeling,
knowledge, and
volition.
In the classification according to feeling, every conscious
factor
partakes of an emotional
quality: agreeable, disagreeable, or
indifferent. These three can be
expanded into five by
dividing the
agreeable category into mentally agreeable and physically
agreeable, and the
disagreeable category into mentally disagreeableand physically
disagreeable. There is no
ategory of
physically indifferent consciousness because indifference
is
primarily a
mental quality.
In the classification in terms of knowledge, again we have a
threefold
division: conscious
factors accompanied by knowledge of
the nature of the object, conscious
factors
unaccompanied by
knowledge of the nature of the object, and conscious
factors
accompanied by definite wrong views about the nature of the
object.
These can also be
called the presence of correct
knowledge, the absence of correct
knowledge, and the
presence of
erroneous knowledge.
Finally, in the classification according to volition, there is a
twofold division into
automatic and volitional consciousness--in
other words, moments of
consciousness that
are automatic in
nature, and moments that have an intentional element.
Let us now look at the sense-sphere consciousness
(kamavachara). There
are fifty-four
types of consciousness in this
category, which divide into three
groups:
The first group consists of
twelve factors that are karmically active
and that have
unwholesome karmic potential. The twelve can be subdivided into
factors
conditioned by
one of the three unwholesome conditions of
greed, ill-will, and
delusion.
The second group consists of eighteen reactive or passive
factors of
consciousness, which
can be further broken down into
those that are resultant and those that
are functional.
Fifteen of the
eighteen are resultant, and refer in general terms to
experiences that
are
agreeable or disagreeable, the result of wholesome or
unwholesome
factors experienced
through the five physical sensesand the sixth mental sense. The
remaining three are
functional, having no karmic potential and not being the
consequence of
karmically
active wholesome or unwholesome
factors.
The third category consists of twenty-four wholesome factors
of
consciousness that are
karmically active and thus have karmic
potential conditioned by
non-greed, non-ill-will,
and non-delusion.
Within the class of sense-sphere consciousness, therefore, we
have
fifty-four types of
consciousness that can be analyzed in terms
of active and passive,
wholesome and
unwholesome, resultant andfunctional, and even in terms of feeling,
knowledge, and
volition.
I want to conclude by spending a few moments on the
multivalent nature
of terms in the
Abhidharma in particular and in
Buddhism in general. The factors of
consciousness listed
in the
bhidharma, and the terms used to describe them, have different
values and
meanings according to the functions they perform.
Failure to understand
this leads to
confusion about Abhidharmic
classifications.
Even in the early years of the Abhidharma, there were critics who
failed to understand
that the factors in it are classified functionally, not ontologically.
What this means is that
if you survey the factors of consciousness listed in the Abhidharma
literature, you find
the same factor occurring in different categories. Your initial
conclusion may be that
there is a great deal of repetition in Abhidharmic material, but this
is not the point. The
presence of the same factor in different categories is due to its
functioning differently in
each one.
The commentary to the Dhammasangani (Classification of Factors) records
the objection
of repetition raised by an opponent. It replies with the analogy that
when a king collects
taxes from people, he does so not on the basis of their existence as
identifiable
individuals, but of their functions as earning entities. (This is also
the case today, when
one pays taxes on the basis of being a property owner, a salaried
worker, on the earnings
of one's stocks and bonds, and so forth.) In the same way, the factors
enumerated in the
Abhidharma occur in different categories because in each case it is the
factor's function
that counts, not its essence.
This is also the case with terms. We need to understand terms in
context--by the way
they are used--rather than imposing rigid, essentialistic, and
naturalistic definitions.
Take, for instance, 'suffering' (dukkha) and 'happiness' (sukha). In
the analysis of the
factors of consciousness, these terms mean physical suffering and
physical happiness. Yet
when we talk about dukkha in the context of the first noble truth, it
includes not only four
physical sufferings but also four mental sufferings. Similarly,
sankhara means simply
'volition' in one context but 'all compounded things' in another.
Thus when we study the Abhidharma, we need to understand the words in
context. If we
keep this in mind, we will be adopting the phenomenological spirit of
Buddhist
philosophy and will find it easier to approach the significance of what
is being said.
Otherwise, we will find ourselves trapped into rigid, unworkable
definitions of terms and
rigid, unhelpful ideas about factors of experience.
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Contents
|
01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 | 09 | 10 | 11
| 12 | 13
| 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 41
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Update : 11-05-2002
