The Tree of Enlightenment
An Introduction to the Major Traditions of Buddhism
by Peter Della Santina
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Part Two
The Mahayana
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Chapter Eighteen
The Philosophy of the Middle Way
The philosophy of the Middle Way, or Madhyamaka philosophy, has
sometimes been
called the central philosophy of
the Mahayana tradition. It has even
been called the
central
philosophy of Buddhism in general. This alone is sufficient to
give
us some idea
of its importance. The Madhyamaka philosophy has
also been called the
doctrine of
emptiness (shunyata) and the
doctrine of the non-self-existence, or
insubstantiality, of
things
(nihsvabhavavada).
The founder of this philosophy was the great holy man and
scholar,
Nagarjuna, who lived
between the end of the first and the
beginning of the second century of
the common era.
He was born
in the south of India, of Brahmin parents. Biographers,
however,
tell us that
he was an early convert to Buddhism. Nagarjuna was an
interpreter more
than an
innovator. He took certain inspirations and
insights from the sutras
and the Abhidharma,
reinterpreting and
restating them in a particularly clear and
forthright way. He is noted
for
his substantial literary works, which include not only
philosophical
works, like the
Foundation Stanzas of the Middle
Way (Mulamadhyamakakarika) and the
Seventy
Stanzas on
Emptiness (Shunyatasaptati), but also works on logic, the
practices
of the
Bodhisattva, fundamentals of Buddhism, and even works of
a devotional
character, such
as four works extolling the virtues of
qualities like the perfection of
wisdom. Nagarjuna's
efforts in
promoting and propagating the central ideas of the Mahayana
won
him
widespread recognition as a Bodhisattva not only in India but
also in
Tibet, China, and
Japan. He figures prominently among the
primary founders of the
Tibetan, and Ch'an,
and Zen Buddhist
traditions.
The works of Nagarjuna--and, indeed, the teaching of the
Madhyamaka
philosophy--
should not be seen as a radical
departure from the general direction
and development of
Buddhist
thought as a whole. They had definite origins in the teachings
of the
Buddha
and in the early Buddhist tradition, particularly the
Abhidharma. In
the Theravada canon,
there is a record of the
Buddha's statements about the importance of
emptiness (shunyata)
and also a record of the famous 'fourteen inexpressibles,' or
unanswerable questions. In
addition, we find a very clear precursor
of the Madhyamaka philosophy
in the Perfection
of Wisdom
literature, where the primary theme is emptiness. This is the
very
theme
elaborated by Nagarjuna in works like his
Mulamadhyamakakarika. In the
Abhidharma
Pitaka, in the Book
of Causal Relations (Patthana), too, we can see the
anticipation of
the
Madhyamaka philosophy in the emphasis on the examination of
relations.
All these are
clear indications of the very early and
authentic origins of the
Madhyamaka philosophy.
Just as the
contents of the Madhyamaka philosophy are not anything
radically
new, so the
method of the Madhyamaka is not, but can be found in
the very earliest
period of the
Buddhist tradition. The characteristic
method of the Madhyamaka is
analysis--the
analysis of phenomena
and of relations. One might even say that its
characteristic method
is not only analysis but also critical dialectic. All this
methodology--from analysis to
criticism and dialectic--is, like the
substance of the Madhyamaka,
indicated both in the
Buddha's own
approach in his discourses, the sutras, and in the
approach of the
Abhidharma tradition, where we find the various alternatives
isolated
and methods of
answering questions elucidated. This
should be sufficient to indicate
that the origins and
methods of the
Madhyamaka philosophy go far back in the history of
Buddhist
thought.
As for Nagarjuna's fundamental message in his
philosophical works, it
is important first
to realize the object toward
which his criticism is directed--namely,
the notion of
independent
being, or self-existence (svabhava). The fact that his
doctrine has
been
termed the doctrine of insubstantiality (nihsvabhavavada,
literally,
'the doctrine that
refutes svabhava') emphasizes
Nagarjuna's characteristic rejection of
the notion of self-
existence.
Nagarjuna rejects self-existence by examining relativity, or
interdependent origination, in
a critical, dialectic way, beginning
with the idea of self-existence,
going on to the idea of
relativity or
the absence of self-existence, and terminating with the
idea of
emptiness
(shunyata). These three steps--from self-existence to
non-self-existence, and finally to
emptiness--are developed through
three types of investigation: (1) the
investigation of
causality, (2) the
investigation of concepts, and (3) the investigation
of knowledge.
Through the investigation of these three classes of phenomena,
Nagarjuna and the
Madhyamaka system take us from the naive,
everyday belief in the idea
of self-existence,
in the independent
reality of phenomena, to an intellectual
understanding of emptiness.
Let us first look at the Madhyamaka critique of causality.
Madhyamaka
philosophy
arrives at the insubstantiality and relativity
of all phenomena through
an examination of
interdependent
origination. In this context it is shown that, insofar
as all things exist
dependent on a combination of causes and conditions, they have
no
independent self-
existence and are therefore empty. The
classical example is that of the
sprout, which
exists dependent on
the seed, earth, water, air, and sunlight. Inasmuch
as the sprout
depends on these factors for its existence, it has no self-existence
and is therefore without
self-existence. And being without
self-existence, it is empty. This is
the simplest and
most direct
Madhyamaka investigation of causality, and it leads us
straight to
the notion
of emptiness.
But for the Madhyamaka, emptiness also means
non-origination,
non-production. In the
Perfection of Wisdom
literature, as we saw in the Heart Sutra, the idea
of non-origination
and non-cessation occurs very frequently. Here, too, in the
Madhyamaka
philosophy,
emptiness means non-origination--the
non-arising in reality of all
phenomena. Nagarjuna
explains this
particular consequence of emptiness through the dialectic
method.
Here we
see again the fourfold dialectical analysis that appeared in
the
fourteen inexpressible
propositions which the Buddha rejected.
There are four possibilities for the origination of phenomena, or the
relationship between
cause and effect: (a) that the cause and effect
are identical, (b) that
the cause and effect
are different, (c) that the
cause and effect are both identical and
different, and (d) that
phenomena arise without cause. These four basic alternatives are
indicated in the first
verse of the Mulamadhyamakakarika, which
states that 'No entity is
produced at any
time, anywhere, or in any
manner from self, from other, from both, or
without cause.'
This is
the fundamental Madhyamaka critique of causality.
It is interesting to note that these four alternatives are
analytically
derived. Otherwise, one
might wonder how it is that we
isolate only these four. The Madhyamaka
isolates these
four in the
following way: If phenomena do originate, they will
originate either
with a
cause or without a cause. Here we already have two
fundamental
alternatives: phenomena
originate either with or
without a cause. The latter position is
represented in the fourth
alternative, according to which phenomena originate without a
cause.
Now, if we accept
that phenomena do originate with a
cause, then the effect and the cause
can either be
identical or
different. In this way, we isolate the first two of the
four
alternatives: the
identity of cause and effect, and the difference of
cause and effect.
The third alternative--
that the cause and effect
are both identical and different--is simply a
combination of the
first
two. In this way, we analytically arrive at the four
alternatives, each
of which is, in
turn, to be rejected.
Each of these four explanations of the nature of causality was
represented by a
philosophical school contemporary with the
Madhyamaka. The position
that maintains
that cause and effect are
identical was advocated by the Sankhya
system, one of the
classical systems of Indian philosophy. The position according to
which
cause and effect
are different was propounded by the
Hinayana schools of Buddhism, the
Vaibhashikas
and the
Sautrantikas, and by some of the Brahmanical schools. The
position according to
which phenomena originate from causes that
are both identical and
different was affirmed
by the Jaina
philosophers. The last alternative, which holds that
phenomena
originate
without a cause, was affirmed by the materialists in ancient
India.
The Madhyamaka refutes these four explanations of
origination by means
of a very
typical Madhyamaka method that
has drawn the attention of many scholars
both in the
East and the
West. This method is called the method of reductio ad
absurdum,
and it is a
kind of negative dialectic that exposes the inherent
contradictions and
absurdities in the
opponent's position. Let us try
to illustrate how this method of
argumentation works.
Take the first
alternative, which affirms the identity of cause and
effect. The
Madhyamaka says that, if in fact cause and effect are identical, then
having bought
cottonseed with the price one would pay forcloth, one ought to be able
to clothe oneself
with it. The idea
that cause and effect are identical thus leads to
absurdity. If cause
and
effect are identical, then there would be no difference between
father
and son, and also no
difference between food and
excrement.
In the case of the second alternative--that cause and effect are
different--anything could
originate from anything else, because all
phenomena are equally
different. Hence a stalk
of rice might just as
easily originate from a piece of coal as from a
grain of rice, for
there
would be no connection between a stalk of rice and a grain of
rice, and
a piece of coal and
a grain of rice would have the same
relationship of difference to a
stalk of rice. Thus the
notion that
cause and effect are absolutely different is an
intrinsically absurd
idea.
The third alternative--that cause and effect are both identical
and
different--is no more
acceptable, and suffers from two faults.First, both the argument that
refuted the identity
of cause and
effect and the argument that refuted the difference of
cause and
effect are
applicable to the third alternative as well. The argument
refuting the
identity of cause and
effect is applicable insofar as
cause and effect are identical, and the
argument refuting
their
difference is applicable insofar as cause and effect are
different.
We really have no
new proposition in the case of the third
alternative. Second, the third
alternative is faulty
because of the law
of contradiction: no phenomenon can have
contradictory
characteristics. An entity cannot be both existent and nonexistent at
once, just as one
entity cannot be both red and not red at the same
time.
Finally, the fourth alternative--the idea that phenomena
originate
without cause--is
rejected by appeal to common
experience. For instance, if we set a
kettle of water on a
lighted
stove, the water will boil, but if we set it on a block of ice,
it won't.
Hence
Madhyamaka philosophy concludes that causality according
to any one of
these four
alternatives--from self, from other, from
both, and without cause--is
impossible. This is
the Madhyamaka
critique of causality.
There is also a Madhyamaka critique of concepts--the
concepts of
identity and
difference, existence and nonexistence,
and so forth. All these
concepts are relative; they
are mutually
conditioning. Let us take the concepts of short and long.
The ideas
of short
and long are relative one to the other. We say that A is
shorter than B
or that B is longer
than C, so the concepts of long
and short are relative. If I put two
fingers side by side, we
can say
that one finger is longer than the other, but if I put out a
single
finger, unrelated to
anything else, we cannot say anything about it
being long or short.
This is another kind of
interdependence. Just as
we have material dependence in the origin of a
sprout that is
dependent on a seed, the earth, sunlight, and so on, here we have
conceptual dependence,
the dependence of one concept on
another.
And just as short and long are dependent one upon another,
so identity
and difference are
dependent, or relative, to each other.
Identity only has meaning in
relation to difference,
and difference
only makes sense in relation to identity. The same is
true of
existence and
nonexistence. Without the idea of existence,
nonexistence has no
meaning, and without
nonexistence, existence
has none. This is also true of the three
divisions of time--past,
present, and future. Depending on the past, the ideas of the present
and future are
conceived; depending on the past and future, we
speak about the
present; and depending
on the present and the
past, we speak about the future. The three
moments of time--like
short and long, identity and difference, and existence and
nonexistence--are all concepts
that are interdependent, relative,
and empty.
Finally, the analysis of relativity is applied to knowledge, or to
the
means of acquiring
knowledge. This is an important application
of the Madhyamaka critique
because
ordinarily we accept the
reality of phenomena on the basis of
perception. For example,
we
say that this cup which I have before me undoubtedly exists
because
I perceive it--I
can see and touch it. We have knowledge
of things through the means of
knowledge.
Traditionally, in India,
there were four means of knowledge: (i)
perception, (ii) inference,
(iii) testimony, and (iv) comparison.
For the sake of simplicity, let us take the case of perception.
Suppose
something is
established by perception, that it is through
perception that we accept
the existence of the
cup: What, then, is it
that proves the existence (or truth) of the
perception itself (i.e., the
means of knowledge itself)? One might say that perception is
proved by
itself. In that
case it would not require proof, but since
when can something be
accepted without proof?
Alternatively, one
might say that perception is established or proved
by other means
of
knowledge, but in that case we have an infinite regress, as in the
old
story of the
philosopher who, when asked what the earth stood
on, replied that it
stood on a great
tortoise, and when asked what
the great tortoise stood on, said that it
stood on four great
elephants, and so on and so forth. Nowhere can we find a firm
foundation for perception
if perception is proved by other means of
knowledge.
Finally, if perception is established by the object of
perception, then
perception and its
object are mutually established
and interdependent. This is, in fact,
the case: The subject
and
object of perception are interdependent. They are mutually
conditioned. Perception is
therefore in no position to prove the
existence of its object, and that
object is in no
position to prove the
existence of perception, since they depend on
each other. Thus
knowledge--like cause and effect and mutually related concepts--is
interdependent. It
lacks self-existence, and is therefore empty.
Nagarjuna composed a very
interesting text,
called The Turning
Away of Objections (Vigrahavyavartani) which
discusses this
point.
Let us now consider some of the more practical, therapeutic
applications of the
Madhyamaka philosophy. The Madhyamaka
uses the critical and dialectical
method to
reject the notions of
cause
and effect, mutually related concepts, and
the subject and
object of knowledge because these notions are the products of
imagination, or
discriminating thought (vikalpa). The Madhyamaka
is concerned with
dispelling these
products of discriminating
thought because they are the causes of
suffering. It is as a
result of
discriminating the ideas of cause and effect, identity and
difference,
existence
and nonexistence, and so forth that we are imprisoned in
samsara.
Discriminating
thought, which has its seed in the mind, is
the fundamental cause of
suffering.
Nagarjuna says that, just as a painter, having painted the
picture of a
fearful demon, is
then terrified by that image, so
ignorant people, through
discriminating thought, produce
the cycle
of the six realms of existence and then suffer as a
consequence.
Hence mind,
which is afflicted by ignorance through the function of
discriminating
thought, produces
the world we know, or samsara,
where the concepts of causality,
origination, cessation,
and the rest
have a meaning. This is the origin of suffering. And if
samsara is the
product
of discriminating thought--if cause and effect, identity and
difference, and existence and
nonexistence are actually relative and
empty--then there is no
objective difference
between samsara and
nirvana.
What the renowned Mahayana and Madhyamaka doctrine of
the
non-differentiation of
samsara and nirvana means is that the
difference between samsara and
nirvana is a
subjective difference,
a difference within one's own mind. It is not a
difference in
anything
objective or real. Samsara and nirvana are the same thing seen
from two
different points of view: from the point of view of
ignorance (of
causality, identity and
difference, existence and
nonexistence), reality appears as samsara;
from the point of
view of
insubstantiality, relativity, and emptiness, however, reality
appears
as nirvana.
Thus samsara and nirvana do not depend on anything
'out there': they
depend, rather, on
the point of view. It is in this
context that the portrayal of nirvana
emphasizes the fact that
it is
beyond existence and nonexistence, beyond origination and
cessation, beyond all
conceptions and expressions. Indeed, if
nirvana is unconditioned, it
must transcend these
relative concepts.
The two points of view--that of discriminating
thought and
ignorance,
and that of insubstantiality, relativity, and emptiness--are
reflected
in the doctrine of the
two truths, conventional and
ultimate. The conventional truth is valid
of this world in
which
ignorance prevails, in which we operate by accepting--and taking
for granted--the
ideas of cause and effect, identity and difference,
existence and
nonexistence, and the
like. The ultimate truth is valid
of this world seen in the light of
insubstantiality,
relativity, and
emptiness. Like samsara and nirvana, the conventional
truth and
ultimate
truth are not contradictory but complementary. They refer
to two points
of view--the
ordinary, afflicted point of view
obscured by ignorance, and the point
of view of the
enlightened
ones.
Nagarjuna said that without relying on the conventional truth,
the
ultimate truth is not
taught, and without arriving at the ultimate
truth, nirvana is not
achieved. In these few
words, we can
understand the complementary and necessary relationship
between
the two
truths. We must rely on the conventional truth to
communicate and
function in the world,
yet without arriving at an
understanding of ultimate reality, or
emptiness, nirvana is not
gained. Hence we can see how groundless is the charge of nihilism
leveled against the
Madhyamaka by some of its opponents.
Emptiness is not nothingness. The
Madhyamaka
does not teach the
absolute nonexistence of cause and effect, or karma
(wholesome
and
unwholesome actions with their consequences). All these exist
on the
conventional level.
They exist as long as they are sustained
by discriminating thought and
ignorance.
Without relying on the
notion of cause and effect, or the doctrine of
karma, the ultimate is
not taught; yet without transcending causality, karma, concepts,
and
expressions, nirvana
is not achieved.
Nagarjuna asserts that interdependent origination, emptiness,
and the
Middle Way are
identical in significance. Taken from the
point of view of ignorance,
interdependent
origination explains,
sustains, and is the very essence of samsara. But
interdependent
origination is also emptiness, because everything that exists
dependent
on something else
does not really exist--it has no
independent being and does not exist
by itself. Therefore,
it is
empty. All that is interdependent origination is also emptiness.
And
interdependent
origination which avoids the alternatives of identity
and difference,
existence and
nonexistence, eternalism and nihilism
is also the Middle Way taught by
the Buddha.
Hence the system
founded by Nagarjuna and sustained by his disciples
and
successors is
known as the philosophy of the Middle Way, or
Madhyamaka.
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Contents
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Update : 11-05-2002
